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Abstract 
Increasingly, social security systems in the UK and internationally stipulate work-
related behavioural requirements for claimants of out-of-work benefits. These 
are accompanied by claimant monitoring as well as the threat and imposition of 
financial penalties, which are known as benefit sanctions. The growth in recent 
decades in the use of behavioural conditions and sanctions has generated 
significant debate and contestation, in terms of the ethical justification of such 
approaches and, relatedly, evidence regarding their overall effectiveness.  
 
An important topic concerns the impacts of benefit sanctions on claimants. 
Policymakers typically assume that sanctions will improve labour market 
outcomes for the unemployed, which will then lead to a range of individual and 
societal benefits. A well-developed literature exists in relation to the labour 
market impacts of sanctions, though less is known in terms of their wider 
effects. A small but growing body of research, nevertheless, links benefit 
sanctions with outcomes such as financial hardship and foodbank usage, and 
there is increasing concern regarding adverse impacts on mental health.  
 
This thesis investigates the relationship between benefit sanctions and mental 
health outcomes, and considers whether higher rates and/or longer durations of 
sanctions are associated with adverse mental health impacts. A quantitative 
study is undertaken that focuses on Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) sanctions during 
the period of Coalition government (2010-15). In this period, the frequency of 
sanctions varied significantly and their severity was increased following the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012. This exogenous variation is used to better estimate 
the independent effect of sanctions on mental health outcomes.  
 
Given data availability, the empirical investigation carries out four analyses 
involving different data sources, outcomes and research designs at separate data 
levels. The first two studies carry out longitudinal ecological analyses using local 
authority-level data and fixed effects models. They find that, following the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012: every 10 additional sanctions applied per 100,000 
population per quarter are associated with 4.57 additional antidepressant 
prescribing items; and that every 10 additional sanctions applied per 100,000 
working age population per quarter are associated with 8.09 additional people 
suffering from anxiety and/or depression.  
 
The third study carries out a multi-level analysis, which provides a robustness 
check on the aggregate-level analysis carried out in the second study. It finds 
that, in the post-reform period, increases in the area-level sanctions rate are 
associated with increases in the likelihood that JSA claimants suffer from anxiety 
and/or depression. Finally, the fourth study carries out a difference-in-
differences analysis. It indicates that the harsher sanctioning environment  
brought about at the onset of the Coalition government is associated with an 
increase in JSA claimants newly experiencing anxiety and/or depression.  
 
These results combine to provide a robust indication that JSA sanctions are 
associated with adverse mental health impacts, which is an important 
contribution to the existing empirical literature. They suggest that UK sanctions 
policy is overly harsh, and that steps need to be taken to reduce the adverse 
effects that it entails for claimants.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Behavioural conditionality, activation and benefit 
sanctions 
In recent decades, welfare states across developed economies have been 
transformed through the proliferation of conditional approaches to social 
provision (Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018). Whilst the requirement that individuals 
satisfy certain conditions in order to access state support is not a uniquely 
contemporary phenomenon, the role of conditionality has nevertheless grown 
significantly in scope and importance. Arguably, it now represents a key 
constitutive element of social policy interventions in areas as diverse as health, 
social housing and homelessness, criminal justice and anti-social behaviour, 
education, migration and social security (Deacon, 2004). This thesis is concerned 
specifically with developments in social security, where behavioural 
conditionality, monitoring and sanctions are widely used policy tools in relation 
to unemployment and other out-of-work benefits (Immervoll and Knotz, 2018). 
This behavioural shift within social security is itself closely associated with the 
development of a so-called “activation paradigm” within labour market policy 
since the 1990s (Bonoli, 2010: 448). In terms of unemployment benefits, for 
example, a key area of overlap is represented by the growth in conditions 
relating to job search activity, suitable work criteria and involvement in 
employment-related programmes as requirements of continued benefit receipt. 
Increasingly, furthermore, such work-related conditions are being enforced 
through both the threat and imposition of benefit sanctions (Knotz, 2018).  
The use of financial penalties within the social security system represents the 
central topic of this thesis. In particular, the investigation is concerned with 
sanctions policy in the UK, where financial penalties are used to enforce 
conditions that affect a wide variety of working age individuals, including the 
unemployed, long-term sick and disabled people, lone parents and those in low-
paid employment (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). Successive UK governments have 
intensified the role and use of sanctions since the 1990s, increasing the overall 
number of behavioural requirements that are attached to benefit receipt, 
increasing the length for which sanctions apply and restricting access to 
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mitigating support in the form of hardship payments (Adler, 2016). A particularly 
important period in terms of UK sanctions policy occurred during the Coalition 
government (2010-15), which imposed an unprecedented overall number of 
sanctions on claimants and – following the implementation of the Welfare 
Reform Act 2012 – significantly increased the severity of the financial penalties 
that can be applied. Webster (2016: 2) describes this period in terms of a “great 
sanctions drive”, in which nearly a quarter (24%) of claimants of the main 
unemployment benefit, Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), received at least one 
sanction, and in which monthly sanction rates experienced substantial 
fluctuations (NAO, 2016a).  
Sanctions policy, both in the UK and internationally, has generated significant 
debate. Within this discussion, an important area of contention relates to the 
impacts of sanctions on claimants. The explicit aim of sanctions policy is to 
improve employment outcomes, and as a result an extensive empirical literature 
has developed that examines the labour market impacts of sanctions in terms of 
employment re-entry, post-unemployment earnings, job stability and labour 
force attachment (McVicar, 2014). A growing area of research, furthermore, 
investigates wider impacts in terms of outcomes such as financial hardship, 
homelessness and food bank usage (Griggs and Evans, 2010; Dwyer, 2018).  
A relatively underdeveloped area within this wider literature relates to the 
mental health impacts of benefit sanctions. The Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP), which is the government department in charge of sanctions 
policy in the UK, assumes that sanctions will be associated with positive health 
outcomes for claimants (DWP, 2011a). For the DWP, this follows from their view 
that sanctions will be associated with increases in employment, and from the 
additional assumption that such employment will itself lead to beneficial 
impacts on health and well-being. A small qualitative literature, however, 
contests this assumption and indicates that sanctions are routinely accompanied 
by acute negative psychological impacts such as stress, anxiety and depression 
(Stewart and Wright, 2018; Dwyer et al., 2020). Indeed, in the public debate 
beyond academia, the potential for sanctions to lead to negative mental health 
impacts has attracted significant attention. Such impacts have been widely 
reported by the media, for example, and have been highlighted by various third 
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sector organisations (CAB, 2013; Hale, 2014; Mills, 2018). Importantly, these 
criticisms have also been reiterated by professional groups such as the British 
Psychological Society (BPS, 2017).  
In light of this debate, this thesis aims to contribute to existing knowledge in the 
area of sanctions and mental health. Specifically, it investigates the relationship 
between sanctions and outcomes such as antidepressant prescribing, anxiety and 
depression. As indicated above, a limited amount of existing qualitative research 
provides valuable insight into claimant experiences with regard to sanctions and 
emotional and psychological outcomes. Building on this evidence base, this 
thesis adopts a quantitative approach and examines larger-scale longitudinal 
data on sanctions and mental health outcomes across separate but mutually 
reinforcing analyses. In so doing, it is able to pay particular attention to the 
issue of identifying causal effects using the data that are available, specifically 
in relation to the impact of sanctions on mental health.  
In particular, the empirical investigation focuses on JSA sanctions during the 
period of Coalition government (2010-15). As indicated above, this period is 
significant in that it was characterised by large variations in the frequency of 
sanctions as well as an increase in their overall severity. These developments 
are also considered to be exogenously determined by the government’s policy 
decisions, as opposed to by changes in the behaviour of claimants themselves 
(Loopstra et al., 2018). Consequently, this period provides the context within 
which it is possible to better estimate the independent effect of sanctions on 
claimant outcomes. Using available data from across the time period, the 
analyses in this thesis make use of separate research designs to investigate 
outcomes such as antidepressant prescribing, anxiety and depression. In addition 
to the time period selected, causal inferences are supported by a variety of 
additional sensitivity and robustness tests in the separate quantitative analyses. 
In so doing, the research is able to examine a largely underappreciated 
consequence of sanctions policy, and make an empirical contribution to ongoing 
debate in this area. Benefit sanctions are now common across international 
social security systems, and so the findings of this thesis have wider relevance 
beyond the UK context, contributing to the contested issue of the “efficacy and 
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ethical legitimacy” (Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018: 15) of conditionality more 
broadly.  
Within the UK itself, developments in sanctions policy during the Coalition 
government form the basis of conditionality as it currently operates within the 
social security system and the changes continue to attract significant public 
scrutiny. Following the implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012, for 
example, criticism regarding sanctions has prompted several official 
investigations, which include: an independent review by Oakley (2014); two 
inquiries by the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (HoC WPC, 
2015; 2018); an investigation by the National Audit Office (NAO, 2016a); and an 
inquiry by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (HoC PAC, 2017). 
Each of these investigations has made a wide range of recommendations for the 
DWP. Most recently, for example, the House of Commons Work and Pensions 
Committee (HoC WPC, 2018: 19) argues that the DWP needs to “urgently 
evaluate the effectiveness of reforms to welfare conditionality and sanctions 
introduced since 2012”. This recommendation is a recurring one across the 
various reports, which repeatedly highlight the concern that the sanctions 
reforms implemented in 2012 were not sufficiently informed by a robust 
evidence-base, and that a subsequent evaluation of the changes has 
unfortunately not been forthcoming. The DWP has now accepted this criticism 
and committed to improving evidence in this regard, specifically in the areas of 
employment and health (HoC WPC, 2019).  
1.2 Research objectives 
Informed by the above discussion, the main aim of this thesis is to investigate 
the relationship between benefit sanctions and mental health outcomes. 
Specifically, the thesis aims to investigate whether there is evidence that higher 
rates and/or longer durations of sanctions are associated with adverse mental 
health impacts. In this regard, the objectives of this study are as follows:  
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i. To contribute to the existing literature on the wider impacts of benefit 
sanctions, by using quantitative methods, longitudinal data and causal 
modelling frameworks to establish robust claims about the causal impacts 
of sanctions on mental health outcomes.  
ii. To provide evidence that can be used to inform sanctions policy in the UK, 
specifically in relation to the reforms introduced by the Welfare Reform 
Act 2012.  
1.3 Thesis outline 
In order to achieve the above objectives, this thesis is structured as follows. 
First, Chapters 2 to 4 review the existing literature. Chapter 2 sets the broader 
context for the use of benefit sanctions across contemporary social security 
systems, through an examination of the separate but related concepts of 
behavioural conditionality and activation. By highlighting the link between 
conditionality and activation in the area of unemployment benefits, the 
discussion then goes on to consider the available empirical evidence that 
documents the growth of work-related conditions and sanctions across 
developed economies in recent decades. Chapter 2 ends by providing an 
overview of the ongoing debate regarding the ethical legitimacy of behavioural 
conditionality, within which it is argued that empirical evidence relating to the 
impacts of benefits sanctions is of central importance.  
Next, Chapter 3 details developments relating to behavioural conditionality and 
sanctions in UK social security policy in recent decades. Beginning with the 
introduction of JSA in 1996, it considers the proliferation of work-related 
behavioural requirements beyond the initial concern with unemployment, 
eventually encompassing lone parents, disabled people and – following the 
introduction of Universal Credit (UC) in 2013 – people in low-paid work. Chapter 
3 ends by detailing developments in sanctions policy during the Coalition 
government (2010-15), with a specific focus on JSA sanctions. This is important 
as it provides the context for the empirical investigation that is ultimately 
carried out.  
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Chapter 4 reviews the literature on the impacts of benefit sanctions, considering 
the available UK and international evidence in relation to both labour market 
and wider outcomes. It begins by discussing the dominant theoretical framework 
that is relied upon in the empirical literature on labour market impacts of 
benefit sanctions, known as job search theory. It then provides an overview of 
the empirical evidence on impacts such as employment re-entry, post-
unemployment earnings, job stability and labour force attachment, 
distinguishing between what is known in relation to the threat and imposition of 
benefit sanctions. This overview focuses on the primarily quantitative literature 
on these impacts, and consideration is given to attempts to identify causal 
effects, given that individuals who receive sanctions may differ in important 
ways to those who do not in a manner that may influence labour market 
outcomes. Next, Chapter 4 provides an overview of the developing quantitative 
and qualitative literature on the wider impacts of benefit sanctions, where a 
range of negative outcomes have been observed. In the process of discussing this 
literature, the mental health impacts of sanctions are identified as the 
particular focus of this thesis. To support the empirical investigation, therefore, 
Chapter 4 ends by developing a theoretical framework that elucidates the 
assumed link between sanctions and adverse mental health impacts. In this 
regard, this framework distinguishes between the influence of separate material 
and psychosocial mechanisms.  
Chapter 5 details the methodological approach that is taken in order to 
investigate the relationships identified. Given the reliance on a quantitative 
approach, the discussion first considers debates relating to causal inferences 
within quantitative social research, and then goes on to outline the various 
methods that are used in the empirical investigation itself. Data availability is a 
key issue that shapes the research designs that are ultimately adopted in the 
empirical chapters, and so considerable attention is given to how mental health 
outcomes and sanctions are measured and operationalised within the research. 
Specifically, the investigation considers antidepressant prescribing and self-
reported anxiety / depression as outcomes, whilst a reliance is ultimately placed 
on local authority-level data on JSA sanctions using the DWP’s Stat-Xplore 
database (DWP, 2018c).  
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Chapter 5 ends by providing an overview of the data and methods that are used 
in each empirical chapter, which investigate the relationships of concern at 
different levels (local authority-level; multi-level; individual-level) and using 
different techniques (fixed effects regression; random intercept regression; 
difference-in-differences regression) in order to respond to the limitations 
placed upon the research by the issue of data availability. Given the various 
differences between the analyses carried out, and the specific research 
questions that underpin them, more detailed information in terms of data and 
methods are provided in the relevant empirical chapters themselves, which aids 
the interpretation of the results obtained.  
The empirical investigation itself is carried out in Chapters 6 to 9. Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7 carry out longitudinal ecological analyses at the local authority-level 
using fixed effects regression analysis. The former considers impacts on 
antidepressant prescribing using data from NHS Digital (2018) whilst the latter 
considers rates of self-reported anxiety and/or depression using estimates 
produced from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) (ONS, 2018c). The 
analyses in these chapters are carried out using data between 2010 and the end 
of 2014, and are able to identify separately the impact of the harsher sanctions 
regime introduced by the Welfare Reform Act 2012. To consider the influence of 
compositional bias on the results in Chapter 7, Chapter 8 goes on to carry out a 
multi-level analysis. It uses local authority-level data on JSA sanctions and 
individual-level data on JSA claimants’ self-reported anxiety and/or depression, 
again using the QLFS. Finally, Chapter 9 aims to improve upon the causal 
inferences made in the preceding empirical chapters by carrying out a 
difference-in-differences analysis, focusing specifically on developments in 
sanctions policy brought about at the onset of the Coalition government in 2010.  
Chapter 10, finally, provides a concluding chapter. First, it summarises the 
findings of the empirical investigation, relating them back to the overarching 
research question motivating the separate empirical analyses and highlighting 
the overall contribution of the thesis. Important avenues for future research are 
then identified, particularly in terms of the need for individual-level research in 
this area, whilst discussion is then provided regarding what the findings imply for 
contemporary sanctions policy. The chapter ends with a reflection on what the 
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collective weight of evidence on the impacts of benefit sanctions, including the 
findings presented in this thesis, implies for sanctions policy. It highlights the 
need for policymakers to respond to the available evidence in this area by 
adopting a precautionary approach to policymaking that ensures that the harms 
associated with sanctions are minimised. Several options are outlined that would 
help achieve this aim, all of which are readily implementable.  
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Chapter 2. Conditionality and activation 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides context to the current role of benefit sanctions within 
welfare states, by situating their development in relation to the wider concepts 
of conditionality and activation. First, this chapter considers the notion of 
behavioural conditionality, outlining the different types of conditional 
requirements that can be identified and their relationship to a so-called 
“behavioural turn” (Dwyer, 2016: 42) in social policy. Whilst the development of 
conditionality has been identified in terms of a “broad and far-reaching shift” 
(Deacon, 2004: 911) in the welfare state, affecting areas as different as 
education, health and housing, this thesis is specifically concerned with the 
impacts of benefit sanctions as applied within the social security system. 
Consequently, the discussion focuses on conditionality in relation to 
unemployment benefits, which is an area that has also been subject to a so-
called “activation turn” (Bonoli, 2010: 435) since the 1990s. This chapter 
explicates the link between conditionality and activation in the area of 
unemployment, and then goes on to outline the available international evidence 
regarding the growth of conditionality and sanctions in recent decades. Finally, 
this chapter considers the ongoing ethical debate in relation to the acceptable 
role of conditionality across the welfare state. A central issue within this 
debate, it is argued, relates to benefit sanctions and their associated impacts.  
2.2 Behavioural conditionality 
2.2.1 Types of benefit conditions 
Clasen and Clegg (2007: 171) argue that entitlement and eligibility to socially-
provided benefits have “always and everywhere” been conditional in certain 
respects. They contend, therefore, that such conditions are a fundamental part 
of the ways in which welfare states have, and continue, to regulate access to 
the support that they provide. Indeed, it is arguably difficult to conceive of a 
social benefit provided by a nation state that could be designed without any 
conditional requirements attached to it. The notion of a Universal Basic Income 
(UBI), for example, has recently attracted considerable policy discussion. UBI is 
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premised on the notion of the state providing a regular and unconditional cash 
payment (Standing, 2017). Whatever the merits of this proposal, even a truly 
unconditional UBI provided by a nation state would inevitably involve some 
restriction in eligibility to citizens or residents, which can be regarded as a 
categorical condition specifying who can and cannot receive the support in 
question. In actually existing social security systems, of course, conditional 
requirements apply much more broadly than in the example just given and often 
include demands relating to claimant behaviour. This section, therefore, focuses 
its attention on the different types of benefit conditions that exist, including 
their relationship to behavioural requirements and, ultimately, their 
enforcement through benefit sanctions.  
Clasen and Clegg (2007) develop a framework for understanding the different 
types of benefit conditions that can be demanded, which distinguishes between 
three ‘levels’ of conditions: conditions of category; conditions of circumstance; 
and conditions of conduct. Conditions of category refer to conditions that 
restrict eligibility to particular benefits to members of specifically-defined 
groups. A basic requirement for an individual to be eligible for unemployment 
benefit, for example, is that they are considered to be unemployed. Once 
categorical definitions have been established, access to support can then be 
regulated through conditions of circumstance, which refer to eligibility and 
entitlement criteria based on the circumstances of claimants. Such conditions 
are numerous, but might include work history-based criteria in the case of 
contributory benefits, for example, or need-based criteria in the case of means-
tested benefits. Finally, conditions of conduct, which place behavioural demands 
upon individuals, are applicable once both conditions of category and 
circumstance have been established. As Clasen and Clegg (2007: 174) emphasise, 
these conditions are conceptually distinct from the first two ‘levels’ in that they 
serve to regulate “ongoing benefit receipt” once initial access has been 
established. In the case of unemployment benefits, for example, typical 
requirements are often work-related, in that they specify availability 
requirements, job search criteria and involvement in training activities as a 
condition of continued benefit receipt (Immervoll and Knotz, 2018).  
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2.2.2 Unemployment benefit and behavioural demands 
Clasen and Clegg’s (2007) framework is useful in that it helps to identify the 
routes that are available to the state in terms of regulating access to social 
benefits. In particular, each conditional ‘level’ provides a ‘lever’ through which 
it is possible to expand or restrict access through category re-definition, changes 
to eligibility and entitlement criteria and the development of behavioural 
requirements. It is important to recognise, however, that explicit attempts to 
influence behaviour are not necessarily restricted to the ‘level’ of conditions of 
conduct. A good example is provided by the case of unemployment benefit, 
where retrospective behavioural requirements are widely imposed as a condition 
of benefit receipt (Langenbucher, 2015). In the UK, for example, access to 
unemployment benefit since it was introduced in 1911 has been restricted – in 
the form of a maximum six-week disqualification – for those who lost their 
previous job due to perceived misconduct or to those deemed to have left their 
previous job voluntarily (Adler, 2016). Clearly, such retrospective conditions aim 
to influence individuals who are employed by discouraging and promoting 
particular forms of behaviour. In terms of unemployment benefits at least, 
therefore, behavioural conditions can be specified that determine both initial 
access (conditions of circumstance in the form of retrospective requirements) as 
well as ongoing access (conditions of conduct).  
Indeed, this argument can be further extended to apply to the very definition of 
unemployment itself (conditions of category). In the UK, for example, a new 
definition of unemployment was introduced in 1989, which required individuals 
to be available for work and to actively seek work (Price, 2000). This change 
brought the categorical identification of unemployment more in line with the 
internationally-accepted definition adopted by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO, 1982), which had previously defined unemployment in similar 
terms. In this regard, Boland and Griffin (2015: 29) identify a broader shift that 
they describe as the “death of unemployment”, which refers to the systematic 
replacement of the category of ‘unemployment’ with the term ‘jobseeker’ by 
policymakers. This can be seen clearly in the UK, which replaced the pre-
existing unemployment benefit with Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) in 1996. This 
shift has also occurred internationally, with organisations such as the OECD 
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increasingly framing unemployment in terms of seeking paid work (OECD, 2013; 
Immervoll and Knotz, 2018). Rhetorically, the emergence of the ‘jobseeker’ re-
frames the notion of unemployment in direct relation to the labour market. 
Accordingly, unemployment is viewed as a transitional phase in which individuals 
must actively seek employment in order to constitute themselves as being in a 
state of unemployment.  
2.2.3 Defining behavioural conditionality 
Considered together, the behavioural requirements that have been developed 
and imposed in the case of unemployment benefits complicate the distinction 
between conditions of category, circumstance and conduct, by embedding 
behavioural demands at each ‘level’ of conditionality identified by Clasen and 
Clegg (2007). Indeed, as Chapter 3 will go on to detail, benefit sanctions in the 
UK social security system apply for behavioural reasons relating to all three 
‘levels’ of conditionality. Whilst their framework is nevertheless useful in terms 
of delineating the types of conditions that can and do exist, and indeed in 
identifying the growth in conditions of conduct as a relatively new area of 
concern, this suggests that a narrow emphasis on conditions of conduct is 
insufficient in terms of providing an overall account of how behavioural 
conditionality operates in practice. In this regard, Watts and Fitzpatrick (2018) 
adopt a wider conceptualisation of behavioural forms of welfare provision, which 
recognises that behavioural requirements serve to regulate both initial as well as 
ongoing access to benefits, and are underpinned by three key characteristics: 
“they specify behavioural requirements which determine initial access to 
and/or continued receipt of benefits, goods and services; they employ 
monitoring and surveillance processes that verify compliance with those 
requirements; and they impose sanctions in the event of non-compliance 
or, in some cases, offer incentives for compliance.” (Watts and 
Fitzpatrick, 2018: 31) 
According to the above conceptualisation, behavioural conditionality is 
constituted by behavioural requirements that are enforced through claimant 
monitoring and sanctions. Importantly, the recent growth of such requirements 
across the social security system and other areas of social policy has been 
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criticised in terms of representing a “behavioural turn” (Dwyer, 2016: 42), in 
which the welfare state has been re-imagined primarily as a tool with which to 
influence individual behaviour. A notable example of this policy agenda is 
provided by the UK, which established a Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) in 2010 
to apply the insights of so-called ‘nudge theory’ into policy design and service 
provision (Gandy et al., 2016). Partly, criticism of this shift is directed at the 
fact that, as a policy solution, it relies on the contested assumption that the 
social issues in question are “fundamentally behavioural in nature” (Watts et 
al., 2014: 16). This is a topic that will be further discussed in the next section in 
relation to unemployment. Indeed, Friedli and Stearn (2015: 40) argue that in 
this policy area, the ‘behavioural turn’ has extended in terms of “psychological 
conditionality”, in which interventions have sought to modify not only the 
behaviour of unemployed claimants but their beliefs and attitudes as well. On 
this account, the key to tackling unemployment is not only conceived of through 
claimant behaviour change, but also in terms of the acquisition of “work-
appropriate attitudes and beliefs” (Friedli and Stearn, 2015: 40).  
As previously highlighted, conditional requirements have always provided states 
with a means through which to regulate access to the publicly available support 
that they provide, and claimant behaviour has consequently long been of 
concern. With regard to unemployment benefits, this concern is invariably work-
related, as shown by the establishment of unemployment insurance in the UK in 
1911 that was “explicitly presented as a measure … that would help to 
encourage good work habits” (Clasen and Clegg, 2011: 4). Indeed, Watts and 
Fitzpatrick (2018: 2) argue more broadly that welfare state interventions per se 
are “intrinsically socially controlling”, given that such support inevitably 
“shapes, moulds and constrains the choices people make”. Whilst recognising 
this broader context, it is nevertheless important to be cognisant of the fact 
that it is possible for the nature and extent of behavioural conditionality to vary 
significantly through time. Chapter 3 of this thesis provides more depth 
regarding the growth of behavioural conditionality in the UK social security 
system in recent decades, paying particular attention to the increased role of 
benefit sanctions. In this chapter, furthermore, Section 2.4 provides a broader 
account of the growth of conditionality and sanctions internationally. First, 
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however, the next section considers the concept of activation, which is closely 
associated with behavioural conditionality in the area of unemployment.  
2.3 Activation 
2.3.1 Defining activation 
Bonoli (2010: 435) identifies a so-called “activation turn” that has occurred in 
labour market policymaking across developed economies since the 1990s. Whilst 
conceptually distinct, the relationship between work-related behavioural 
conditionality and activation is a close one. Indeed, the behavioural demands 
placed on unemployed claimants that were identified in the previous section – 
particularly in terms of conditions of conduct – have been referred to in the 
literature as “activation requirements” (Lødemel and Moreira, 2014: 1) as well 
as in terms of “benefit activation” (Clasen and Clegg, 2011: 9). Clasen and Clegg 
(2006), furthermore, specifically recognise work-related behavioural 
conditionality in their definition of activation, which understands the concepts 
in terms of the interaction between social security and labour market policy by 
distinguishing between a narrow and a broad form:  
“Most narrowly, [activation] involves developing tighter links between 
unemployment protection policies and active labour market policies. More 
broadly, activation is about increasing labour market entry and 
participation, and phasing out temporary labour market exit options for 
working age claimants (early retirement, disability and long-term sickness 
benefits). In its narrow and sometimes also its broad meaning, activation 
implies making established welfare rights more conditional on job seeking 
efforts.” (Clasen and Clegg, 2006: 527-528).  
Barbier (2001: 5) refers to an “intrinsic fuzziness” that pervades usage of the 
term activation, and as the above definition makes clear part of this imprecision 
relates to the fact that the concept combines several closely related but 
nonetheless distinct elements. In addition to work-related behavioural 
conditionality, for example, activation is associated with a wider set of 
interventions described as active labour market policies (ALMPs), which Sage 
(2015a: 320) defines broadly as “targeted schemes that enrol (and often 
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mandate) unemployed people onto programmes intended to promote and speed 
up labour market reattachment.” Indeed, in debates surrounding activation in 
the 1990s the term was more narrowly associated with a focus on promoting 
ALMPs (OECD, 1994). Over time, however, the concept of activation developed 
to encompass the broader set of concerns articulated in the definition above, 
notably the interaction between (un)employment, the social security system, 
ALMPs and behavioural conditionality itself (OECD, 2006). A clear example of this 
interaction is provided by the fact that failure to comply with mandated 
involvement in ALMPs represents grounds for a sanction across developed 
economies (Immervoll and Knotz, 2018).  
2.3.2 Developments in activation 
As is the case for behavioural conditionality, activation is not a uniquely 
contemporary concern. Bonoli (2010), for example, categorises its development 
since the 1950s into three separate phases. Up until the 1970s, countries focused 
on the need to up-skill their workforces in response to the skilled-labour 
shortages that developed in the context of rapid post-war economic growth. 
ALMPs in this phase were pioneered in Sweden, where the Rehn-Meidner strategy 
combined attempts to modernise industry with both full employment and income 
equality (Sihto, 2001). The second phase, in contrast, refers to the late 1970s 
and 1980s, in which policies were developed in response to the persistently high 
levels of unemployment affecting most developed economies. Labour market 
policies during this period were concerned with what Bonoli (2010: 443) refers to 
as “occupation”. Given the context of mass unemployment, even extremely 
active interventions could not expect to have much influence on employment 
outcomes, and so ALMPs merely aimed to attenuate the potential for skill-loss. 
The third phase, lastly, describes developments from the 1990s onwards within a 
generally improving economic context, whereby falling unemployment rates 
shifted the attention of policymakers towards groups such as the long-term 
unemployed. In the view of policymakers, the low levels of demand and wages 
available for low-skilled labour meant that unemployed individuals faced greater 
disincentives to work than had existed previously.  
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Bonoli (2010: 435) describes this latter stage in terms of an “activation turn”, in 
which policies have had a dual focus on the provision of greater work incentives 
as well as employment assistance. This qualitative shift in activation has also 
been understood in terms of both “punitive and enabling mechanisms” (Raffass, 
2017: 350), which can be thought to be present in both of the dimensions 
identified. With regard to work incentives, for example, this stage of activation 
is associated with the more widespread development of minimum wage policies 
and working tax credits, though it has also entailed cuts in the real value of 
unemployment benefits and greater use of benefit sanctions (Serrano Pascual 
and Magnusson, 2007; Immervoll and Scarpetta, 2012). With regard to 
employment assistance, furthermore, Lindsay et al. (2007) distinguish between 
human capital development and work first approaches. Human capital 
development approaches emphasise investment in skills, education and training 
as a route out of unemployment. In theory, a supply-side focus on up-skilling 
should be beneficial for the short- and long-term labour market prospects of 
unemployed individuals, in terms of finding paid work, potential job quality and 
future in-work progression. Work first approaches, in contrast, focus on job 
search and more basic skills training as a route to getting unemployed individuals 
into work as quickly as possible. The emphasis in this approach, therefore, is on 
short-term job outcomes as opposed to job quality or suitability.  
2.3.3 Important drivers of activation 
Arguably, the development of work-related behavioural conditionality and 
sanctions represents a key constitutive element of the punitive dimension of the 
‘activation turn’, specifically within its focus on work incentives. In an attempt 
to identify important determinants of this shift, Knotz (2019: 616) argues that 
there is a “political logic” to the timing of sanctions reforms across the OECD, in 
that governments have tended to introduce tougher sanctions rules during 
economic downturns in response to the pressure of reduced tax revenue and 
increased expenditure on unemployment benefits. Clasen and Clegg (2011) take 
a wider view, however, situating behavioural conditionality primarily in terms of 
the state’s adaptation to the fundamental realities of post-industrial labour 
markets. Given the central importance of social security to the functioning of 
labour markets, the authors argue that unemployment benefit systems have 
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always reflected the broader economic context in which they operate. In the 
post-war era, for example, contributory unemployment insurance was favoured 
in order to support the stable employment relationships upon which 
manufacturing-based economies functioned, primarily required to protect 
against the risk of cyclical and frictional forms of unemployment. In the post-
industrial era, in contrast, unemployment benefit systems have been redesigned 
to support the flexible employment relationships and structural forms of 
unemployment that are characteristic of the service-dominated economy.  
In particular, this transformation has seen a hollowing-out of labour markets 
across developed economies, including the proliferation of precarious low-wage 
work, higher youth and long-term unemployment (Goos and Manning, 2007; 
Bosch et al., 2009; Eichhorst and Marx, 2015). According to Clasen and Clegg 
(2011: 1), this shift has led to a so-called “triple integration” in unemployment 
protection across Europe. First, unemployment benefits have become more 
homogenised, representing a move away from contributory benefits and their 
emphasis on claimants’ labour market history as economies have become less 
able to provide stable employment attachments. Second, a risk re-categorisation 
has seen the traditional policy focus on the unemployed broadened to include 
groups in the working-age population that were previously exempted from work-
search requirements, such as single parents and disabled people. This has 
occurred, for example, by reducing the differences in the conditions of 
circumstance and conduct for various out-of-work benefits, given the apparent 
need to integrate as much of the working-age population into the labour market 
as possible. Third, a process of benefit activation has occurred, primarily in 
terms of a growth in work-related behavioural conditionality, such as 
requirements surrounding job search, a widening in the types of jobs that 
claimants are expected to accept as well as a greater emphasis on work first 
forms of ALMPs and sanctions.  
Whilst Clasen and Clegg’s (2011) analysis prioritises adaptation to post-industrial 
labour markets as a key determinant of policy development in this area, it might 
also be argued that social security systems themselves play an important role in 
influencing how labour markets function. McDaniel and Berry (2017: 24), for 
example, argue that social security arrangements and labour market imperatives 
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do not constitute separate “spheres of activity”. Rather, they interact with one 
another in a two-way process to ultimately sustain underlying economic 
dynamics. Indeed, the UK’s work first model of activation arguably serves to 
reinforce and perpetuate Britain’s “low-pay, no-pay” (Shildrick et al., 2012: 2) 
labour market by ensuring that demand for such employment from employers is 
met by an available supply of labour (Bosch, 2009; Collins and Murphy, 2016). 
Adler (2016) makes a similar point in relation to benefit sanctions specifically, 
viewing them as a disciplinary tool deployed to pressurise claimants into 
accepting low-paid and insecure employment (see also Wacquant, 2010; Fletcher 
and Wright, 2018). Considered within this punitive dimension, activation has 
been viewed as a form of “re-commodification” (Greer, 2016: 162), through its 
erosion of the ability of unemployed individuals to effectively withhold their 
labour power from the labour market (Grover, 2012; Wiggan, 2015).  
2.3.4 The passive versus active distinction 
The ‘activation turn’, in both its work incentives and employment assistance 
dimensions, has been associated with a shift away from a policymaking focus on 
the demand-side of labour towards one of labour supply, a development that is 
at least partly underpinned by behavioural explanations of unemployment 
(Aurich, 2011). Indeed, proponents of activation have sought to label pre-
existing policy responses to unemployment as ones that encouraged claimants to 
be overly ‘passive’ (Wright, 2012). This has been the view, for example, of those 
bodies that have promoted activation such as the EU, the OECD and the World 
Bank, which contrasted ‘active’ approaches to unemployment with so-called 
‘passive’ income maintenance (Sinfield, 2001). Critics of this view argue that 
activation, particularly in its work first variants, ignores the structural 
determinants of unemployment and consequently mistakenly re-frames lack of 
work in terms of a “deficient work ethic among individuals” (Watson, 2015: 251) 
and as the individual responsibility of the unemployed (Wiggan, 2012). In a 
partial counter, furthermore, Clasen and Clegg (2011: 3) note a number of the 
“productive functions” of the compensatory approach in the industrial era 
welfare state, in terms of improving job matching and stabilising aggregate 
demand during economic downturns. Indeed, such unemployment benefit 
systems existed within a context of full employment – albeit one based on a 
19 
 
  
male-breadwinner model – that was actively managed by an interventionist 
macroeconomic policy.  
Wright (2016: 236), furthermore, argues that the widespread use of the 
passive/active dichotomy relies on an influential “deficit model” regarding the 
agency of benefit claimants, who are viewed by policymakers as “inherently 
deficient … naturally inactive and in need of activation – either because of their 
perceived incompetency or immorality”. As Wright (2016) outlines, Murray’s 
(1984; 1990) notion of an emerging underclass and Mead’s (1992; 1997) concept 
of welfare dependency are two influential accounts that deploy the deficit 
model, albeit through adoption of two diverging perspectives on human 
motivation and agency. Murray (1990), for example, draws on the theory of the 
‘economic man’, viewing individuals as rational maximisers who act rationally 
when they maximise their own self-interest. Unemployment benefits, on this 
account, merely serve to sustain poverty through the creation of a so-called 
welfare trap, which can only be counteracted through the re-arrangement of 
both monetary and non-financial incentives and disincentives. Mead (1992: 133) 
adopts a different view, in which unemployed individuals are “dutiful but 
defeated” and are no longer able to act rationally in their own self-interest. 
According to this perspective, work is valorised as the overriding moral 
obligation in society, and given the failure of the unemployed to meet this moral 
duty the state itself has a right to coerce individuals into paid employment 
through the use of activation measures.  
2.3.5 Cross-country differences 
Thus far, this section has provided an overview of activation, detailing its 
relationship to behavioural conditionality and sanctions as well as the important 
material and ideational factors that have contributed to its most recent 
articulation. Whilst an overall turn towards activation across developed 
economies since the 1990s has been identified, a large literature exists that 
seeks to detail country-specific trends, timings and developments as well as the 
extent of convergence in this area (Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2004; 
Serrano Pascual and Magnusson, 2007; Betzelt and Bothfeld, 2011; Immervoll and 
Scarpetta, 2012; Weishaupt, 2013; Lødemel and Moreira, 2014). Providing an 
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account of cross-country developments in activation is difficult, not least due to 
the broad nature of the concept itself and the wide array of policies that it 
encompasses. Bonoli (2010), nevertheless, identifies Denmark and the UK as two 
of the earliest adopters of activation in Europe in the 1990s, albeit contrasting 
Denmark’s human capital focus with the UK’s broadly work first approach. The 
UK reforms themselves were heavily influenced by similar developments that 
occurred in the US (Daguerre and Etherington, 2014). Germany, in contrast, is 
viewed as a relatively late adopter, via implementation of the Hartz IV reform in 
2005 that merged unemployment benefit and social assistance as well as 
reduced benefit generosity. Lødemel and Gubrium (2014), nevertheless, identify 
a move towards work first forms of activation across most European countries in 
the 2000s, including in those countries that had previously pursued more human 
capital-oriented approaches.  
Given the broad nature of activation as a concept, it is arguably more useful to 
focus on specific components when seeking to provide supporting evidence of 
developments that have occurred across countries and through time. Indeed, 
given the specific concerns of this thesis, the next section considers in more 
depth the available international evidence in the area of conditionality and 
sanctions. Until relatively recently, comparative accounts in this area have been 
limited by data availability, which has restricted accounts of conditionality to 
descriptive overviews based on a limited number of countries (see, for example, 
Clasen and Clegg, 2011). Whilst these accounts are extremely useful, recent 
work has improved the scope of the available evidence in terms of both 
longitudinal (Knotz, 2018; 2019) as well as in cross-sectional data (Venn, 2012; 
Langenbucher, 2015; Immervoll and Knotz, 2018). These are discussed in the 
next section.  
2.4 Trends in behavioural conditionality 
2.4.1 Measuring overall conditionality 
Knotz (2018) analyses data on unemployment benefit conditionality and 
sanctions across 21 OECD countries between 1980 and 2012, based on a dataset 
compiled by Knotz and Nelson (2015). Specifically, the data available allow 
conditionality to be measured on the basis of three separate dimensions: 
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availability requirements; job-search and reporting requirements; and sanction 
rules. First, availability requirements relate to the definition of suitable 
employment in each country, and refer to the type of work and wages that 
claimants are required to accept, as well as identifying the range of 
circumstances in which claimants are permitted to refuse offers of employment. 
Second, job-search and reporting requirements refer to the frequency with 
which the job-seeking activity of claimants is checked, as well as whether 
claimants are required to sign agreements that detail the conditions. Third, 
sanction rules refer to the length and severity of sanctions. These can be 
imposed for reasons such as becoming unemployed voluntarily, refusing job 
offers, non-attendance at meetings and failing to sufficiently evidence job-
search activity. Importantly, Knotz (2018) highlights two key limitations to the 
data. First, the dataset measures conditionality and sanctions in relation to 
unemployment insurance schemes in each country, with the exception of 
Australia and New Zealand. This is important, as the stringency of conditions and 
sanctions is considered by Knotz (2018) to be stricter in means-tested or social 
assistance schemes. Second, the data take into account how stringent 
conditionality rules are intended, as opposed to how they are actually applied in 
practice.  
These limitations aside, the data nevertheless provide unique insight into the 
development of conditionality and sanctions across international social security 
systems in recent decades. As part of the analysis, Knotz (2018) constructs an 
overall measure to capture the conditionality of unemployment benefits across 
the OECD, which is determined by combining the average strictness of both 
conditions and sanctions together. Importantly, this measure confirms that 
conditionality has increased overall between 1980 and 2012, which supports the 
substance of the discussion detailed in Section 2.2. Indeed, consistent with the 
notion of an ‘activation turn’, the topic of Section 2.3, the increase is 
particularly observed from around 1990 onwards. This is driven by a “significant 
increase” (Knotz, 2018: 101) in the strictness of both conditions and sanctions at 
that point in time.  
It is worth noting, however, specific developments for the individual components 
that form this overall measure. In terms of availability requirements, claimants 
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have come under increasing pressure to accept employment in an occupation 
other than their previous one as the degree of occupational protection fell. In 
terms of wage conditions, a trend is observed in countries increasingly defining 
suitable wages in precise terms, such as in relation to the claimant’s previous 
wage or the current benefit level. There is also some evidence, nevertheless, of 
what Knotz (2018: 97) describes as a “recalibration” in availability requirements, 
as there was an increase in the number of countries explicitly recognising 
reasons for refusing work based on grounds such as caring responsibilities, lack 
of appropriate skills and ethical, moral or religious concerns. With regard to job-
search requirements, furthermore, there was a clear trend towards reporting 
requirements becoming more clearly defined. In 1980, for example, 70% of 
countries had no systematic checks of claimants’ job-search activity, a figure 
that had fallen to below 20% in 2012. The use of both voluntary and compulsory 
jobseeker agreements, in addition, rose rapidly from the early 1990s onwards, 
instruments that specify the behavioural demands on claimants and any support 
they will receive from their caseworker.  
2.4.2 Strictness of benefit sanctions 
Regarding benefit sanctions specifically, Knotz (2018) finds that the rules 
surrounding sanctions also became more clearly specified in the period analysed. 
This occurred, for example, through the development of additional sanctions for 
second and third refusals of employment. In the 1980s, under 20% of countries 
had sanctions for a second refusal, whilst none imposed sanctions for a third 
refusal. By the end of the period, however, these proportions had increased to 
50% for second refusals and 40% for third refusals. Such sanctions are escalating, 
furthermore, in that they increase in severity for repeat refusals. The average 
length of a sanction increases from 10 weeks for an initial refusal of work to 15 
and 20 weeks for second and third refusals respectively. Importantly, the 
average ‘effective’ duration of sanctions for initial refusals of work, which is 
measured by combining the length of benefit sanctions imposed with the benefit 
share withdrawn as a result of a sanction, increased across the period. 
Interestingly, nevertheless, the average duration of sanctions for initial refusals 
of work fell where sanctions for second and third refusals were introduced. This 
dynamic means that the average duration of sanctions for initial refusals of work 
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peaked at approximately 13 weeks in the late 1990s, and then gradually reduced 
to 10 weeks by the end of the period.  
Using the same dataset, Knotz (2019) provides greater detail on individual 
countries with respect to the trend in the overall strictness of their sanctioning 
rules. In particular, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Sweden and the UK saw 
notable increases in the strictness of sanctions across the period. Belgium, 
Denmark and Japan, in contrast, introduced fewer changes, albeit ones which 
increased the strictness of sanctions, whilst no reforms were observed in Greece 
since 1980. Although rare, instances of relaxations in sanctions were also 
observed in certain countries, such as Australia, Germany and New Zealand. 
Since such instances of relaxations are rare compared with increases in 
strictness, nevertheless, it is clear from the evidence provided by Knotz (2018; 
2019) that an overall trend towards more severe penalties is observed.  
Building on the work of Venn (2012) and Langenbucher (2015), Immervoll and 
Knotz (2018) provide the most recent cross-sectional data on conditionality and 
sanctions from across 39 OECD and EU countries in 2017. Their analysis provides 
a useful addition to that provided by Knotz (2018; 2019) in that they are able to 
rank countries in terms of the strictness of their requirements and sanctions, 
though again the focus remains on sanctions rules in unemployment insurance 
schemes as opposed to means-tested or social assistance schemes. In terms of 
sanctions specifically, Immervoll and Knotz (2018) construct an overall strictness 
indicator based on the severity of sanctions for different reasons, which include: 
voluntary resignation; first and repeated refusals of job offers; and first and 
repeated refusals of ALMP participation. Based on this measure, the UK is mid-
ranked in terms of the harshness of its sanctions regime, placed 20th most severe 
out of the 39 countries. This is shown in Figure 2.1. As the authors note, 
sanctions rules are generally strictest in Southern and Eastern Europe and less 
severe in Central and Northern Europe as well as in non-European countries such 
as Japan and South Korea. Interestingly, nevertheless, the UK ranks 
comparatively worse on the overall conditionality indicator, which includes 
sanctions rules as well as availability, suitable work, job-search and monitoring 
requirements, where it is placed 8th in terms of strictness.  
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Figure 2.1: strictness of benefit sanction rules across the OECD and EU, 2017 
 
Source: Immervoll and Knotz (2018) 
Used with permission of the OECD 
Whilst the UK is placed in the middle of the sanctions ranking detailed in Figure 
2.1, Immervoll and Knotz (2018) nevertheless specifically highlight the unusually 
steep and escalating nature of the sanction rules in the UK. This refers to the 
fact that the length of sanctions increases rapidly for second and third 
infringements. Chapter 3 will provide more detail on the precise nature of the 
UK system, including information on the severity of sanctions, the reasons for 
which they apply and the frequency with which they have been applied. The 
sanctions that Immervoll and Knotz (2018) refer to are termed ‘high level’ in the 
UK system, for reasons such as not participating in mandatory workfare, not 
accepting a job offer, and losing a job voluntarily or due to misconduct. They 
lead to complete benefit loss for periods of 13, 26 or 156 weeks for first, second 
and third infringements respectively. Chapter 4 of this thesis reviews the 
available evidence on the impacts of benefit sanctions, discussing studies that 
use data from the US, the UK and other European countries such as Denmark, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. It is useful to note here that 
out of these countries the UK is ranked second in the Immervoll and Knotz (2018) 
ranking, similar to but slightly below Finland in terms of strictness. Differences 
in the length of sanctions can be large. In Sweden, for example, the first refusal 
of a job offer leads to a one week sanction, compared with 13 weeks in the UK.  
25 
 
  
Before progressing to the UK policy chapter, the final section in this chapter 
considers the ongoing ethical debate regarding the acceptable role of 
behavioural conditionality within the social security system and across the 
welfare state more broadly. Arguably, evidence relating to the impacts of 
benefit sanctions forms a central issue within this debate, which has important 
implications for the empirical focus of this thesis.  
2.5 Ethical legitimacy of behavioural conditionality 
2.5.1 Competing normative perspectives 
The ethical justification of behavioural conditionality is contested by a variety of 
normative perspectives, including – though not limited to – contractualism, 
communitarianism, rights-based approaches, paternalism and utilitarianism 
(Deacon, 2004; Paz-Fuchs, 2008; Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018). The discussion in 
this section provides a broad overview of each of these perspectives, without 
seeking to defend any one view in particular. Rather, the main rationales within 
this debate will be outlined, and the relevance of ethical concerns ultimately 
situated within the aims and contribution of this thesis. Watts and Fitzpatrick 
(2018: 15) defend a form of value pluralism in their development of a framework 
for assessing behavioural conditionality in terms of both its “efficacy and ethical 
legitimacy”. In contrast to a monist pursuit of a single normative perspective, 
their pluralism is based on the view that legitimate yet incommensurable values 
inevitably conflict as part of social policy analyses, and that there is therefore a 
need to consider trade-offs between competing societal objectives using 
multiple criteria. Whatever the relative validity of this perspective in terms of 
normative theory, an identifiable merit of the direct engagement with trade-offs 
inherent within the pluralist approach is its emphasis on the “interdependence 
between ethical reasoning and empirical evidence” (Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018: 
139) when attempting to provide overall assessments of particular policy 
agendas.  
Appeals to contractualist arguments are prominent within attempts to justify 
behavioural conditionality, and can be most succinctly summarised as the view 
that there can be “no rights without responsibilities” (Giddens, 1998: 65). 
Appeals to contractualism have a long history, motivating, for example, the 
26 
 
  
demands placed on individuals from the Elizabethan Poor Laws onwards as well 
as part of the more recent ‘behavioural turn’ (Paz-Fuchs, 2008). According to 
contractualism, reciprocal obligations emerge from a social pact between state 
and citizen, whereby an individual’s access to rights must be matched by their 
own fulfilment of particular responsibilities (Deacon, 2004). Viewed through the 
lens of “reciprocal responsibility” (Sage, 2012: 359), behavioural conditionality 
can be considered as justified if it is accepted that the various behavioural 
demands that are established, as well as the concomitant need for monitoring 
and sanctions, represent a fair quid pro quo for the provision of state support. At 
a basic level, contractualist arguments simply adhere to the view that a 
“something for nothing” (Paz-Fuchs, 2008: 89) exchange is itself morally unjust. 
Additional assumptions, however, are required to motivate particular demands 
made in specific instances. In terms of unemployment benefits, for example, the 
fundamental expectation placed upon claimants is that they do what they can to 
secure employment. The contractual logic in this scenario therefore also 
assumes that this obligation would not be met without the imposition of 
behavioural conditions.  
Grover (2012) critiques such defences of behavioural conditionality by 
highlighting the unequal power relations that in reality underpin the so-called 
reciprocal state-citizen contract. Somewhat problematically, the state is able to 
act unilaterally in setting the terms of the agreement with claimants, who have 
minimal power to influence the process and are compelled to conform to the 
result. Communitarian arguments avoid this criticism by emphasising the 
commitments that individuals have towards one another independent of any 
state-citizen contract, which are seen to “arise merely from their membership 
of a community” (Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018: 130). In particular, these 
obligations are based upon principles of mutual respect, recognition of the needs 
of others and a commitment to the common good. Behavioural conditionality can 
be justified on this view if it is seen to play an important role in articulating the 
collectively established common good, as well as in ensuring that the civic 
responsibilities associated with it are carried out. Such arguments have been 
brought to bear in debates surrounding anti-social behaviour (Deacon, 2004), 
though they might equally be applied in relation to social security. In this policy 
domain, the communitarian approach would directly affirm a commitment that 
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is more implicit within the contractualist perspective, arguing that employment 
should be afforded an overriding moral status as the primary activity through 
which individuals are able to contribute to the common good.  
Rights-based approaches, in contrast, have been advanced to contest 
behavioural conditionality, based on the view that social citizenship should be 
accompanied by unconditional entitlements when it comes to ensuring that basic 
needs are met (Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018). For these critics, needs claims 
come prior to and are privileged above any behavioural obligations. Behavioural 
conditionality is therefore unjustified since it makes such entitlements 
conditional upon individuals’ performance as opposed to being available based 
upon their inalienable rights. Such views are often advanced on the basis of 
citizenship rights, though Dean (2013) goes as far as to defend a vision of social 
rights in which a degree of unconditional support should be made available to all 
individuals, citizens or otherwise, on the basis of shared and interdependent 
human needs. Indeed, the impact on both citizenship and migrant rights of 
conditionality is an important and arguably overlooked area of concern (Shutes, 
2016; Edmiston, 2017). Weaker forms of rights-focused approaches have made 
the more limited claim that the extent of behavioural conditionality, as 
currently enforced, over-emphasises duty at the expense of any substantive 
commitment to social rights (Deacon, 2004). On this view, a reciprocal balance 
between rights and responsibilities is not currently being realised in practice. 
Whilst behavioural demands on the unemployed have significantly increased in 
recent decades, this has arguably not been accompanied by any meaningful 
expansion in employment support (Daguerre and Etherington, 2014; Fitzpatrick 
et al., 2019).  
Paternalist perspectives of conditionality circumvent discussion of rights and 
responsibilities, arguing instead that behavioural requirements are justifiable as 
they ultimately serve the best interests of those who claim state support. Mead 
(1989: 165) is a prominent and influential proponent of this view, defending 
behavioural conditionality as a legitimate “exercise in authority” that should be 
used to compel claimants to behave in ways that are thought to be good for both 
them and society as a whole. As discussed in Section 2.3, this perspective is 
underpinned by a particular conception of human agency, which views the 
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unemployed as welfare dependent and unable to act in their own best interests. 
Behavioural conditionality is arguably required, therefore, to force individuals to 
pursue activities that would improve their own lives but that they would not 
otherwise carry out. As is the case with contractualism and communitarianism, 
the paternalist defence of conditionality affords paid work a normative primacy 
above other forms of social activity, leading it to favour forms of conditionality 
based upon work-related behavioural requirements designed to promote entry 
into paid employment. Any short-term negative implications of this approach for 
individuals, such as the imposition of benefit sanctions, are justified by the 
argument that claimants will benefit in the long-term through the development 
of work-related behaviour and subsequent opportunities to gain employment and 
increase their income (Dunn, 2014).  
Despite its specific normative commitments, therefore, the paternalist defence 
of behavioural conditionality is heavily reliant on its empirical claim relating to 
the overall long-term benefits of such approaches. The same is true of utilitarian 
arguments that have appealed to the deterrence effects of conditionality and its 
role in minimising state expenditure through the ‘efficient’ use of public 
resources (Paz-Fuchs, 2008). It can be reasonably assumed that an expansion of 
behavioural conditions, and the increased monitoring and sanctioning of 
claimants that they imply, will serve as an effective deterrent for eligible 
individuals. Indeed, deterrence effects can be observed empirically as a key 
driver of the widening gap between official levels of unemployment and the 
claimant count in recent decades (Phillips, 2017). The link between behavioural 
conditionality and state expenditure is not straightforward, however, not least 
because of the administrative cost associated with maintaining a monitoring and 
enforcement bureaucracy. In their assessment of the UK sanctions regime, for 
example, the National Audit Office (NAO, 2016a) found that the overall cost 
implications of conditionality are unknown, given the fact that many of the 
wider costs for individuals and the state have not been measured. Indeed, a 
growing empirical literature contests the link between sanctions and positive 
labour market outcomes, and identifies a range of negative wider impacts on 
claimants themselves and third parties such as children (Watts et al., 2014).  
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2.5.2 The role of empirical evidence 
Whilst empirical evidence is clearly important to the validity of paternalist and 
utilitarian arguments, Watts and Fitzpatrick (2018: 152) argue that evidence 
regarding the “effectiveness in practice” of conditional approaches should be of 
concern to all the normative perspectives discussed in this section. This 
argument follows from the fact that, in the area of social security, the 
perspectives that seek to justify specific forms of behavioural conditionality 
make a common set of assumptions that themselves are open to empirical 
scrutiny. First, they assume that without behavioural conditions claimants would 
not carry out the activities necessary to find paid employment. Second, by 
emphasising paid work as the desired end goal that is achieved using 
conditionality, they make implicit assumptions regarding the benefits of paid 
work to individuals and society as a whole. As previously highlighted, 
furthermore, Watts and Fitzpatrick (2018) defend a value pluralist framework 
that recognises that competing normative commitments will inevitably collide in 
social policy debates, often without there being a clear means of resolution. It 
therefore becomes necessary to consider potential trade-offs between normative 
commitments and evidence regarding the actual impacts of behavioural 
conditionality, as investigated through empirical research.  
Whilst the differences between these perspectives are not necessarily fully 
resolvable through empirical investigation alone, evidence relating to the impact 
of behavioural conditionality on claimants is clearly relevant for each viewpoint 
when attempting to provide an overall assessment of particular policy designs. In 
this regard, Chapter 4 discusses the UK and international research that 
investigates the impacts of benefit sanctions on claimants, focusing both on 
labour market as well as wider effects. This discussion provides important 
background for the empirical chapters in this thesis, which investigate the 
relationship between sanctions and mental health outcomes for claimants of 
unemployment benefits. Prior to this, however, Chapter 3 provides an overview 
of developments in behavioural conditionality in the UK social security system in 
recent decades, paying particular attention to the increased role of benefit 
sanctions.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has situated the use of benefit sanctions in relation to the broader 
notions of behavioural conditionality and activation. In terms of conditionality, 
behavioural requirements have been developed for each of the three conditional 
‘levels’ identified by Clasen and Clegg (2007). Thus, whilst the recent growth in 
conditions of conduct is a core feature of the behavioural shift in welfare state 
provision, behavioural conditionality itself can be understood in terms of 
behavioural requirements that regulate both initial and ongoing benefit access. 
These demands, furthermore, are enforced through both monitoring and 
sanctions for non-compliance. For unemployment benefits, these behavioural 
requirements are invariably work-related, specifying acceptable reasons for 
leaving work as well as availability requirements, job search criteria and 
involvement in training as conditions of continued benefit receipt. As such, 
behavioural conditionality within the social security system is viewed as a key 
constitutive element of the so-called ‘activation turn’ that has occurred across 
developed economies since the 1990s.  
Whilst both behavioural conditionality and activation are not uniquely 
contemporary phenomena, a qualitative shift in their emphasis has arguably 
occurred in recent decades. This is clearly demonstrated by the available cross-
country data that relate to conditions and sanctions in the OECD and the EU. The 
ethical legitimacy of behavioural requirements and sanctions is viewed 
differently by competing normative perspectives. An important issue within this 
debate relates to the impacts of behavioural conditionality on claimants, which 
will be further investigated from Chapter 4 onwards. First, however, Chapter 3 
will provide an overview of the growth in behavioural conditionality and benefit 
sanctions in the UK, which provides the policy context for the empirical 
investigation conducted in this thesis.  
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Chapter 3. Conditionality in UK social security 
policy 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter details developments in UK social security policy since the 1980s. 
Specifically, it tracks the growth of behavioural conditionality and benefit 
sanctions imposed on unemployed claimants, as well as on additional groups 
such as lone parents and disabled people. As Chapter 2 highlighted, 
nevertheless, it is important to remain cognisant of the fact that the receipt of 
unemployment benefits in the UK has always been conditional in certain 
respects. Since the introduction of an unemployment insurance benefit in 1911, 
for example, a maximum six-week disqualification could be applied to claimants 
who lost their previous job due to perceived misconduct, to those deemed to 
have left their previous job without just cause, and for not being available for 
work (Adler, 2016). This chapter, however, does not seek to provide a 
comprehensive account of behavioural conditionality since 1911, and is instead 
divided into three sections according to more recent government 
administrations: Conservative governments (1979-1997); New Labour 
governments (1997-2010); and the Coalition government (2010-2015). The initial 
Conservative period provides a good starting point as it ended with the 
introduction of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), the unemployment benefit that 
forms the basis of the empirical investigation in this thesis.  
An important distinction to highlight before discussing developments in 
behavioural conditionality throughout this period is that between 
disqualifications, sanctions and disentitlements. In the pre-JSA period, six-week 
disqualifications applied for the three main reasons listed above, which relate 
mainly to conditions of circumstance in the form of retrospective requirements. 
Following the introduction of JSA, however, disqualifications were replaced as 
an official term by sanctions, which applied to an expanded list of requirements 
encompassing both retrospective requirements as well as ongoing conditions of 
conduct. In terms of disentitlement, furthermore, the introduction of JSA in 
1996 established greater provisions for the enforcement of the new definition of 
unemployment, introduced in 1989, which required individuals to actively seek 
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work. Failure to demonstrate compliance with this demand within JSA leads to 
disentitlement, as opposed to a sanction. In practice, this meant that the 
affected individual would stop receiving JSA but would be able to re-claim and 
receive the full JSA amount straight away if they could show that they were now 
meeting the necessary requirements (DWP, 2011a). In order to provide sufficient 
context for the empirical investigation in this thesis, the final section of this 
chapter focuses specifically on JSA benefit sanctions in the context of the 
Coalition government, which oversaw various developments as well as a change 
in the rules relating to both sanctions and disentitlements.  
3.2 Conservative governments (1979-1997) 
3.2.1 The ‘Stricter Benefit Regime’ 
Since at least the 1980s, successive governments have sought to develop stricter 
social security regimes that tighten eligibility and increase conditional 
requirements. The first Conservative government of the 1979-1997 period 
oversaw dramatic rises in unemployment, and responded initially by developing 
training programmes for the young and the long-term unemployed (Lindsay and 
Mailand, 2004). Given the scale of unemployment at the time, however, and 
combined with attempts to reduce the number of civil servants, the 
administrative capacity of the state to monitor job search was limited up until 
1986 (Price, 2000). This situation changed following the implementation of the 
Restart Programme, which increased the maximum period of disqualification 
from six to 13 weeks in 1986 and then to 26 weeks in 1988, and expanded the 
institutional resources available to enforce new requirements (Finn, 2003). 
Consequently, those unemployed for over six months were required to undertake 
mandatory job search reviews whilst those unemployed for over a year were 
offered opportunities designed to help them back into employment, with 
sanctions applying for non-participation. Legislation passed in 1989, 
furthermore, restricted the reasons for which claimants could refuse job offers 
and required them to actively seek work. Price (2000: 267) refers to 
developments in this period as the formation of a “Stricter Benefit Regime”, 
which aimed to increase institutional pressure on claimants to seek paid 
employment.  
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3.2.2 Introduction of Jobseeker’s Allowance 
The Jobseekers Act 1995 is considered a “watershed moment” (Dwyer, 2016: 45) 
in terms of behavioural conditionality. As set out in the White Paper Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (DSS, 1994), Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) established a single 
unemployment benefit consisting of a contributory component and an income-
based component. Eventually introduced in October 1996, JSA saw a reduction in 
the length of entitlement to contributory benefit from twelve months to six 
months, a reduction in benefit for under-25s and the restriction of entitlement 
for 16 and 17 year olds (Strickland, 1996). Significantly, JSA was accompanied by 
the creation of the Jobseeker’s Agreement, a document that claimants had to 
sign and abide by and which aimed to enforce the active jobseeking requirement 
introduced in 1989. Accordingly, unemployed individuals had to develop back-to-
work action plans, record job search activity in jobsearch diaries and specify the 
minimum wages that they would be willing to accept. Claimants were also 
required to visit the Jobcentre every two weeks and search for work outside of 
their own occupation after three months. In addition to the new requirements, 
JSA advisers were given discretionary powers to issue a Jobseeker’s Direction, 
which could compel an individual to look for work in a particular way, dress in a 
certain manner to improve their employability, or attend a course to improve 
jobseeking skills and motivation.  
Importantly, the new JSA framework was enforced through an increased 
emphasis on benefit sanctions (Strickland, 1996). Similar to the pre-JSA regime, 
claimants could be sanctioned for a discretionary period of up to 26 weeks if 
they lost their jobs through misconduct, left work voluntarily or refused to apply 
for a notified vacancy. In addition, however, JSA introduced new pre-defined 
sanctions of two weeks, or four weeks for repeat non-compliance within the 
same 12 months, for failing to carry out a Jobseeker’s Direction. Those deemed 
not to be available for and actively seeking work, or who refused to sign the 
Jobseeker’s Agreement, would be disentitled from JSA. Taken together, these 
changes saw the extension of the sanctions regime from largely retrospective 
conditions of circumstance to include ongoing conditions of conduct, and 
reenforced the categorisation of unemployment in behavioural terms. An 
additional and important change in terms of the material circumstances of 
34 
 
  
unemployed individuals, furthermore, saw sanctioned JSA claimants lose 
automatic entitlement to hardship payments, payable at 60% or 80% of the JSA 
rate. Under the new regime, individuals would not get any support unless they 
could demonstrate that they would suffer hardship as a result of their sanction, 
and even then would get no financial support for the first two weeks unless they 
were in a pre-defined ‘vulnerable’ group.  
3.3 New Labour governments (1997-2010) 
3.3.1 Welfare-to-work and the New Deal 
The New Labour government elected in 1997 inherited both a comparatively low 
unemployment rate and benign economic conditions (MacDonald, 1997), but 
nonetheless went on to advance and entrench behavioural conditionality both 
for the unemployed and for previously exempt groups such as lone parents and 
disabled people. Reform was in part motivated by the view that the social 
security system had “become part of the problem itself” (DfEE, 2001: 1), blamed 
for the fact that, in 1997, the claimant count was 60% higher than in 1979, 
approximately one fifth of households had nobody in work and a third of children 
lived in poverty. In response, New Labour promised to rebuild the welfare state 
according to an approach that emphasised paid work as the best way to combat 
poverty, in what Finn (2003: 709) describes as an “employment-first” welfare 
state. As outlined in the Green Paper A New Contract for Welfare (DSS, 1998), 
policy interventions under the new paradigm would combine a carrot and stick 
approach in order to incentivise paid work. Accordingly, the provision of stronger 
work incentives through the establishment of a national minimum wage, tax 
credits and subsidised childcare would be accompanied by benefit sanctions in 
case of non-compliance with the requirements of benefit receipt. Reform began 
almost immediately in 1997, though the new era of welfare-to-work programmes 
that promised support tailored to the needs of each individual was formalised in 
the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 (Hasluck, 2001).  
A core element of the New Labour reform agenda was the development of New 
Deal programmes for various groups of benefit claimants, with primary 
importance placed on tackling youth unemployment (Jarvis, 1997). Introduced in 
1998, the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) was a compulsory programme 
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directed at individuals aged 18-24 who had been claiming JSA for over six 
months (DfEE, 1997). The NDYP involved a ‘Gateway’ period of up to four 
months of intensive job-search support, with claimants who were still 
unemployed at the end of this period moving on to a second stage that offered 
one of five compulsory options: full-time education and training for twelve 
months; work experience in the voluntary sector for six months; a community 
placement with the Environment Task Force for six months; a private-sector job 
supported by wage subsidy for six months, with training for at least one day per 
week; or an additional self-employment route with support towards starting and 
running a business. Importantly, refusal of the NDYP options in the second stage 
resulted in the claimant facing a benefit sanction. Initially, the NDYP operated 
within the JSA sanctions regime of pre-defined sanctions of two and four weeks 
for first and second ‘failures’, but from March 2000 a third repeat ‘failure’ 
resulted in an individual having their benefit suspended for up to 26 weeks (Finn, 
2003).  
3.3.2 Broadening the scope of conditionality 
The NDYP was accompanied by other New Deals for groups such as lone parents 
and disabled people (van Reenen, 2004). As the Green Paper Towards full 
employment (DfEE, 2001) describes, each New Deal was based on principles 
similar to those outlined for the NDYP, though participation for lone parents and 
disabled people was initially voluntary. An early emphasis on incentives and 
support, however, gradually shifted towards more conditional approaches that 
sought to promote employment outcomes (Dwyer, 2016). Throughout the first 
decade of the New Labour era, for example, two distinct conditionality regimes 
developed that distinguished between unemployed people through the JSA 
regime and lone parents and disabled people through the Work-focused 
Interviews (WFIs) regime (Gregg, 2008). WFIs were intended to provide 
personalised support for individuals to move towards employment by 
encouraging them to engage with a mix of support services and employment 
programmes. Mandatory WFIs were introduced for lone parents in 2001, 
affecting those claiming Income Support (IS) with a youngest child aged 5 or 
older (Johnsen, 2014). WFIs were extended to all lone parents claiming IS from 
2004, and incorporated mandatory Action Plans in 2005, with failure to comply 
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resulting in an open-ended 20% sanction until the conditions were met. For 
disabled people, mandatory WFIs were introduced in pilot form in 2003 and 
rolled out thereafter (Toerien et al., 2013).  
Subsequently, a Green Paper (DWP, 2006) and a report commissioned by the 
DWP recommended the further extension of work-related conditionality to lone 
parents and disabled people (Freud, 2007), with the various changes 
incorporated in the Welfare Reform Act 2007. Lone Parent Obligations (LPOs) 
were introduced in 2008, initially requiring claimants of IS with children over the 
age of 12 to be available for and to actively seek work (Johnsen, 2014). For 
disabled people, Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) was introduced for 
new claimants in 2008, replacing Incapacity Benefit (IB), disability related 
Income Support (IS) and Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA) (Patrick, 2011). 
The new regime distinguished between the severely disabled and those 
temporarily unfit to work and required new claimants to undergo a Work 
Capability Assessment (WCA), from which three outcomes follow. First, those 
with severe conditions enter the Support Group, which entitles them to 
unconditional support. Second, those with less severe conditions are placed in 
the Work Related Activity Group (WRAG) and required to participate in WFIs, 
produce action plans and engage in work-related activities. Failure to comply 
would result in an open-ended sanction of 50% of the Work Related Activity 
Component (WRAC) of ESA for the first four weeks and 100% thereafter until the 
conditions are met. Finally, those found fit for work are disqualified from ESA 
and must instead claim JSA.  
Following the Welfare Reform Act 2007, the DWP commissioned an additional 
report, Realising Potential (Gregg, 2008), which set out aims to establish 
personalised conditionality and support in line with the government’s previous 
Green Paper (DWP, 2008a) and subsequent White Paper (DWP, 2008b). The 
Gregg report (2008: 27) describes behavioural conditionality as a “central tenet” 
of the social security system, and recommended that it should be extended to 
the vast majority of claimants so that all but the most in need would be 
required, under threat of sanction, to take steps towards finding work. The 
report argued, furthermore, that the existing sanctions regime was too complex 
and difficult to understand, and should align the imposition of a sanction more 
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closely with specific types of non-compliant behaviour. The recommendations 
were incorporated in the Welfare Reform Act 2009, enacted in the aftermath of 
the recession that followed the 2007-08 financial crisis (Daguerre and 
Etherington, 2014). In particular, the Act set out plans to abolish IS and IB and to 
move recipients onto JSA or ESA, as well as changes to make the sanctions 
system more “consistent, automatic and escalating” (Barker and Lamble, 2009: 
324). The new rules, for example, introduced a new regime for non-attendance 
at mandatory Jobcentre appointments for JSA claimants, which would result in a 
benefit sanction of at least a week for a first ‘failure’ and two weeks for 
subsequent non-compliance.  
3.4 Coalition government (2010-2015) 
3.4.1 Continuity and change 
The Conservatives and Liberal Democrats formed a Coalition government in 
2010, forged together around an austerity programme that – amongst other 
rationales – renewed the emphasis on behavioural conditionality as a means for 
achieving reductions in public expenditure (McEnhill and Taylor-Gooby, 2018). 
Daguerre and Etherington (2014) highlight the features of the Coalition’s reforms 
that arguably represent a continuation of the New Labour agenda. First, the 
Welfare Reform Act 2009 had introduced a mandatory Work for Your Benefit 
scheme for long-term JSA claimants, introduced in pilot form pre-2010 and then 
fully rolled out by the Coalition. Subsequently, this was replaced by the 
Mandatory Work Activity scheme in 2011, which enabled advisers to instruct 
claimants to attend up to 30 hours per week unpaid compulsory work placements 
for a maximum of four weeks. Second, the Coalition continued to reduce the 
child age thresholds at which eligibility to IS for lone parents became conditional 
on active job search. Age thresholds were gradually reduced from age 10 or 
above in 2010 to 3 or above in 2014, with lone parents of children aged 5 and 
above expected to meet the full work-related requirements of JSA. Third, the 
Coalition continued to target the number of existing IB claimants. Between 2011 
and 2014, all existing claimants of incapacity benefits were reassessed for ESA 
under the Work Capability Assessment (WCA).  
38 
 
  
Several aspects of the post-2010 period, nevertheless, distinguish it from the 
New Labour era in what Fletcher and Wright (2018: 324) describe as the 
Coalition’s “punitive turn”. Prior to 2010, the UK’s work first approach combined 
both disciplinary and assistive measures as previously described, in the form of 
work-related conditionality, sanctions and a variety of employment-related 
support initiatives, a national minimum wage, support for childcare and working 
tax credits. Indeed, a significant initiative towards the end of the New Labour 
era saw the creation of the Future Jobs Fund (FJF) in 2009, which provided a 
temporary guaranteed job to young long-term unemployed people (Fishwick et 
al., 2011). The FJF, however, was abandoned by the Coalition in favour of its 
centrepiece welfare-to-work scheme, the Work Programme (WP) (DWP, 2012). 
The Work Programme was aimed at assisting the long-term unemployed into 
work, and was mandatory for JSA claimants and ESA WRAG claimants, on the 
basis of a “payment-for-results” (DWP, 2012: 2) model in which a range of sub-
contracted private and third sector providers were allowed significant freedom 
in determining what support to provide. Critics of the scheme have argued that 
the payment structure incentivised providers to offer minimal support and poor 
quality services for long-term unemployed individuals, focusing on those closest 
to the labour market and ignoring harder to help groups in a process described 
as “creaming and parking” (Carter and Whitworth, 2015: 277).  
A diminished emphasis on employment support was accompanied by a renewed 
emphasis on benefit sanctions, with the Coalition period characterised by what 
Webster (2016: 2) describes as a “great sanctions drive”. Section 3.5 provides 
more depth on sanctions policy during this period, which provides the context to 
the empirical investigation carried out in this thesis. Here, however, it is 
important to briefly highlight two important features of this sanctions drive. 
First, the Coalition government oversaw an unprecedented level in the 
frequency with which sanctions were imposed. Between 2010 and 2015, for 
example, nearly a quarter (24%) of JSA claimants received at least one sanction 
(NAO, 2016a), whilst monthly rates of JSA sanctions were consistently higher 
compared with their historic level (Webster, 2016). ESA WRAG sanctions also 
experienced an increase, albeit to a smaller degree and from a lower base level. 
Second, the Coalition marked a step change by dramatically increasing the 
severity of the sanctions that could be applied, as enacted by the Welfare 
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Reform Act 2012. For JSA claimants, the minimum length of a sanction was 
increased from one to four weeks, whilst the maximum length was increased 
from 26 to 156 weeks, in an escalating system in which claimants could be 
sanctioned for fixed lengths of 4, 13, 26 and 156 weeks (DWP, 2013a). For ESA 
WRAG claimants, furthermore, the new regime replaced the previous system 
with a 100% open-ended reduction of the central ESA component, followed by a 
sanction of one, two or four weeks following re-compliance.  
3.4.2 Universal Credit 
The Welfare Reform Act 2012 is significant, furthermore, for its introduction of 
Universal Credit (UC), as initially outlined in an earlier Green Paper (DWP, 
2010a) and White Paper (DWP, 2010b). Universal Credit began a phased 
introduction in 2013 for new claimants, amalgamating several existing means-
tested benefits and tax credits into a single working-age benefit, which include: 
JSA; ESA; IS; Housing Benefit; Child Tax Credit; and Working Tax Credit (Dwyer 
and Wright, 2014). Existing contributory benefits, however, such as contributory 
JSA and contributory ESA remain. Universal Credit is delivered as a single 
payment that is intended to incentivise entry into work for the unemployed, as 
well as progression to more or higher paid work for those on low wages. An 
important feature of the new benefit is the Claimant Commitment, also 
introduced for JSA and ESA WRAG claimants. Similar to the Jobseeker’s 
Agreement, the commitment sets out the job seeking and work-related 
conditions of benefit receipt and may include, for example, the requirement to 
attend the local Jobcentre more frequently, to spend 35-hours a week looking 
for work or to apply for a minimum number of jobs per week (Gillies et al., 
2013). Importantly, the monitoring of the Claimant Commitment intensifies the 
threat of sanction for claimants, who can have their benefit removed for non-
compliance with any item that it includes (Fletcher and Wright, 2018).  
Arguably, the most significant feature of Universal Credit is its extension of 
conditionality to those in employment, re-categorising the previously ‘deserving’ 
status of low-paid workers and constructing ‘dependency’ as a failure to be fully 
financially independent of the state (Dwyer and Wright, 2014; Millar and 
Bennett, 2017). In-work conditionality operates through the creation of a 
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“conditionality threshold” (DWP, 2010b: 31), which specifies that recipients in 
low-paid or part-time employment with earnings that fall below the minimum 
will be subject to conditionality until they find better paid work or work more 
hours. Thus, Universal Credit aims to achieve “personalised conditionality” 
(DWP, 2010b: 27), whereby the intensity of welfare conditionality applied varies 
along a spectrum. In addition to the in-work group, this includes: ‘no 
conditionality’ for those in the ESA Support Group; ‘keeping in touch’ with the 
labour market via mandatory WFIs for lone parents with a child aged one to five; 
‘work preparation’ for ESA WRAG claimants; and ‘active job search’ for JSA 
claimants and lone parents with a child aged 5 or above. Sanctions operate in a 
similar fashion to the JSA regime, with penalties of between one and 156 weeks 
depending on the number and type of ‘failures’ committed (DWP, 2019). Whilst 
three-year sanctions have recently been abolished by the DWP, the harshness of 
the system continues, including consecutive as opposed to concurrent sanctions 
combined with repayable hardship payments.  
3.4.3 Key developments in sanctions 
Thus far, this chapter has provided an overview of developments in 
conditionality and sanctions in UK social security since the 1980s, documenting 
an agenda that has been pursued by a variety of governments and in varying 
economic circumstances (Wright, 2012). Dwyer (2004: 265) describes 
developments in the earlier period in terms of “creeping conditionality”, in a 
process that has arguably reached a state of “ubiquitous conditionality” (Dwyer 
and Wright, 2014: 27) today following the introduction of Universal Credit. 
Whilst work-related conditionality has long played a role within the UK social 
security system, its influence is no longer restricted to the unemployed, now 
also applying to lone parents, disabled people and people in low-paid 
employment. With regard to sanctions specifically, significant developments 
have seen changes in the “nature, scope, and scale” (Adler, 2016: 199) of their 
application. Table 3.1 summarises these developments, adapting a table initially 
constructed by Adler (2018: 47). It contrasts the era prior to the introduction of 
JSA in 1996 with subsequent developments.   
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Table 3.1: developments in UK sanctions policy 
Pre-JSA (1996) Post-JSA and Welfare Reform Act 2012 
Apply mainly for retrospective conditions 
of circumstance, e.g. for leaving work 
voluntarily, being dismissed for 
misconduct or not being available for 
work. 
Also apply for ongoing conditions of 
conduct, e.g. for not actively seeking 
work, failing to attend a training or 
employment scheme, or missing an 
interview. 
Apply to unemployed individuals – 
specifically applicants of unemployment 
insurance benefits. 
Apply to unemployed individuals, lone 
parents, long-term sick and disabled 
people and those in low-paid 
unemployment – applicants and recipients 
of JSA, ESA, IS and UC. 
Apply for discretionary periods of up to 
six weeks (1911-1986), 13 weeks (1986-
1988) or 26 weeks (1988 onwards). 
Apply for fixed periods ranging from four 
weeks to 156 weeks (though 156 week 
sanction dropped in 2019). 
Sanctioned claimants had a right to claim 
means-tested social assistance (at a 
reduced rate) immediately. 
Sanctioned claimants have to apply for 
discretionary hardship payments (also at 
a reduced rate) but, in most cases, only 
after a two-week delay. For UC 
claimants, these must be repaid. 
Source: adapted from Adler (2018) 
The following section considers JSA sanctions policy throughout the Coalition 
government in more depth, which is the period that provides the specific 
context for the empirical investigation carried out in this thesis. Sanctions policy 
between 2010 and 2015 is considered to represent a major economic and social 
policy experiment, which as previously alluded to involved an increase in the 
overall number of sanctions applied as well as a significant increase in their 
potential length of application (Webster, 2016). Whilst the next section focuses 
solely on JSA sanctions, it is important to re-iterate that ESA sanctions also saw 
important developments during this period. There were variations in the 
frequency of ESA sanctions, albeit at a much lower level than for JSA sanctions, 
whilst the severity of sanctions were increased from December 2012 onwards, as 
previously described.  
3.5 JSA sanctions policy during the Coalition 
3.5.1 Variations in the frequency of sanctions 
All JSA claimants are subject to the threat of sanctions for not complying with 
the rules of JSA receipt. In terms of the frequency of sanctions actually applied, 
however, the DWP has repeatedly claimed that such financial penalties 
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ultimately affect relatively few JSA claimants, arguing for example that 
sanctions are “only used as a last resort in a small percentage of cases” (DWP, 
2015a: 2). Between 2010 and 2015, however, nearly a quarter (24%) of JSA 
claimants received at least one sanction, of which nearly three-fifths (58%) 
received one sanction, a fifth (20%) received two sanctions and just over a fifth 
(22%) received three or more sanctions (NAO, 2016a). These figures suggest that 
whilst sanction impositions do not affect a majority of JSA claimants, they 
certainly affect a sizeable minority that represents many more than the small 
percentage of cases claimed by the DWP. Importantly, furthermore, there was 
significant variation in sanction rates throughout this period, which saw notable 
rises and falls as the Coalition’s social security policies developed. This variation 
is demonstrated in Figure 3.1, which depicts the monthly rate of JSA sanctions 
imposed as a proportion of JSA claimants between 2010 and 2015.  
As Figure 3.1 makes clear, there was considerable monthly variation in the rate 
of JSA sanctions throughout the 2010-2015 period. Following the onset of the 
Coalition government, for example, there was an immediate and marked rise in 
sanctions rates, which rose from 3.1% in May 2010 to 5.3% in March 2011 in what 
Webster (2016: 2) describes as an “unannounced change of policy”. Non-
transparent changes in policy are, by their very definition, hard to verify. The 
available evidence, however, suggests that such departmental decision-making is 
likely to have played an important role throughout the period. In April 2011, for 
example, the previous “system of targets through benchmarks” (Couling, 2013: 
3) for sanctions referrals was removed, which the DWP itself identified as a 
factor in the subsequent fall in the sanctions rate to December 2011 (NAO, 
2016a). Whilst the DWP denies any subsequent use of sanctions targets from 
April 2011 onwards, the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (HoC 
WPC, 2014) notes that in the same month new performance indicators for 
Jobcentre Plus offices and staff were introduced, in which sanction referral 
rates formed part of an advisor’s overall performance assessment. In a review of 
sanctions policy under the Coalition, furthermore, the National Audit Office 
(NAO, 2016a) concludes that management focus was influential, citing evidence 
from Jobcentre staff relating to an increased emphasis on sanctions in the period 
leading up to the height of sanctions in October 2013, followed by a relaxation in 
management pressure in the following period.  
43 
 
  
Figure 3.1: monthly rate of JSA sanctions (per cent of JSA claimants), 2010-15 
 
Source: author’s calculations using Stat-Xplore data (DWP, 2018c) 
Another important determinant of sanctions during the period relates to the 
Work Programme, introduced in June 2011 and considered a key driver in the 
increase in sanctions from the beginning of 2012 to its peak of 7.5% in October 
2013, over twice the monthly rate at the onset of the Coalition (NAO, 2016a; 
Webster, 2016). According to the Oakley Review (2014), for example, the Work 
Programme led to many more sanctions referrals than would otherwise have 
been the case, partly due to the fact that providers were obliged by the DWP to 
make sanction referrals according to a very strict interpretation of the 
sanctioning rules, irrespective of claimants’ actual willingness to comply with 
such rules. Indeed, the principle reason for sanctions being imposed during this 
period related to ‘failures’ to participate in training or employment schemes, 
which in this context can be interpreted as the Work Programme (Webster, 
2016). The number of sanctions relating to the Work Programme were followed 
in frequency by sanctions for not actively seeking work as well as not attending 
an interview. Importantly, Figure 3.1 depicts that following October 2013 the 
sanctions rate gradually returned to its pre-Coalition level. In addition to the 
change in management focus identified above, this reduction is partly explained 
by falling numbers of people involved in the Work Programme from the end of 
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2013 onwards, as opposed to any change in claimant behaviour, leading to the 
3% sanction rate reached by the end of the Coalition in May 2015.  
Whilst there is a clear fall in the sanctions rate from its height in October 2013, 
however, it is important to consider this change within the wider context of 
sanctioning policy. The JSA sanctions rate displayed in Figure 3.1, for example, 
does not include sanctions associated with unemployed claimants of Universal 
Credit (UC), which began its pathfinder phase in April 2013 followed by a 
national rollout in February 2015. Consequently, the observed sanctions rate 
underestimates the true level of sanctions from April 2013 onwards. Despite this 
underestimate, however, the entire Coalition period is characterised by an 
abnormally high imposition of benefit sanctions. Indeed, prior to May 2010 and 
going back to the introduction of JSA in 1996, the rate of sanctions was 
consistently below 3%, only rising to slightly below 4% during the 2007-08 
financial crisis (NAO, 2016a). Webster (2016) calculates that during the Coalition 
period there were over a million more JSA sanctions than there would have been 
if the rate inherited from the previous government had continued. As the 
previous section described, furthermore, the Welfare Reform Act 2012 marked a 
step change by dramatically increasing the severity of the sanctions that could 
be applied. Whatever the overall rate of sanctions, therefore, the individual 
experience of a sanction was made significantly worse by the Coalition’s social 
security reforms.  
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3.5.2 Increase in the severity of sanctions 
Table 3.2 details the specific aspects of the new JSA sanctions regime that were 
introduced in October 2012, contrasting the new rules with the system that was 
previously in operation. As Table 3.2 indicates, the Welfare Reform Act 2012 
introduced a tiered system with three levels of sanctions, according to which 
unemployed individuals are now at threat of losing their benefits for between 
four and 156 weeks depending on the type and number of rules not complied 
with. As previously indicated, the three most common reasons for a sanction 
during the Coalition period relate to failing to participate in training or 
employment schemes, not actively seeking work and not attending an interview. 
Perhaps most significantly, the minimum sanction length increased four-fold 
from 1 to 4 weeks whilst the maximum sanction length increased six-fold from 
26 to 156 weeks. As Table 3.2 indicates, furthermore, the requirement to be 
available for and actively seeking work was previously accompanied solely by a 
disentitlement, which in practice permitted almost immediate returns to JSA if 
the individual could show that they were now meeting requirements (DWP, 
2011a). In the new regime, however, penalties for similar infringements are met 
with both a disentitlement and a minimum four-week sanction, meaning that 
upon re-claiming JSA claimants will not begin receiving JSA again for at least a 
month. Publicly available statistics elide the distinction between disentitlements 
and sanctions, an issue that will be further discussed in Chapter 5.  
3.5.3 Public controversy 
Sanctions policy during the Coalition government generated significant 
controversy, caused both by the frequency with which sanctions were applied as 
well as by the new harsher sanctions regime introduced by the Welfare Reform 
Act 2012. Adler (2016: 195), for example, argues that sanctions policy during this 
period came to represent a “new leviathan”, on the basis that at their height, 
the frequency of sanctions exceeded the number of fines originating in the 
criminal courts. Along with many of the Coalition’s benefit reforms in this 
period, sanctions attracted significant media attention, as well as criticism from 
various third sector groups and think tanks (CAB, 2013; Cowburn, 2015; Tinson, 
2015). Criticism focused on the large number of sanctions made in error, narrow 
and inflexible adherence to sanctioning rules by Jobcentre staff, 
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disproportionate rates of sanctions imposed on particular groups and – as 
highlighted in Chapter 2 – adverse impacts on claimants (de Vries et al., 2017; 
Garthwaite, 2016; NAO, 2016a; Geiger, 2017).  
Indeed, public controversy in this area motivated a number of official 
investigations into sanctions policy, including a review by Oakley (2014), a House 
of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (HoC WPC, 2015) inquiry and an 
investigation by the National Audit Office (NAO, 2016a). Subsequent to the 
Coalition period, furthermore, two additional inquiries were carried out by the 
House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (HoC PAC, 2017) and the House 
of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (HoC WPC, 2018), both of which 
considered the ongoing legacy of the reforms that were implemented in 2012.  
Each of these official investigations made several recommendations to the DWP, 
and covered a wide range of issues and concerns. A recurring theme relates to 
the evidence that the DWP used to inform the 2012 reforms, as well as the 
evidence-base relating to the impacts of sanctions themselves. The National 
Audit Office (2016a: 10) report, for example, notes that the DWP provided “little 
evidence for its design choices” when introducing the escalating sanctions 
regime outlined in Table 3.2 and didn’t subsequently use its own data to 
evaluate the impacts of sanctions. In addition, the report argues that the DWP 
lacks a “strong evidence base about the effects of sanctions and the trade-offs 
involved” (NAO, 2016a: 38), in terms of the labour market and wider effects of 
sanctions, and the overall net cost or benefit of sanctions policy. These concerns 
were forcefully reiterated in the most recent inquiry, which recommended the 
DWP to “urgently evaluate the effectiveness of reforms to welfare conditionality 
and sanctions introduced since 2012” (HoC WPC, 2018: 19). In its response, the 
DWP accepted this criticism and stated that it intends to carry out an 
evaluation, specifically in relation to labour market outcomes and impacts on 
health and well-being (HoC WPC, 2019).  
Partly informed by this pressing need, the empirical chapters in this thesis 
consider the mental health impacts of sanctions policy using data pertaining to 
the Coalition period. In order to inform this investigation, the following chapter 
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focuses specifically on the labour market and wider impacts of benefit sanctions, 
reviewing both the UK and international evidence in this regard.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of behavioural conditionality in the UK 
since the 1980s, documenting the growth of work-related requirements and 
sanctions in the social security system to a state of “ubiquitous conditionality” 
(Dwyer and Wright, 2014: 27) for claimants today. Whilst work-related 
requirements played a role in the UK social security system prior to the period of 
analysis of focus here, this chapter has nevertheless demonstrated important 
qualitative changes along all the three ‘levels’ of conditionality that provide 
support for the ‘triple integration’ in unemployment protection previously 
discussed in Chapter 2 (Clasen and Clegg, 2007; 2011). An important shift was 
signified by the introduction of JSA in 1996, which brought together changes 
designed to better enforce the notion of unemployment as active jobseeking, 
more restrictive eligibility criteria and an expansion in the scope of 
conditionality and sanctions, which subsequently applied to both retrospective 
rules and ongoing work-related behavioural demands. Since then, behavioural 
conditionality and sanctions have been extended to previously exempt groups, 
such as lone parents, disabled people and people in low-paid employment. In 
addition, this chapter has outlined the various developments in sanctions policy 
that occurred during the period of Coalition government (2010-15). Specific 
attention was given to JSA sanctions policy during this time, which saw 
unprecedented levels in the frequency of sanctions applied and a significant 
increase in their severity. Sanctions policy in general, and these changes 
specifically, has generated debate regarding impacts on claimants, which is the 
focus of the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4. Impacts of benefit sanctions 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the literature that investigates the impacts of benefit 
sanctions on claimants, distinguishing between what are described as labour 
market and wider impacts. The stated primary aim of sanctions policy, both in 
the UK and internationally, is to increase rates of re-entry into employment for 
unemployed individuals (DWP, 2011a; Immervoll and Knotz, 2018). In addition, it 
is argued that these employment effects will lead to various wider benefits. The 
DWP (2011a: 10) argues, for example, that sanction-related employment effects 
will be accompanied by a range of “fiscal, as well as wider economic and social 
benefits”. These include: reduced public expenditure on a variety of benefits 
and increased tax receipts; benefits to the economy as a whole; increased 
income and improvements in health as a result of being in work; as well as 
reductions in child poverty from increases in parental employment. Based on this 
distinction between the separate impacts of benefit sanctions, this chapter first 
discusses the theory and evidence regarding labour market impacts before going 
on to discuss the evidence relating to wider impacts. Given the empirical focus 
on mental health impacts in this thesis, particular attention is paid to the 
existing literature in this area, as well as to considering the mechanisms that 
might link sanctions and impacts on mental health outcomes.  
Before discussing the literature, it is important to highlight that there are at 
least three points in time at which benefit sanctions might have an effect. These 
are referred to as take-up effects, threat effects and imposition effects (Griggs 
and Evans, 2010). Take-up effects are influential before a benefit claim is made, 
since the very prospect of sanctions may deter eligible individuals from claiming 
in the first place. Threat effects, in contrast, occur during a benefit claim itself 
when the general threat of sanctions or an actual warning may impact claimants 
in some way. Imposition effects, lastly, occur once sanctions have actually been 
applied. Whilst take-up effects represent an important element of sanctions and 
conditionality more broadly, the focus here is on threat and imposition effects, 
given the empirical focus of this thesis. Regarding these latter two effects, 
furthermore, the literature on sanction impacts is more developed in the area of 
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imposition effects, which are easier to measure and investigate within empirical 
research. With the possible exception of formal sanction warnings, there is an 
evident difficulty in separating the threat effect of sanctions from the broader 
effect that the pressure of conditionality and monitoring might have on 
individuals. Indeed, since conditional requirements are premised on the threat 
of sanctions to ensure compliance, there are conceptual reasons against trying 
to delineate between their separate effects.  
4.2 Labour market impacts 
4.2.1 Job search theory 
The economic literature on benefit sanctions relies solely on job search theory 
as formalised by Mortensen (1977), which has three key constitutive elements: 
job search intensity and effectiveness; job matching; and an individual’s 
reservation wage. As is standard in economic modelling, job search theory 
adopts a rational choice theory of human agency, as described in Chapter 2 in 
relation to Murray’s (1990) appeal to the behaviour of the ‘economic man’. 
According to this framework, utility maximising individuals in the job search 
model compare the expected utility from unemployment benefits versus the 
expected utility associated with job search and possible employment. Job search 
intensity determines the rate of job offers that an individual receives, and job 
acceptance depends on the individual’s reservation wage, the lowest wage rate 
that they are willing to accept. Unemployment benefits, it is therefore assumed, 
disincentivise work by lowering the cost of unemployment for individuals, 
reducing their job search intensity and increasing their reservation wage. Work-
related conditionality, monitoring and sanctions, on the other hand, are assumed 
to increase the likelihood of an individual finding employment by increasing the 
relative costs of unemployment (van den Berg et al., 2004). Individuals are 
expected to respond to the threat of sanctions, for example, by increasing their 
job search intensity, lowering their reservation wage and accepting more job 
offers, or else risk having a sanction imposed.  
Basic job search theory therefore appears to offer the unequivocal prediction 
that sanctions will result in positive employment outcomes, both in terms of 
threat and imposition effects. Developments of the basic model, however, 
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complicate this unambiguous view. Van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006), for 
example, distinguish between formal and informal job search, in which formal 
routes refer to job search methods that are recognised by the social security 
system compared with unrecognised informal routes such as job referrals by 
friends, relatives or other contacts. Within this model, the threat of sanctions is 
potentially ineffective, since such a threat simply leads unemployed individuals 
to substitute formal job search for the informal job search methods that they 
were already doing. The overall level of job search, therefore, may not increase, 
implying no employment impacts whatsoever. Indeed, since the possibility exists 
that informal job search is in fact more effective than formal job search, 
monitoring and the threat of sanctions could even have a perverse effect on 
employment re-entry, though the relative balance of the two methods is 
assumed by van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) to ultimately be 
undetermined.  
In addition, it is unclear what the job search model implies in relation to 
sanctions and labour market outcomes other than job re-entry. Arni et al. 
(2013), for example, argue that the theory’s predictions regarding post-
unemployment earnings and job stability are indeterminate. Job search theory 
posits that if an unemployed individual searches more intensely for a job as a 
result of threatened or imposed sanctions, they will then spend less time in 
unemployment. Such an outcome could have positive consequences, since less 
time spent out of work minimises the risk of skill depreciation and serves as a 
positive signal to employers. Consequently, it might be expected that sanctions 
will be associated with individuals finding jobs that are similar to the one that 
they had prior to unemployment, with potentially beneficial implications for 
earnings and job stability. On the other hand, an explicit feature of the job 
search model is that benefit sanctions function by influencing individuals to 
lower their reservation wages. This implies that the model should also expect 
that unemployed individuals will accept lower-quality jobs than they would 
otherwise do, at lower wage levels or job duration. Theoretical predictions, 
therefore, are inconclusive on the matter of post-unemployment effects, since it 
is unclear what the balance of factors is expected to be.  
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In addition, Arni et al. (2013) recognise that benefit sanctions may be associated 
with negative impacts on labour force attachment for some individuals. To 
explain this potential outcome within the job search framework, they posit – in 
an arguably ad hoc fashion – that a certain subpopulation of unemployed 
individuals gain only slightly more utility from being in registered unemployment 
than being in unregistered unemployment. For these individuals, both the threat 
and imposition effects of benefit sanctions reduces the utility of registered 
unemployment such that they would prefer to be unemployed but without 
registering to claim unemployment benefit. It is not clear, however, whether 
such individuals would eventually become economically inactive, as opposed to 
remaining unemployed but unregistered, and it is unclear on what basis job 
search theory would provide a means for making a prediction in this area. Once 
again, therefore, appeals to job search theory provide indeterminate predictions 
in the area of labour market outcomes. Informed by the present discussion, 
Table 4.1 summarises the labour market outcomes of benefit sanctions predicted 
by job search theory, distinguishing between threat and imposition effects.  
Table 4.1: job search theory predictions of the labour market impacts of benefit sanctions 
 
Job re-
entry 
Post-unemployment 
earnings 
Job 
stability 
Labour force 
attachment 
Threat effect: Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain 
Imposition effect: Increase Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain 
Table 4.1 demonstrates that job search theory, despite its predominant 
application within the quantitative literature, has arguably limited potential in 
terms of informing research in this area. Indeed, out of the various potential 
labour market impacts that are identified, the job search framework provides 
only one clear prediction in relation to imposition effects and job re-entry. 
Based on a usefulness criterion alone, therefore, there is a clear need for a 
separate framework to be developed in order to inform both policymaking and 
research into the labour market impacts of benefit sanctions, though this 
potentially expansive task will not be carried out here.  
Indeed, there are a number of criticisms of the application of job search theory 
in relation to benefit sanctions that go beyond its poor predictive insight. A 
central criticism relates to its reliance on rational choice theory, a highly 
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reductive account that might enable economic modelling but has much less 
relevance in terms of informing successful policy design, which needs to take 
into account the realities and complexities of human agency and motivation 
(Wright, 2012; 2016). Additional concerns, for example, highlight the evident 
need for claimants to have sufficient resources for successful job search and re-
entry to take place, as well as whether there is sufficient job availability for 
sanctioned claimants to have realistic employment prospects (Taulbut et al., 
2018). Clearly, the possibility exists that policymaker assumptions regarding 
sanctions and labour market effects might not correspond with the reality, and 
it is to the empirical literature that this section now turns.  
4.2.2 Empirical evidence 
The available quantitative research from the UK provides mixed evidence 
regarding labour market outcomes. The most methodologically robust study is 
carried out by the National Audit Office (NAO, 2016b), which analyses individual-
level data on claimants who were part of the Work Programme. Chapter 3 
provides more detail on the Work Programme itself, though the important 
feature to highlight here is that the initiative was targeted at the long-term 
unemployed, and so the results are not necessarily generalisable beyond this 
group. The NAO (2016b) study, nevertheless, was able to exploit an 
experimental feature in the design of the Work Programme, whereby claimants 
were randomly allocated to different providers who themselves made varying 
use of sanctions. Exploiting this randomisation through the use of instrumental 
variables regression, the study finds that JSA sanctions are associated with an 
increased probability of employment up to a year after a sanction has been 
imposed, though no effect is observed regarding earnings. A reduction in the 
number of days that individuals claim JSA is also observed, though this effect is 
driven by both increases in days in employment as well as slightly larger 
increases in days neither in employment nor claiming benefits.  
The results of the NAO (2016b) study are complemented by two additional UK 
studies that are carried out at the aggregate-level. Loopstra et al. (2015b) 
analyse local authority-level data using fixed effects models, and find that 
increases in the application of sanctions are associated with increases in 
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individuals exiting JSA. Similarly, whilst this effect is partly explained by 
transitions into employment, a larger effect is found in terms of transitions to 
unknown non-work destinations, which the authors consider to be explained by 
individuals remaining unemployed whilst not claiming benefits. Indeed, the 
results indicate that increased sanctioning is associated with falls in the JSA 
claimant count, but no relationship is found to exist for local authority 
employment or unemployment rates. Taulbut et al. (2018), furthermore, analyse 
time-series data using multivariate structural vector auto-regression models, and 
find that increases in the threat and imposition of sanctions has a positive 
impact on flows into work in the short-term (below six months) but not in the 
long-term (up to 18 months). No impact is observed on unemployment rates, 
however, suggesting little effect on the functioning of the labour market itself. 
Importantly, an interrupted time-series analysis suggests that the harsher 
sanctions regime brought about by the Welfare Reform Act 2012 had no impact 
on flows from JSA into work.  
There is a limited amount of evidence in the UK literature on sanctions relating 
to disabled people. The previously discussed NAO (2016b) study, for example, 
also looks at labour market impacts for long-term ESA WRAG claimants who 
participated in the Work Programme. Contrary to the findings for JSA claimants, 
which showed both positive and negative labour market effects, the findings for 
ESA claimants are uniquely negative. That is, up to a year after a sanction has 
been imposed, sanctions are found to: reduce the probability of employment; 
reduce earnings; increase the number of days claiming benefits and not working; 
increase the number of days neither in employment nor claiming benefits; and 
reduce the number of days both claiming and employed. Reeves (2017), 
furthermore, provides additional evidence on sanctions imposed on JSA 
claimants who self-declare as having a physical or mental health problem that 
seriously affects their day-to-day life, though for reasons unknown are not 
claiming ESA. Through analysis of local authority-level data and using fixed 
effects models, the findings suggest that increases in sanctions are associated 
with rises in the economically inactive disability rate, whilst no clear 
relationship is observed in terms of the employed disability rate.  
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In addition to the UK evidence, there is a larger literature from across other 
European social security systems that focuses on unemployment-related 
sanctions. A US literature also exists, though these studies are not discussed 
here given the use of full-family sanctions in the US social security system 
(Fording et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2014). This restriction is helpful in terms of 
comparability. It is important to re-iterate the point previously highlighted in 
Chapter 2, however, that sanctions in the mainland European studies considered 
in this section are less severe than in the UK, with the exception of Finland. 
These studies are also unable to benefit from the type of natural experiment 
design utilised by the NAO (2016b) study. In that investigation, randomisation is 
exploited to help overcome the risk that sanctioned and non-sanctioned 
individuals may differ in important ways that are relevant to their labour market 
outcomes. In contrast, the quantitative studies discussed in the remainder of 
this section rely on the timing-of-events model developed by Abbring and van 
den Berg (2003). Within this approach, both the duration until sanctioning and 
the duration of unemployment are modelled simultaneously. It seeks to control 
for unobserved characteristics that affect both the duration until sanctioning 
and the speed at which an individual finds a job once sanctioned, such as skill 
level, preferences and motivation. By controlling for such unobserved 
characteristics, the model aims to reduce potential bias affecting the estimated 
effect of sanctions on labour market outcomes.  
In terms of employment re-entry, van den Berg et al. (2004) conduct one of the 
earliest studies into the imposition effects of sanctions that uses Dutch 
administrative data on means-tested unemployment benefit recipients, as 
opposed to unemployment insurance (UI) recipients. Within the Dutch system, 
sanctions for those on means-tested unemployment benefits consist of 
temporary reductions of 5%, 10% or 20% for a potential maximum of six months 
but usually of only one or two months. In this context, the study finds large 
employment effects. Sanctions more than double the transition rate from 
benefits to employment, which increases by over 140%. However, the harsher 
20% sanctions are not found to be associated with stronger effects compared 
with the 5% sanctions. Abbring et al. (2005) conduct a similar study using 
administrative data on UI recipients in the Netherlands. Though the UI benefit is 
more generous than the means-tested benefit, UI sanctions are slightly harsher, 
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in that temporary partial reductions range from 5% for four weeks to 30% for 13 
weeks, whilst permanent reductions are either full or partial. Interestingly, 
Abbring et al. (2005) find slightly smaller employment effects, which range from 
increases in the transition rate of between 36% and 98% depending on the 
sample analysed.  
A study by Svarer (2011), furthermore, indicates that the unemployment exit 
effects of benefit sanctions can operate in response to the imposition of 
relatively small financial penalties. Using administrative data from Denmark, 
where UI sanctions last for up to 3 days or – in fewer instances – for 3 weeks, the 
results indicate that the exit rate increases by more than 100% in response to a 
sanction. In addition, the effects of sanctions are shown to differ depending on 
claimant characteristics. Danish citizens and single unemployed people in the 
sample, for example, appear to respond more strongly to sanctions than non-
citizens or married individuals. Perhaps most importantly, however, is the 
finding that the effect of sanctions decreases over time and does not persist in 
the long-term, since the imposition effects of sanctions are no longer 
statistically significant after three months. As Svarer (2011) highlights, a possible 
explanation of this finding is that those individuals who are already closest to 
the labour market are the ones who find employment following a sanction, 
whilst those who find it harder to find employment remain unemployed. Whilst a 
plausible interpretation, the data used by Svarer (2011) does not distinguish 
between unemployment exits into employment or outside the labour force itself.  
Busk (2016), in contrast, is able to compare both means-tested and UI benefit 
sanctions as well as investigate a wide range of specific labour market effects, 
considering impacts on the exit rate from unemployment to work, involvement 
in ALMPs and to outside the labour force. Administrative data from Finland is 
analysed, where complete benefit loss is imposed for between 30 and 150 days 
depending on a variety of circumstances. Importantly, the findings indicate that 
the effect of sanctions differs according to the type of benefit claimed. In 
particular, ongoing sanctions increased the transition rate to work by 84% for the 
means-tested recipients and 25% for UI recipients, whilst completed sanctions 
increased the rate by 34% for the former group but had no effect on the latter. 
Sanctions also led to an 11% increase in the probability of participating in an 
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ALMP for means-tested recipients, but had no effect on UI recipients. For both 
benefit types, sanctions increased the rate of transition out of the labour force, 
but the effect was particularly strong for UI recipients, who were three times 
more likely to exit the labour force (82%) than to return to work (25%).  
In addition to imposition effects, Lalive et al. (2005) are able to consider threat 
effects. Using Swiss data, they can observe the date when a sanction warning is 
announced to an individual and the date when the maximum 60 day sanction is 
actually enforced. The results indicate that the exit rate from unemployment 
increases by 25% following a warning and by an additional 20% if a sanction is 
subsequently imposed. The key limitation of this study, however, is that it does 
not distinguish between the types of exit from UI benefits, focusing solely on 
unemployment duration. A study by Arni et al. (2013), in contrast, is able to 
overcome this limitation, considering threat and imposition effects on 
employment re-entry, employment stability and earnings for a period of two 
years following unemployment exit. Using administrative data from Switzerland, 
the results suggest that threat and imposition effects are associated with 
increases in the rate of job re-entry in the short-term. Relatively larger impacts, 
however, are observed on the exit rate to non-employment. In the longer-term, 
furthermore, it appears that the pressure to accept job offers more quickly 
leads to reduced employment stability and lower earnings. These findings are 
supported in a study by van den Berg and Vikström (2014), which finds negative 
impacts on wages, occupation-level and on hours worked up to four years 
following unemployment exit.  
The literature on the labour market impacts of sanctions is extensive, though 
limited in relation to threat effects, and the discussion in this section does not 
aim to describe all relevant studies. From the literature discussed, however, 
some clear conclusions emerge in relation to sanctions and unemployment 
benefits that are consistent with several existing reviews and summaries (Griggs 
and Evans, 2010; McVicar, 2014; NAO, 2016a; Geiger, 2017). First, sanction 
warnings and actual impositions are associated with increased employment re-
entry in the short-term. With regard to imposition effects, this finding appears 
to hold across means-tested and UI schemes, though the available evidence 
suggests that harsher sanctions do not lead to greater employment effects. 
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Second, sanctions are also associated with increased exits out of the labour 
force, an outcome that is often larger than the employment effect itself. Third, 
evidence on the longer-term impacts of sanctions suggests that they have 
negative impacts on job quality, in terms of wages, stability and hours. This 
finding is arguably an unsurprising one, given the wider labour market context 
within which sanctions policies have proliferated, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
These findings are summarised in Table 4.2, which contrasts with the theoretical 
summary detailed in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.2: summary of the evidence of the labour market impacts of benefit sanctions 
 
Job re-
entry 
Post-unemployment 
earnings 
Job 
stability 
Labour force 
attachment 
Threat effect: Increase Decrease Nil Decrease 
Imposition effect: Increase Decrease Decrease Decrease 
As McVicar (2014) highlights, nevertheless, a number of gaps in the evidence 
base remain. Importantly, for example, there is relatively little evidence on 
whether labour market impacts differ across separate groups of unemployed 
individuals. It could be important to compare, for example, sanction outcomes 
for individuals with differing prospects in the labour market. The limited UK 
evidence discussed in this section suggests that this is likely to be important, 
given the uniquely negative impacts observed for ESA claimants and JSA 
claimants with physical or mental health problems. More broadly, there is a 
clear need for an expanded UK evidence base in light of the fact that 
international evidence is not necessarily applicable to the UK, given differences 
in the generosity of benefits, the size and length of sanctions, interactions with 
other social security benefits as well as differing labour market and economic 
contexts. The available international and UK evidence, nevertheless, clearly 
highlights the potential negative labour market outcomes associated with 
sanctions, therefore increasing the likelihood that the wider expected benefits 
of sanctions will themselves not be realised. Evidence on the wider impacts of 
sanctions is the focus of the next section.  
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4.3 Wider impacts 
4.3.1 Empirical evidence 
There is a limited but growing literature that investigates the wider impacts of 
benefit sanctions. Primarily UK and US focused, this literature observes 
consistently negative outcomes that will be discussed in turn here, including: 
financial hardship and debt; food bank usage; survival crime; third-party impacts 
on children; and adverse mental health impacts. It is important to highlight in 
advance, however, that the studies in this section make less use of the research 
designs exploited in Section 4.2. There, natural experiments and timing-of-
events methods were used to underpin more robust causal inferences. The 
reliance on less sophisticated research designs in the wider literature on 
sanctions is a weakness with regard to the estimation of causal impacts.  
Another important point to note relates to the scope of the evidence discussed 
in this section. Various third-sector organisations in the UK, for example, provide 
evidence on a range of negative impacts on claimants using surveys and in-depth 
interviews (see, for example: CAB, 2013; Homeless Link, 2013; Hale, 2014; 
Stephenson, 2014; Batty et al., 2015; Beatty et al., 2015; Fitzpatrick et al., 
2016; Loopstra and Lalor, 2017; Rabindrakumar and Dewar, 2018). The discussion 
here, however, will focus primarily on the policy and academic literature. 
Indeed, given the particular focus on JSA sanctions in the empirical chapters of 
this thesis, evidence relating to this group is foregrounded. Due to the limited 
size of the literature, nevertheless, some reliance is placed on US research 
where full-family sanctions are imposed on claimants with dependent children. 
Indeed, in the discussion on the mental health impacts of sanctions, wider 
consideration is given to groups other than JSA claimants, as well as to the 
impact of conditionality more widely.  
Since the introduction of JSA in 1996, several investigations carried out for 
separate UK government departments have considered the impacts of sanctions 
on claimants, and consistently find negative impacts in terms of financial 
hardship (Vincent, 1998; Saunders et al., 2001; Peters and Joyce, 2006; Dorsett 
et al., 2011). As highlighted in Section 4.2, the financial implications of benefit 
sanctions form a core part of their policy rationale, whereby the withdrawal of 
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benefit income is assumed to induce particular behavioural responses. Evidence 
in terms of financial hardship is nevertheless discussed in this section on wider 
impacts. This is carried out due to the fact that the overriding policy belief is 
that benefit sanctions will straightforwardly be accompanied by beneficial 
labour market outcomes for claimants, and should therefore not entail 
significant financial hardship beyond the initial withdrawal of benefit income. As 
will become clear, furthermore, financial hardship has an important role as a 
determinant of the additional wider impacts that will be discussed.  
In the first of the UK JSA sanctions reports carried out, Vincent (1998: 28) 
interviews 30 JSA claimants and finds that sanctions “impose real hardship” on 
individuals, who are forced into a variety of financial coping strategies in 
response to their reduced income, which they must carry out in order to avoid 
falling into debt or adding to existing debts. Similarly, Saunders et al. (2001) 
interview 50 sanctioned JSA claimants and detail the significant financial 
impacts that are incurred, including debts of up to £800. As the authors note, 
the financial impacts depended on a number of factors, such as whether 
claimants found work, received information regarding hardship payments, lived 
with their parents or had a partner and/or children. In the largest of these 
studies, Peters and Joyce (2006) present findings from over 3,000 survey 
respondents and 70 in-depth interviews with individuals claiming JSA. Over two-
thirds (68%) of the survey interviewees who had been sanctioned reported that 
they had experienced financial hardship, whilst many were forced to borrow 
money from friends and family as a coping mechanism. Sanctioned claimants had 
difficulty paying utility bills, rent and managing debt. Indeed, many had already 
been struggling to get by financially on JSA itself, a situation that was severely 
aggravated following the imposition of a sanction.  
Further evidence on the potentially severe financial implications of benefit 
sanctions is provided by a series of US studies investigating the Temporary Aid to 
Needy Families (TANF) programme, which provides temporary financial 
assistance to low-income families with one or more dependent children (Cook et 
al., 2002; Kalil et al., 2002; Pavetti et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2004; Reichman et 
al., 2005). Kalil et al. (2002), for example, use panel data on 562 individuals and 
find that sanctions are associated with claimants having their gas or electricity 
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shut off because they could not afford to pay their bills, despite efforts to 
engage in a variety of hardship-mediating activities. Lee et al. (2004), 
furthermore, use longitudinal data on 1,123 individuals and find that those who 
are sanctioned are three times more likely to experience food hardship – 
reporting that they sometimes, or often, do not have enough to eat – than those 
who are not sanctioned. Given that recipients of TANF have dependent children, 
it is not surprising that such food insecurity is found to extend to children 
themselves (Reichman et al., 2005).  
The US evidence regarding TANF sanctions is supported by more recent UK 
evidence, which identifies sanctions as a key factor driving demand for food 
banks in both qualitative and quantitative research (Lambie-Mumford, 2014; 
Loopstra et al., 2015a; Garratt et al., 2016; Loopstra et al., 2018). Loopstra et 
al. (2018), for example, investigate the relationship between JSA sanctions and 
food bank usage by linking sanctioning rates in local authorities to area-level 
food bank usage data from the Trussell Trust Network, the largest food bank 
network in the UK. Using fixed effects models, the authors find that sanctions 
are associated with increases in the rate of food bank usage. In particular, every 
additional 10 sanctions per 100,000 adults within local authorities are associated 
with an additional 3.36 adults fed by food banks. The results of the study are 
strengthened by the fact that increases in sanctions in the previous quarter are 
associated with subsequent increases in food bank usage, whilst decreases in the 
previous quarter are associated with subsequent decreases in food bank usage. 
The availability of food distribution sites, furthermore, is shown to affect the 
relationship between sanctions and food bank usage. In areas with few 
distribution sites, rising sanctions lead to smaller increases in food bank usage, 
as would be expected.  
It has also been argued that benefit sanctions have the potential to push some 
claimants towards survival crime (Meacher, 1974; Eardley et al., 2005). Indeed, 
this is recognised even in the UK policy literature, where Vincent (1998: 30) 
notes that several sanctioned JSA claimants in their study had been “driven to 
an extremity in which crime might be their last resort”. Machin and Marie (2006) 
investigate the relationship between JSA sanctions and both property and violent 
crime, using aggregate-level data from police force areas in England and Wales. 
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First, the authors adopt a difference-in-differences (DiD) model to consider the 
impact of the introduction of JSA in October 1996, which introduced benefit 
sanctions as discussed in Chapter 3. Importantly, the results indicate that crime 
rates in areas more affected by the policy change rose by more than areas that 
were less affected. Second, fixed effects models are used to investigate the 
post-JSA introduction period, which indicate that sanctions are associated with 
increases in the rate of crime. The effect is strongest in the quarters following 
the introduction of JSA, before becoming statistically insignificant towards the 
end of the period of study. These quantitative findings are additionally 
supported by more recent qualitative evidence based on the harsher sanctions 
penalties introduced in 2012 (Batty and Fletcher, 2018; Johnsen et al., 2018).  
As previously indicated, sanctions have the potential to impact third parties such 
as the friends and family of individuals who receive them, and of particular 
concern are impacts on the children of claimants. US quantitative research 
considering the effects on the children of TANF claimants finds consistently 
negative impacts, though it is important to highlight that these studies suffer 
from weak designs in terms of substantiating causal inferences. Larson et al. 
(2011), for example, investigate the impact on educational outcomes and find 
that children from sanctioned families have significantly more school disruptions 
and lower attendance than children from non-sanctioned families. Lohman et al. 
(2004), furthermore, examine whether sanctions affect the well-being of 
children from single mother families, and find that they are associated with 
lower cognitive achievement scores for pre-school age children when their 
mothers remain on benefits, and severe behavioural problems when their 
mothers stop claiming entirely. Paxson and Waldfogel (2003), lastly, investigate 
the relationship between sanctions and child maltreatment using aggregate-level 
data across states in the US. The results indicate that sanctions in general and 
the use of sanctions of longer duration are associated with increases in 
maltreatment, though these effects are not consistent across the different 
measures and are not always robust to small changes in the sample.  
An issue that is attracting growing attention relates to the mental health 
impacts for claimants of both sanctions and behavioural conditionality more 
broadly, both in terms of academic research as well as in wider debates. During 
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the ‘great sanctions drive’ period described in Chapter 3, for example, the UK 
media frequently covered claims about the impact of sanctions in relation to 
anxiety, depression and suicide (Cowburn, 2015; Stone, 2015; Mills, 2018). Many 
submissions from claimants, academics and third sector organisations to the 
House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (2015; 2018) reports into 
benefit sanctions and the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 
(2017) report, furthermore, highlighted the adverse mental health impacts of 
sanctions, for those both with and without pre-existing mental health 
conditions. Groups such as the British Psychological Society (BPS, 2017) have 
called on the government to suspend the use of sanctions and commission an 
independent review of their mental health impacts. At the time, the DWP 
resisted such calls, and appeared to take a much different view in terms of 
mental health impacts. Neil Couling, in the capacity of the DWP’s Work Services 
Director, for example, gave evidence to the Scottish Parliament Welfare Reform 
Committee (2014: 11) and argued that “many benefit recipients welcome the 
jolt that a sanction can give them”.  
Interestingly, however, UK departmental reports themselves identify adverse 
emotional and psychological impacts resulting from benefit sanctions. Vincent 
(1998: 30), for example, notes that some claimants reported being “made to 
feel like a criminal”, and felt powerless and impotent in the face of benefit 
sanctions. Typical reactions to sanctions included claimants feeling: angry and 
frustrated; stressed and panicked; treated without respect and degraded; and 
bitter because they had told the truth and been penalised for it. Saunders et al. 
(2001: 40), furthermore, report that some sanctioned claimants felt that the 
“impact on their mental health had been quite serious”, leading them to claim 
Income Support (IS) because of depression or relying on prescription drugs to 
cope. In addition, respondents reported adverse effects on relationships with 
partners, friends and family resulting from benefit sanctions that led to further 
stress, an outcome also observed by Dorsett et al. (2011). Peters and Joyce 
(2006), lastly, identify emotional and psychological impacts affecting nearly a 
tenth (9%) of sanctioned individuals in the study, which include: stress; anxiety; 
anger and humiliation; and depression. The authors speculate that emotional 
impacts such as stress, anxiety and depression were more pronounced for those 
who already experienced related mental health problems.  
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In the academic literature, Stewart and Wright (2018) conduct longitudinal 
qualitative interviews with 43 JSA claimants, over half of whom had been 
sanctioned at least once. Whilst mental health impacts are not the unique focus 
of their study, the authors nonetheless find that sanctions are commonly 
associated with effects such as anger, stress, anxiety and depression, caused 
both by the fear of and the actual imposition of benefit sanctions. These findings 
reinforce the observations made at the first stage of their research, in which 64 
JSA claimants were interviewed for the first time, again over half of which had 
been sanctioned (Wright and Stewart, 2016). At this stage, similarly, sanctions 
were associated with “severe and acute negative emotional effects” (Wright and 
Stewart, 2016: 4), including: anger; powerlessness, due to not being listened to; 
the perception of being punished unfairly; low mood; and anxiety or depression. 
The authors also argue that negative emotional impacts are most likely to occur 
in cases where individuals feel that their sanction is “unjustified, unfair or 
disproportionate” (Wright and Stewart, 2016: 5) to the purported infringement. 
Additional qualitative research identifies similar negative psychological and 
emotional impacts of sanctions that are imposed on groups such as lone parents, 
disabled people and homeless people (Dwyer, 2018; Dwyer et al., 2018; Johnsen 
and Blenkinsopp, 2018; Johnsen et al., 2018; Dwyer et al., 2020).  
Quantitative research in this area has focused more broadly on the impact of 
work-related behavioural conditionality on various groups, as opposed to the 
impact of sanctions specifically. Katikireddi et al. (2018), for example, 
investigate the impact of job search requirements on lone parents in the UK 
using a natural experiment design, by exploiting the step-wise reductions over 
time in the lower age limit at which Lone Parent Obligations (LPOs) apply. The 
findings suggest that those newly exposed to LPOs saw their mental health 
worsen compared to two control groups, those not exposed and those already 
exposed to LPOs. Davis (2019) provides supporting evidence from the US, using 
fixed effects models to show that mental health is worse for low-educated single 
mothers in states with stricter behavioural conditionality, measured in terms of 
sanctions, job search requirements and expenditure on welfare-to-work policies. 
Barr et al. (2016), finally, investigate the impact of Work Capability Assessments 
(WCAs) for ill and disabled people in the UK, a fit-for-work test that determines 
eligibility for ESA. Using fixed effects models and aggregated local authority-
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level data, the study finds that higher rates of WCAs are associated with higher 
rates of self-reported mental health problems, antidepressant prescribing and 
suicides.  
4.3.2 Overarching research question 
As Chapter 5 will go on to detail, the empirical research in this thesis will 
contribute to the existing literature on the impacts of benefit sanctions through 
a quantitative investigation of the relationship between JSA sanctions and 
mental health outcomes, with a particular focus on anxiety and depression. 
Informed by the evidence discussed throughout this chapter, the overarching 
research question that motivates the empirical investigation carried out in this 
thesis is as follows: 
[RQ]: Are benefit sanctions associated with adverse mental health 
impacts? 
Whilst this chapter has identified the need for more systematic evidence on the 
relationship between sanctions and mental health outcomes, the research 
discussed throughout this chapter, both in terms of labour market and wider 
impacts, arguably leads to the expectation that sanctions will be associated with 
adverse mental health impacts. Indeed, material deprivation, debt, economic 
precariousness and food insecurity, for example, have all been consistently 
linked with detrimental effects on mental health (Fitch et al., 2011; O’Campo et 
al., 2015; McKee et al., 2017; Renahy et al., 2018; Loopstra et al., 2019). As this 
section has demonstrated, furthermore, existing qualitative research provides 
evidence that sanctions are associated with adverse mental health impacts, 
which this thesis seeks to contribute to by adding a more specifically focused 
investigation than is provided by the limited quantitative research in this area. 
Before investigating this issue empirically, however, it is first useful to consider 
the precise mechanisms that might explain the link between sanctions and 
mental health. This is an important exercise that will provide the empirical 
investigation with a stronger theoretical grounding, and is the focus of the next 
and final section of this chapter.  
66 
 
 
4.4 Sanctions, mental health and causal mechanisms 
4.4.1 Mental health 
Different perspectives exist in terms of conceptualising mental health, which 
remains a highly contested topic subject to terminological as well as ontological 
and epistemological disagreement (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2010). Arguably, two 
main approaches to understanding mental health can be distinguished within the 
sociological literature, which considers both the social determinants of mental 
and emotional distress as well as the ways in which such terms are socially 
constructed (Warner, 2009). Social causation perspectives have been criticised 
for uncritically accepting medical diagnoses such as ‘depression’ as facts 
representing an objective reality, using prevalence measures to investigate the 
relationship between social disadvantage and mental distress through 
consideration of factors such as social class, ethnicity, gender and age. Social 
constructivist perspectives, in contrast, have problematised the basis of various 
medical diagnoses by highlighting how reality emerges as a product of human 
activity, challenging naïve forms of realism by emphasising the relationships of 
power that are involved in the creation of medical categories. Consequently, 
social constructivist perspectives have been influential in foregrounding and 
critiquing the role that medical professionals and the legal system have 
historically played in categorising mental ‘disorder’ in ways that ultimately serve 
to enforce “how people ought to think, feel and act as part of an ideal moral 
order” (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2010: 272).  
Indeed, the inherently value-laden nature of medical categorisation is evident in 
attempts to define mental health itself, where even broad definitions inevitably 
situate mental health in relation to ‘normal’ functioning within the expectations 
of a particular social context. To give one prominent example, the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) defines mental health as: 
“a state of well-being in which the individual realizes his or her own 
abilities, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively 
and fruitfully, and is able to make a contribution to his or her 
community”. (WHO, 2014: 12) 
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Social constructivist accounts of mental health, however, have themselves been 
critiqued. Primarily, this criticism relates to the view that strong variants of 
constructivism ultimately serve to deny the ‘reality’ of the pain experienced by 
those struggling with mental and emotional distress, given the apparent 
commitment to the claim that such distress is “only a category and does not 
refer to any objective reality” whatsoever (Busfield, 2000: 547). Whilst debate 
between competing approaches to understanding mental health is ongoing, less 
polarised perspectives have developed to support the view that operationalising 
definitions of mental health in empirical research does not necessarily need to 
be accompanied by an uncritical approach to the concepts investigated or the 
conclusions reached. Indeed, more theoretically grounded empirical work has 
itself been crucial in identifying the social – over and above the biological – as a 
determinant of mental health, and thus in advancing possible social responses to 
mental health problems (Wilkinson and Marmot, 1999; 2003).  
A further distinction that can be made is between the positive and negative 
dimensions of mental health. In the first, mental health is understood as a “state 
of psychological wellbeing”, whilst in the second it is viewed in terms of “mental 
health problems” (Pilgrim, 2017: 3). Warner (2009) highlights that a range of 
different terms are used to discuss mental health in the negative sense, 
including: mental illness; mental disorder; and mental and emotional distress. 
Importantly, particular applications in empirical research have tended to imply 
adherence to distinct perspectives on the nature of mental health problems. 
Usage of the term ‘mental illness’, for example, has often been accompanied by 
a lack of recognition of the contested nature of medical categories and an 
uncritical “commitment to the idea that distress can be identified, diagnosed, 
and treated through medical intervention” (Warner, 2009: 361). Broader terms 
such as ‘mental health problems’ and ‘mental and emotional distress’ provide 
alternatives that will be used throughout this thesis. Chapter 5 provides more 
discussion of anxiety and depression specifically, which form the basis of the 
outcomes that will be investigated in the empirical chapters of this thesis. In the 
remainder of this section, however, the focus remains on understanding the 
potential relationship between sanctions and mental health problems more 
broadly.  
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4.4.2 Unemployment: material and psychosocial mechanisms 
In order to understand the relationship between sanctions and mental health, it 
is important to first recognise that unemployment itself – independently of 
sanctions – is associated with negative mental health outcomes. A widely used 
framework for understanding the key social determinants of both physical and 
mental health is the Dahlgren-Whitehead (1991) rainbow model (Bambra et al., 
2010), which maps the relationship between individuals and the various 
influences on their health. This is displayed in Figure 4.1.  
Figure 4.1: the rainbow model of the social determinants of health 
 
Source: Dahlgren and Whitehead (1991) 
Used with permission of the Institute for Futures Studies 
Clearly, the discussion here is most concerned with the ‘Unemployment’ section 
of the Dahlgren-Whitehead (1991) rainbow model, which forms part of the 
‘Living and working conditions’ segment. Before discussing this issue, however, 
it is important to emphasise that a focus on the mental health consequences of 
unemployment and sanctions does not necessarily imply that work itself is 
straightforwardly associated with positive mental health outcomes. The DWP, in 
contrast, take a singular view regarding the health benefits of employment, 
arguing that: 
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“work, and the improved incomes that flow from it, have beneficial 
effects in terms of people’s health and well-being … It is difficult to 
quantify these effects precisely but their existence is not in doubt.” 
(DWP, 2010: 5) 
As the ‘Work environment’ section of Figure 4.1 implies, however, it is not work 
itself but rather the quality of work that is likely to be important for an 
individual’s mental health. Indeed, this is an intuition that is supported by 
various systematic reviews (Allen et al., 2014; WHO, 2014; Silva et al., 2016). 
Recent evidence, furthermore, highlights the potential that poor quality 
employment might be as worse, or potentially even worse, for mental health 
than unemployment itself (Kim and von dem Knesebeck, 2015; Kim and von dem 
Knesebeck, 2016; Chandola and Zhang, 2018).  
In terms of unemployment, an extensive literature demonstrates that there is a 
negative association between unemployment and mental health outcomes (for 
systematic reviews, see McKee-Ryan et al., 2005; and Paul and Moser, 2009). 
Paul and Moser (2009), for example, note that the association is observed for a 
number of different dimensions, including: symptoms of anxiety and depression; 
distress and hopelessness; self-esteem; feelings of control; and subjective well-
being. Although the exact nature of the causal influences at play is still a 
debated issue, the literature broadly agrees that the mental health effects of 
unemployment are at least partly causal. That is, unemployment exerts an 
independent causal effect on people’s mental health, over and above the fact 
that some unemployed individuals are also more likely to be affected by mental 
health problems in the first place (Fryer, 2014).  
In order to explain this causal relationship, furthermore, researchers have 
distinguished between two separate pathways through which unemployment can 
impact on mental health, referred to as the material and psychosocial routes 
(Sage, 2013). As its name suggests, the material pathway is concerned with the 
income and poverty effect of unemployment, highlighting the evident financial 
implications that unemployment involves and the various forms of suffering that 
follow from a lack of material resources. According to one definition, for 
example, the material explanation is based on the observation that “money buys 
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health-promoting goods and the ability to engage in a social life in ways that 
enable people to be healthy” (Benzeval et al., 2014: 1). Financial resources, 
that is, provide access to key necessities that underpin good mental health, such 
as adequate housing, warmth, food, exercise and recreational activities. The 
psychosocial pathway, in contrast, is concerned that there is something 
damaging about the experience of unemployment itself, irrespective of directly 
material factors. Stated broadly, psychosocial mechanisms are concerned with 
attempting to understand the “way in which people’s social environment makes 
them feel” (Benzeval et al., 2014: 4).  
Psychosocial mechanisms are thought to operate as a result of two distinct sub-
pathways. First, being unemployed and living on a low income is highly stressful, 
which relates to a growing body of research that investigates how financial 
stress gets “under the skin” (Sturgeon et al., 2016: 134) of individuals to impact 
their mental health. Clearly, this sub-pathway is closely associated with material 
concerns, and indeed material factors have been understood as central 
determinants with psychosocial factors providing an explanatory pathway that 
connects financial circumstances to health outcomes (Smith and Anderson, 
2018). The second psychosocial sub-pathway, in contrast, argues that there is 
something qualitatively specific about the experience of unemployment that 
leads to poor health outcomes (Sage, 2013). Arguably, stress is likely to play an 
important role in the second sub-pathway as well, though the primary concern of 
theories in this route is to identify the psychosocial needs that are inadequately 
met through the experience of unemployment. Sage (2018), for example, 
categorises these in terms of loss of the functions of paid work, loss of agency 
and loss of social status, the latter of which includes stigma.  
In order to develop this categorisation, Sage (2018) identifies three prominent 
attempts to explain the health impacts of unemployment in terms of 
psychosocial needs. First, functionalist approaches focus on the social institution 
of employment and consider the implications for health when individuals are 
excluded from it. Jahoda (1982), for example, advances the concept of the 
latent functions of employment, in which paid work is viewed as an institution 
that meets individuals’ basic psychological needs through the provision of a 
variety of social goods, including: time structure; social activity; collective 
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endeavour; regular activity; and status and identity. Unemployment, in this 
view, results in harmful psychological effects by depriving people of these 
beneficial experiences. Fryer (1986) criticises the functionalist approach on the 
grounds that it ignores the meanings that individuals ascribe to their own 
experiences of unemployment, ultimately treating them as passive actors in the 
face of their social circumstances. In contrast, Fryer’s (1986: 23) agency model 
foregrounds individuals as intrinsically motivated agents who experience 
unemployment in terms of their own “beliefs, intentions, and goals for self-
actualisation”. In this view, health impacts should be understood in the context 
of agency restriction, whereby unemployment places constraints on people’s 
ability to plan and enact their personal agency and autonomy.  
Ezzy (1993) argues that the functionalist and agency theories both suffer from 
too narrow a focus, overemphasising social institutions or individual agency at 
the expense of the other. To overcome this limitation, Ezzy (1993) outlines an 
account in which unemployment is conceived of as a status transition from the 
valued social position of employment to a less valued social position. Within this 
account, the impact of unemployment on an individual’s mental health 
ultimately depends on “the interaction between a person’s objective social 
environment and their subjective interpretation of this environment and their 
place within it” (Ezzy, 1993: 48). Whilst these three theories are often portrayed 
as being in competition with one another, Sage (2018) seeks to integrate their 
varying perspectives into an overarching account of the psychosocial impacts of 
unemployment. To do so, Sage (2018: 1048) conceptualises unemployment as an 
“overarching process of loss”, drawing on qualitative research in which 
participants report experiencing unemployment in terms of loss of “income, 
control, autonomy, status, respect, dignity, structure and skills”. As indicated 
above, Sage (2018) develops this account in order to recast the viewpoints of 
Jahoda (1982), Fryer (1986) and Ezzy (1993) in terms of loss of the functions of 
paid work, loss of agency and loss of social status.   
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4.4.3 Sanctions: material and psychosocial mechanisms 
Importantly, recognition of the separate material and psychosocial mechanisms 
that explain how unemployment affects health highlights the routes through 
which the social security system itself might play a mediating role in influencing 
the experiences of benefit claimants. Indeed, in addition to the literature 
discussed in Section 4.3 in relation to conditionality, previous research has 
considered the influence of benefit generosity on claimants’ health as well as 
the role of ALMPs in shaping claimants’ experiences of unemployment (Coutts et 
al., 2014; O’Campo et al., 2015; Sage, 2015a; 2015b; Carter and Whitworth, 
2017; Renahy et al., 2018). Arguably, the mental health impacts of sanctions 
themselves can be expected to operate through material and psychosocial 
mechanisms, in terms of both threat and imposition effects, which is the focus 
of the remainder of this section. Their elucidation here – similar to their 
application in relation to unemployment – helps support the claim that the 
mental health impacts of sanctions are likely to be at least partly causal. That 
is, sanctions can be expected to exert an independent causal effect on people’s 
mental health, over and above the fact that individuals who are sanctioned 
might be more likely to be affected by mental health problems in the first place.  
First, the material route will clearly be influential following a sanction, which 
holds serious financial implications for individuals both in terms of JSA 
withdrawal and on additional knock-on effects such as managing debt. The 
adequacy level of JSA is already low, having declined slightly in real terms since 
its introduction in 1996 and much more significantly as a proportion of average 
earnings (Rutherford, 2013). Real terms falls have occurred from 2013 onwards, 
furthermore, as a result of below inflation uprating of 1% a year followed by a 
freeze from 2016 onwards (McInnes, 2019). Currently, this means that a four-
week sanction amounts to the loss of over £230 for an individual aged 18-24 and 
over £290 for somebody aged 25 and over, figures which are likely to constitute 
a large proportion of a claimant’s monthly income. Indeed, the financial 
implications of benefit sanctions have the potential to be compounded by a 
recurring issue relating to the wrongful cancelation of Housing Benefit and 
Council Tax Reduction. Following a sanction, the Jobcentre contacts the 
claimants’ Local Authority, who might stop these benefits until the individual 
73 
 
 
confirms their new income. The Oakley Review (2014), for example, received 
evidence of many instances in which claimants had their claims to these 
additional benefits wrongly ended following a sanction, and recommended that 
the DWP take steps to resolve the issue. The House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee (2017), unfortunately, again received evidence of errors occurring in 
this regard, leading them to recommend that the DWP take further steps to fully 
resolve the issue.  
The influence of the material pathway will depend on a number of potentially 
moderating factors, such as whether an individual can rely on financial support 
from friends or family, or the extent to which they are feasibly able to make 
financial adjustments to their living expenses. Hardship payments, furthermore, 
offer an institutional route through which claimants can attenuate the financial 
implication of a sanction, though claimants themselves have to prove that they 
are at risk of financial hardship and unable to pay for essential items (DWP, 
2015b). For those who successfully apply, hardship payments are paid at a rate 
of 60% of JSA for most claimants and 80% for claimants who are pregnant or 
seriously ill. For claimants who are deemed ‘vulnerable’, such as those who are 
pregnant, responsible for dependent children or who suffer from a chronic 
health condition or disability, hardship payments are payable immediately 
though they are not automatic. For claimants not in the ‘vulnerable’ group, 
however, hardship payments only begin in the third week of the sanction period. 
As Webster (2014) has highlighted, the official DWP Decision Makers’ Guide 
(2009: para. 35099) itself recognises that this two-week wait can be expected to 
cause a “healthy adult to suffer some deterioration in their health”. In terms of 
the proportion of sanctioned claimants who receive hardship payments, fewer 
than 10% received them before the Welfare Reform Act 2012, a figure which rose 
to over 40% by the end of the Coalition government (Webster, 2015).  
Whilst the material route can be expected to operate following a sanction, the 
psychosocial route will be relevant in terms of both the threat and imposition of 
benefit sanctions. Informed by the previous discussion, this can be explained 
through two psychosocial sub-pathways, in terms of stress – both financial and 
otherwise – as well as in terms of loss of agency and social status. The third of 
Sage’s (2018) categorisation, loss of the functions of paid work, is not directly 
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relevant here given that sanctioned claimants are already unemployed. Similar 
to the material pathway, the financial stress resulting from sanctions is self-
evident, and indeed research previously discussed in Section 4.3 confirmed this 
in terms of both threat and imposition effects (Wright and Stewart, 2016; 
Stewart and Wright, 2018). The same research, furthermore, highlights the 
impact on claimants’ sense of agency and social status resulting from sanctions. 
Many sanctioned JSA claimants disagreed with the reasons behind their sanction, 
viewing the circumstances as unfair and reporting feelings of powerlessness and 
stigmatisation, and it is in these circumstances that the authors considered the 
psychological impact of sanctions to be most severe. Redman (2020: 90) 
observes similar effects, and additionally finds that sanctions serve to convey 
“pejorative inferences” that lead claimants to internalise stigmatisation and 
shame due to perceived “undeservingness”.  
Drawing on the above discussion, Figure 4.2 depicts the separate routes through 
which benefit sanctions can be thought to impact the mental health of 
individuals in terms of both threat and imposition effects. As previously alluded 
to in this section, the material and psychosocial pathways can be expected to 
interact in important ways and so their clear separation in Figure 4.2 is made for 
clarity of depiction only. As previously highlighted in relation to material 
mechanisms, moderating factors such as support networks and hardship 
payments will influence the eventual financial implications of a sanction and 
thus the overall impact on mental health. The same is true in terms of 
psychosocial mechanisms, the relevance of which may depend on a variety of 
individual circumstances or characteristics. The possibility exists, of course, that 
claimants will not respond to sanctions in terms of the “abjection” identified by 
Redman (2020: 88), but rather with the forms of “everyday resistance” (Shaw et 
al., 2008: 83) that have been observed in response to sanctions and welfare 
reform more broadly (Patrick, 2016; Peterie et al., 2019). Without wishing to 
discount diverse responses to sanctions, it is nevertheless clear from the present 
discussion that sanctions will play a role in terms of agency restriction and social 
status for many, whilst even those who are more resistant to such effects are 
likely to have their mental health impacted through financial stress.  
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Figure 4.2: mechanisms underpinning the mental health impacts of sanctions 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the literature that investigates the impacts of benefit 
sanctions on claimants, and has distinguished between the broad categories of 
labour market and wider effects. The dominant view of policymakers is that the 
threat and imposition of sanctions will lead to improved labour market outcomes 
for claimants, primarily in terms of faster re-entry into employment. The 
available evidence from UK and mainland European research, however, 
complicates this straightforward assumption. With regard to employment 
impacts, the threat and imposition of sanctions do appear to be associated with 
increased transitions into employment in the short-term, an outcome that is 
achievable with relatively small financial penalties. This short-term employment 
effect, however, is accompanied by increased transitions out of the labour force 
altogether, an effect that is counterproductive from the point of view of 
sanctions policy. The available evidence on long-term impacts, furthermore, 
suggests that sanctions are associated with decreases in wages, job stability and 
working hours. Viewed as a whole, the available literature does not support a 
particularly benign interpretation of sanctions in terms of labour market 
outcomes. Indeed, it increases the likelihood that sanctions policy will lead to a 
range of wider negative impacts.  
The literature into the wider impacts of benefit sanctions is less well-developed, 
and is often limited by research designs that are not able to take into account 
the influence of confounding factors. Nevertheless, empirical research 
Threat effects
Imposition effects Material mechanisms
Psychosocial mechanisms
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consistently observes adverse wider impacts, in terms of financial hardship, food 
bank usage, survival crime and third-party impacts on children. Although there is 
a need for additional research into such impacts that is better able to estimate 
causal effects, it is of evident concern that such adverse consequences are so 
consistently linked with sanctions policy. A growing area of concern relates to 
the mental health impacts of the threat and imposition of benefit sanctions. 
These are observed in existing qualitative research in relation to emotional and 
psychological problems such as stress, anxiety and depression. The discussion 
highlights the need for a larger-scale quantitative investigation into the 
relationship between sanctions and mental health outcomes, which is the focus 
of the remaining chapters in this thesis.  
To support this investigation, the final section of this chapter has outlined the 
routes through which sanctions can be expected to impact mental health, in 
terms of both material and psychosocial mechanisms. This provides the empirical 
research with a stronger theoretical grounding in relation to considering causal 
inferences. This will be further discussed in the next chapter, which details the 
methodology pursued in the empirical investigation.   
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Chapter 5. Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter details the methodological approach that is adopted to investigate 
the overarching research question of this thesis, as previously identified in 
Chapter 4. The methodological approach that will be outlined underpins the 
empirical analyses carried out in Chapters 6 to 9, which focus on the relationship 
between benefit sanctions and mental health outcomes such as antidepressant 
prescribing, anxiety and depression. First, this chapter begins by briefly 
distinguishing between qualitative and quantitative approaches within social 
research, highlighting the latter perspective as the method that will be relied 
upon throughout this thesis. Due to the investigation’s particular concern with 
the impacts of sanctions, the discussion then explores how causal inferences 
have been understood within quantitative research. Next, it broadly outlines the 
various methods that are ultimately used to help improve the basis for causal 
inferences in the empirical investigation itself. The chapter then goes on to 
detail how – in light of the available data – both mental health outcomes and 
benefit sanctions are measured in the different empirical chapters, which are 
the two key variables that influence the particular research designs and methods 
that are adopted. Finally, the chapter provides a brief overview of the data and 
methods that are used in each empirical chapter. Given the various differences 
between Chapters 6 to 9, more specific detail in terms of data and methods is 
provided in the individual chapters themselves. This aids the interpretation of 
the findings in each analysis and helps to highlight the specific contribution of 
each empirical chapter.  
5.2 Quantitative research 
The empirical investigation in this thesis applies quantitative methods to 
understand the relationship between benefit sanctions and mental health 
outcomes. A familiar distinction that is made when discussing research methods 
is one that contrasts quantitative and qualitative approaches. In this regard, 
Maxwell (2019: 132) argues that attempts to differentiate between the two via 
appeals to “‘essentialist’ criteria such as numbers versus words, objectivity 
versus subjectivity, and postpositivism versus constructivism” are ultimately 
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misguided. Pointing to the diversity of paradigms and methods that are used 
within quantitative and qualitative research respectively, Maxwell (2019: 133) 
argues that a key difference between the two approaches resides in the “mental 
model” – what can be understood as the “underlying framework or logic of 
justification for social research” (Greene, 2007: 53) – that researchers 
characteristically align with. As highlighted by Maxwell (2019), Mohr (1982), for 
example, contrasts variance and process theories, which are two different 
though potentially complementary ways of conceiving of social phenomena that 
provide a broad basis for distinguishing between quantitative and qualitative 
research. Whilst the variance perspective emphasises the measurement of 
variables and investigates relationships between variables, the process 
perspective foregrounds explanations of how things occur in particular contexts, 
emphasising both the processes that connect them as well as particular 
interpretations of social phenomena.  
Consistent with this distinction, the empirical chapters in this thesis apply a 
variety of quantitative methods that are linked to the variance theory account of 
explanation through use of regression models, as will be discussed in further 
detail later in this chapter. Each selection of methods comes with its own 
strengths and weaknesses, and it is therefore important to briefly highlight what 
is missed out when relying on the quantitative approach in this particular 
context. McNeill et al. (2017: 177), for example, have argued that to be able to 
“fully understand the impact of the extension of conditionality in the UK … it is 
vital to give voice to those with direct experience of the welfare system”. This is 
an end that the quantitative analysis in this thesis does not foreground, and 
indeed is one that quantitative methods can struggle to achieve more generally. 
In a similar vein, Patrick (2020: 251) identifies the underutilised potential of 
participatory research in the area of poverty and social security, a research 
tradition in which “experts by experience” of poverty take a more central role 
throughout the research process. By conducting research “with rather than on 
people” (Patrick, 2020: 252), the participatory approach provides an important 
route for promoting undervalued sources of expertise, contesting entrenched 
misrepresentations of those living in poverty and ultimately in better supporting 
attempts to improve policy itself.  
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Qualitative and quantitative approaches can, nevertheless, be complementary, 
and indeed this thesis has previously drawn on investigations that have sought to 
highlight the experiences of unemployed benefit claimants, which has been 
crucial in developing the overall rationale for this research. Chapter 4, for 
example, surveyed a wide range of quantitative and qualitative evidence into 
the impacts of benefit sanctions, ultimately leading to the identification of 
mental health impacts as an emerging area of concern and one that contradicts 
the assumptions made by policymakers themselves. Given the current extent of 
the empirical literature on the impacts of benefit sanctions specifically, a 
quantitative approach is arguably valuable in terms of investigating mental 
health outcomes as it can be used to provide additional insight to that achieved 
by the qualitative research discussed in Chapter 4. The research in this thesis, 
for example, is able to investigate the relationships concerned using data from 
different sources across the period of Coalition government (2010-15). 
Consequently, it is able to investigate mental health impacts by exploiting 
variations in both the frequency and strictness of sanctions through time, as well 
as focus on the possibility of identifying causal effects using the data available. 
In light of this, the potential for the analysis to demonstrate the causal impact 
of sanctions is the subject of the following section.  
5.3 Causal Inferences 
5.3.1 Causation as robust dependence 
It is important to highlight that different conceptions of causality have been 
developed within the area of quantitative research, and debate on this issue is 
ongoing. Goldthorpe (2001), for example, distinguishes between three particular 
accounts: causation as robust dependence; causation as consequential 
manipulation; and causation as generative process. First, the robust dependence 
perspective argues that whilst correlation between variables does not imply 
causation, causation is not possible without correlation being present. Arguably, 
therefore, the absence of correlation provides grounds to falsify a particular 
theory or hypothesis. Causal inferences can be made, in contrast, where such a 
theory is not falsified. This occurs when correlations are found between two 
variables even after controlling for a variety of additional explanatory variables, 
which is a familiar technique that is adopted within regression analysis. As 
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Charlwood et al. (2014) point out, however, a key limitation of this view is that 
there can be competing theories that each explain an observed correlation. 
Whilst absence of correlation can arguably be used to falsify a theory, therefore, 
robust dependence on its own does not provide sufficient grounds for the 
identification of causal effects.  
The limitations of the robust dependence view are particularly apparent in 
instances where regression analyses are affected by unobserved heterogeneity. 
This occurs when important determinants of the outcome variable in question 
are not included in the analysis, leading to omitted variable bias. In such 
circumstances, any observed correlation between the variables of interest might 
be entirely spurious. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that any particular regression 
analysis will be able to control for all relevant independent variables and will 
therefore be affected by some degree of unobserved heterogeneity. Omitted 
variable bias is particularly problematic where the omitted variable is a 
confounder, in that it is a determinant of both the dependent variable and the 
key independent variable of interest. In the current context, for example, a 
crude comparison of the mental health outcomes of sanctioned and non-
sanctioned claimants would not identify the causal impact of sanctions on 
mental health outcomes since the two groups may differ systematically in terms 
of unobserved characteristics. Claimants who are sanctioned may differ in 
important respects that are not accounted for, such that they are both more 
likely to be sanctioned and to suffer poorer mental health than claimants who 
are not sanctioned. Terminological usage on this topic varies by discipline, with 
some authors referring to omitted variable bias as a particular form of selection 
bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).  
5.3.2 Causation as consequential manipulation 
Given these limitations, Goldthorpe (2001) highlights attempts to improve on 
causal inferences through consequential manipulation. Primarily, this occurs 
using experimental methods such as randomised control trials (RCTs), in which 
participants are randomly assigned into ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups that 
are assumed to be similar in terms of both observed and unobserved 
characteristics. Typically, having sorted individuals into such groups, the 
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treatment group is exposed to a particular intervention whilst the control group 
is not, so that any subsequent difference on the outcome of interest can be 
interpreted as being directly caused by the intervention. Despite the advantages 
of consequential manipulation in terms of causal inference, and indeed RCTs are 
often considered to provide an “experimental ideal” (Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 
11) by quantitative researchers, Goldthorpe (2001: 6) highlights a number of 
issues with this approach. The separation of participants into treatment and 
control groups, for example, has the potential to affect their behaviour in ways 
that might influence differences in outcomes between the groups. Whilst 
researchers can take steps to limit this form of bias, RCTs themselves function 
through the creation and manipulation of a very specific experimental context, 
meaning that it is not always clear how results from RCTs apply to real-world 
social contexts.  
The use of RCTs within empirical research, furthermore, is often limited by 
issues relating to cost and ethical concerns. Based on these and additional 
limitations, Goldthorpe (2001: 6) warns against appeals to the claim that there 
can be “no causation without manipulation” in the context of quantitative 
research. One alternative that has been pursued by researchers is to exploit 
random assignment that occurs in so-called natural experiment contexts. As 
alluded to in Chapter 4, for example, a study into sanctions by the National 
Audit Office (NAO, 2016b) is able to benefit from random assignment in the 
design of the Work Programme, in which the DWP divided Britain into separate 
areas within which different providers were made responsible for supporting 
participants into work. Claimants were randomly assigned to a provider within 
these areas, and the NAO (2016b) study makes use of this feature to estimate 
labour market impacts. To do so, it exploits variation in referral rates between 
providers within the same area, such that it can compare outcomes for 
otherwise similar claimants who are at a greater or lesser risk of being 
sanctioned. The specific strategy adopted within the NAO (2016b) study is 
described as an instrumental variables approach. This attempts to minimise 
omitted variable bias by identifying a third variable that is exogenous to the 
model in question, which is thought to influence the outcome variable of 
interest only through the key independent variable (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).  
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If the NAO (2016b) study has identified a truly exogenous instrumental variable, 
then this approach also helps it deal with the additional issue of reverse 
causality. As Chapter 4 detailed, previous research indicates that benefit 
sanctions are likely to have a negative impact on mental health outcomes. 
Additionally, however, it could also be the case that the direction of causality 
runs in the opposite direction. The possibility exists, for example, that claimants 
already suffering from mental health problems are more likely to be sanctioned, 
meaning that any regression analysis will overstate the direct effect of sanctions 
on mental health. Clearly, neither explanation of the relationship between 
sanctions and mental health would be a positive outcome from the point of view 
of sanctions policy. Differentiating between the two, however, would be useful 
in terms of establishing causal relationships and informing appropriate policy 
responses. Unfortunately, constraints in terms of data availability mean that the 
empirical analysis in this thesis relies on observational data and is not able to 
benefit from random assignment or instrumental variables estimation in order to 
deal with the issues discussed here. Indeed, as Section 5.5 will detail, data 
availability means that local authority-level sanctions data – as opposed to 
individual-level sanctions data – is relied on to investigate the relationship 
between sanctions and mental health outcomes, which places further limitations 
on the types of causal inferences that can be made.  
5.3.3 Responding to the influence of bias 
Whilst the analysis in this thesis is not able to benefit from the strategies 
described in the previous sub-section, various steps are nevertheless undertaken 
in order to minimise the influence of bias. The first step relates to the time 
period that is selected for the analysis, which is restricted to investigating 
sanctions policy during the Coalition government (2010-15). As Chapter 3 
detailed in some depth, sanctions rates varied dramatically during this period in 
a manner that is unlikely to be explained by changes in claimant characteristics 
or by claimant behaviour itself. As argued in Chapter 3, decisions made by 
policymakers themselves were clearly influential throughout the period, 
involving factors such as internal benchmarking, Jobcentre managers’ focus on 
referral rates and the operation of the Work Programme and its sub-contracted 
providers. Such influences led to considerable temporal and spatial variations in 
83 
 
 
sanction rates throughout the Coalition period, which provide a natural 
experiment-type context that helps limit the influence of omitted variable bias 
and reverse causality on the results obtained in the empirical analyses in this 
thesis. Indeed, as Loopstra et al. (2018: 442) argue, changes in the frequency of 
sanctions throughout the period represent a “largely exogenous source of 
variation” driven by policy decisions, which provides a context within which it is 
possible to better estimate the independent effect of sanctions on outcomes of 
interest.  
In addition to the time period investigated, the analysis makes use of several 
different methods to take into account the role of omitted variables bias and 
reverse causality. These methods will be broadly outlined in the remainder of 
this section. Next, Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 will detail the data used in 
relation to mental health outcomes and sanctions respectively, whilst Section 
5.6 will go on to provide a summary of the data and methods that are specific to 
each chapter. In order to make the discussion in this section and in the 
remainder of this chapter as clear as possible, Table 5.1 provides a summary of 
the separate empirical investigations that are carried out in Chapters 6 to 9. It 
details the level of analysis that is involved (local authority-level; multi-level; 
individual-level), the mental health outcome that is analysed, the main 
quantitative method that is applied and the additional robustness tests that are 
carried out (falsification, placebo and Granger tests). As previously highlighted, 
additional detail in terms of data sources will be provided later in this chapter, 
whilst the remainder of this section deals in a more broad sense with the 
methods that are adopted to deal with sources of bias that might affect the 
results of the analysis.   
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Table 5.1: summary of analysis by chapter 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Outcome 
variable 
Main method Robustness tests 
Chapter 
6 
Local 
authority-
level 
Antidepressant 
prescribing 
Fixed effects 
regression 
Falsification and 
Granger tests 
Chapter 
7 
Local 
authority-
level 
Anxiety and/or 
depression 
Fixed effects 
regression 
Falsification and 
Granger tests 
Chapter 
8 
Multi-level 
Anxiety and/or 
depression 
Random intercept 
regression 
Falsification test 
Chapter 
9 
Individual-
level 
Anxiety and/or 
depression 
Difference-in-
differences 
Falsification, 
placebo and 
matching 
In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, two separate longitudinal ecological analyses are 
carried out. In these chapters, the primary method for dealing with omitted 
variable bias is the use of fixed effects regression analysis, which controls for 
the influence of time-invariant unobserved characteristics. Fixed effects models 
function by controlling for differences between groups and exploiting within-
group variation over time (Allison, 2009; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Both entity 
fixed effects and time fixed effects models are used in the analysis. The former 
control for the influence of factors that are constant over time but that vary 
between local authorities, whilst the latter control for factors that are constant 
across local authorities but that vary over time. In so doing, the analysis is able 
to eliminate omitted variable bias arising from unobserved variables that are 
constant over time and that are constant across local authorities. This 
represents a significant advantage over standard OLS regression, though is 
achieved by making slightly more restrictive assumptions. In the current context, 
this requires that the effect of sanctions on mental health is additive and 
constant. At the local authority-level, this implies that a one per cent increase 
in the sanctions rate will have the same impact on mental health outcomes at all 
levels of sanction rates, whether or not the increase is from a low or high base 
rate. When analysing longitudinal data, however, this limitation is outweighed 
by the need to deal with the unobserved confounding factors identified.  
One alternative to fixed effects is the use of random effects regression models, 
which are able to exploit both within-group and between-group variation but 
only by making the additional assumption that any omitted variables are 
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uncorrelated with the explanatory variables included in the regression (Greene, 
2008). Whilst random effects models benefit in efficiency over fixed effects 
models, meaning that the model estimates generally exhibit smaller variances, 
the stricter assumption they make regarding the error term is often unrealistic in 
social settings. The Hausman (1978) test provides one means of testing whether 
this assumption is met, which is carried out as part of the analysis in Chapters 6 
and 7. There, both fixed effects and random effects models are estimated as 
part of the initial modelling process. Fixed effects are ultimately favoured over 
random effects, though the initial consideration of random effects models 
provides a useful sensitivity check on the findings. In contrast to the analysis in 
Chapters 6 and 7, Chapter 8 conducts a multi-level analysis using individual-level 
data on mental health outcomes and local authority-level data on sanctions. This 
is primarily carried out to provide a robustness check on the results obtained in 
Chapter 7, which may have been influenced by changes in the composition of 
JSA claimants across the period of analysis. In Chapter 8, random effects models 
provide a better means of dealing with the clustering of individuals within local 
authorities, and are thus preferred. This will be explained in much greater detail 
in Chapter 8 itself.  
The analysis in Chapter 9 carries out a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis, 
using individual-level data on mental health outcomes. DiD analyses use 
observational data to approximate experimental research designs, by comparing 
‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups before and after a particular treatment occurs 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009). In the standard two-period design, for example, 
researchers exploit situations in which a treatment group is exposed to a 
particular intervention in the second period as a result of a policy change, whilst 
a comparable control group is selected that is not exposed to the intervention in 
either period. The DiD estimate is then obtained by comparing the average 
change in the outcome of interest for the two groups. If the “common trends 
assumption” (Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 245)  is met, then the observed change 
in outcomes for the control group serves as a counterfactual for what would 
have happened to outcomes for the treatment group in the absence of 
treatment. By comparing the average change for the two groups, the DiD 
estimator attempts to identify the causal effect of a particular intervention by 
removing the influence of both selection bias and time trends in the outcome for 
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the group of interest. Chapter 9 explains in more depth the exact details of the 
DiD analysis that is carried out, including the particular sanctions policy change 
that is exploited, as well as the formation of ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups.  
In addition to the main methods described above, each chapter carries out 
robustness tests that are designed to take into account particular sources of 
bias. In terms of omitted variable bias, for example, each chapter conducts 
falsification tests using the “non-equivalent dependent variable” approach 
(Shadish et al., 2002: 184). This test functions by identifying an additional 
dependent variable that is not expected to be influenced by variations in the key 
independent variable of interest, but that is likely to be influenced by the same 
unobserved confounders as the original dependent variable. If such a variable 
can be identified, results of the initial analysis are re-run using the non-
equivalent dependent variable. The plausibility of the original associations 
estimated will be enhanced if no effect between the key independent variable 
and non-equivalent dependent variable is observed. This would lessen the 
potential that alternative explanations are the true cause of the effects 
originally observed. Importantly, however, the selected non-equivalent 
dependent variable must be similar enough to the original dependent variable in 
order to be influenced by related unobserved confounding factors. Otherwise, its 
selection would be “merely arbitrary” (Coryn and Hobson, 2011: 33) and its use 
as part of a falsification test would not strengthen causal inferences. Given the 
various differences between each empirical chapter, separate non-equivalent 
dependent variables are used at each stage, as will be explained in the analyses 
themselves.  
In Chapter 9, use is also made of a placebo test (de Chaisemartin and 
D’Haultfoeuille, 2018). The DiD analysis carried out in Chapter 9 exploits a 
particular change in sanctions policy that occurred at the beginning of the 
Coalition government in 2010. In this context, a placebo test involves repeating 
the results of the main analysis in a period not marked by any significant 
changes in sanctions policy. By choosing a time period that was relatively stable 
in terms of sanctions policy, the results of the main analysis are supported if the 
placebo DiD analysis does not find evidence of an intervention effect. The use of 
a placebo test is also useful as it avoids potential doubts that might affect 
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falsification tests, regarding the appropriateness of the non-equivalent 
dependent variable that is selected. In a further robustness test, Chapter 9 also 
carries out a matching technique (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). This seeks to limit 
the influence of differences between the treatment and control groups by using 
groups that are as similar as possible in terms of observed characteristics. Whilst 
matching provides a useful robustness test on the main results it does not, as is 
occasionally assumed in quantitative analyses, reduce bias resulting from 
unobserved confounding factors. The precise details of the matching technique 
that is applied will be explained in more detail in Chapter 9.  
Lastly, the longitudinal ecological analyses in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are 
supported by Granger causality tests. The Granger test is carried out in two 
steps. First, it tests whether lagged values of the key independent variable are 
jointly associated with the dependent variable, as is implied by the notion that 
cause precedes effect. Second, it tests whether lagged variables of the 
dependent variable are jointly associated with the key independent variable, in 
order to provide an assessment of whether the model is affected by reverse 
causation. The original test developed by Granger (1969; 1980) was designed for 
use with time series data, and so the test carried out in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 
uses an extension to panel data developed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) using 
the Stata command ‘xtgcause’ created by Lopez and Weber (2017). The Granger 
test is premised on a specific notion of causality, based particularly on the 
predictive content of variables. A positive Granger test, therefore, cannot by 
itself rule out reverse causality entirely. Causal inferences, nevertheless, are 
strengthened if it is shown that the key independent variable Granger-causes the 
dependent variable and not vice versa. Indeed, the use of Granger tests is 
favoured over explicitly including lagged sanctions variables in the explanatory 
models themselves. Fixed effects models have been shown to be extremely 
sensitive to the specification of temporal lags, which undermine attempts to 
ascertain the correct lag specification (Bellemare et al., 2017; Vaisey and Miles, 
2017).  
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5.3.4 Causation as generative process 
Thus far, this section has contrasted Goldthorpe’s (2001) categories of causation 
as robust dependence and causation as consequential manipulation. It has been 
highlighted that the empirical analysis in this thesis is not able to benefit from 
the forms of randomised allocation that are central to the consequential 
manipulation approach. Various steps, nevertheless, have been outlined that will 
be used in order to limited sources of bias and improve upon the scope for 
causal inference that is possible when using observational data. It is important 
to highlight, however, Goldthorpe’s (2001) third account of causation as 
generative process. This approach seeks to identify “what must be added to any 
statistical criteria before an argument for causation can convincingly be made” 
(Goldthorpe, 2001: 8). Accordingly, Goldthorpe (2001) outlines a three-stage but 
overlapping process for establishing causal claims within quantitative research. 
This begins by substantiating the existence of empirical regularities through 
theoretically informed empirical work, followed by hypothesising the causal 
mechanisms that might give rise to such empirical regularities before then going 
on to test the mechanisms themselves.  
Importantly, the research presented in this thesis is able to contribute to the 
first two stages of this process. Chapter 4 has considered the separate material 
and psychosocial mechanisms that might plausibly link sanctions with adverse 
mental health impacts, drawing on existing empirical and theoretical work in 
relation to the mental health impacts of sanctions and unemployment. The 
analyses that are carried out in Chapters 6 to 9, furthermore, consider different 
mental health outcomes and use methods that combine to provide a robust and 
thorough investigation into the mental health impacts of benefit sanctions. This 
triangulation of data sources and research designs is a key strength of this 
thesis, which uses data from across the period of Coalition government (2010-15) 
to substantiate empirical regularities in this area. Given data availability, 
however, the investigation is not able to directly test the role of the separate 
mechanisms identified, which relates to the third phase of Goldthorpe’s (2001) 
notion of causation as generative process. This is an avenue that would require 
additional research and data to achieve, which could be used to help strengthen 
any causal inferences resulting from the investigation carried out in this thesis.  
89 
 
 
Having outlined the issue of causal inference and the methods that will be 
adopted in this regard, the discussion now turns to the measurement of 
important variables. The first of these relates to mental health outcomes, as 
explained in the next section.  
5.4 Mental health: measuring anxiety and depression 
Previously, Chapter 4 outlined ongoing debates in relation to the definition and 
conceptualisation of mental health in broad terms, which are equally prevalent 
in attempts to understand the nature and status of the mental distress 
experienced by people affected by anxiety and depression. Kokanovic et al. 
(2013: 377), for example, identify the various tensions that exist “across the 
entire spectrum of lay and medical belief”, which range from viewing anxiety 
and depression as ‘normal’ responses to life’s challenges to forms of potentially 
serious mental illnesses. In the medical sphere, for example, attempts have 
been made to develop symptom-based diagnostic categorisations in order to 
improve upon the reliability of medical diagnoses and therefore guide 
treatment. In the UK, official guidance from the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE, 2009: 6) recognises the “broad and heterogeneous” 
nature of depression, and discusses two classification systems, the ICD-10 and 
the DSM-IV, which identify symptoms such as: low mood; loss of interests, 
pleasure or energy; feelings of worthlessness; and suicidal thoughts or actions. 
The ICD-10 requires four out of ten depressive symptoms to be present for a 
formal diagnosis of depression to be made, whilst the DSM-IV requires five out of 
nine, though the NICE (2009) guidelines advise against merely symptom 
counting. They also recognise that depressive symptoms below the threshold 
criteria can be significantly distressing, especially when experienced on a 
consistent basis.  
The NICE (2009: 7) guidance adopts a cautious and stepped approach to the 
diagnosis and treatment of anxiety and depression, noting the “wide range of 
biological, psychological and social factors” that diagnostic classification systems 
struggle to capture accurately. The development and application of such 
diagnostic systems in a broader context has nevertheless been widely criticised, 
given concerns that they reflect a misguided overemphasis on bio-chemical 
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explanations of depression that have led to a rapid rise in diagnoses, over-
medicalisation and a heyday for the pharmaceutical industry (Blazer, 2005; 
Horwitz and Wakefield, 2007; Horwitz, 2011). Critics point, for example, to the 
difficulty in precisely defining and categorising depression given the overlapping 
nature of the symptoms involved in various mental health-related diagnoses. 
Indeed, several have questioned whether distinguishing between the categories 
of ‘anxiety’ and ‘depression’ is itself meaningful, given the similarities in the 
symptoms and the populations affected by them (Kasper, 2001; Shorter and 
Tyrer, 2003; Das-Munshi et al., 2008). Similarly, critics have highlighted the 
value-laden and contested nature of medical diagnoses, pointing to various lay 
accounts that seek to resist the implication that depression represents an illness 
or an abnormal or inappropriate response to stress of various forms (Pilgrim and 
Bentall, 1999; Pilgrim, 2007; Kokanovic et al., 2013). Others have even gone as 
far, furthermore, as arguing that “no one can say with any authority what 
depression actually is” (Ridge, 2018: 147).  
The above discussion provides some insight into the polarised nature of the 
debate in this area, and highlights the importance of recognising how mental 
distress is measured and operationalised in the current research. Given data 
availability, two indicators of mental health are used in the empirical chapters 
in this thesis, which include: a measure of antidepressant prescribing (Chapter 
6); and a measure of self-reported anxiety and/or depression (Chapters 7 to 9). 
These measures will be explained further in the remainder of this section, as 
well as in more detail in the individual empirical chapters themselves. It is 
important to emphasise, however, that the analysis is not able to contribute to 
or resolve the ongoing debates in this area. As previously indicated, these relate 
to the appropriate treatment of anxiety and depression, the status of such 
mental health problems as distinct issues and their relationship to ‘normal’ 
functioning in the context of an individual’s social environment. Partly driven by 
the reliance on quantitative methods, the measures of mental health utilised in 
this thesis must in some sense be taken at face value, as indications that 
individuals are experiencing mental or emotional distress of some – potentially 
quite serious – form. Following from this, and informed by the discussion in 
Chapter 4, the view that mental health can be influenced by important social 
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determinants suggests that a basic expectation of the social security system is 
that it should not add – inadvertently or otherwise – to such mental distress.  
In Chapter 6, data on the number of antidepressant items prescribed in each 
local authority are accessed from NHS Digital (2018), which publishes monthly 
administrative data from GPs. In particular, the analysis makes use of ‘Selective 
Serotonin Re-Uptake Inhibitors’ (SSRIs) as the specific antidepressant measure. 
These are the first-line medication for treating depression and anxiety (NICE, 
2015). They are also the most appropriate indicator for capturing impacts on 
such mental health problems since the broader total antidepressant measure 
includes items prescribed to treat non-psychiatric health conditions such as 
chronic pain (Spence et al., 2014). Clearly, not all individuals suffering from 
anxiety and/or depression will be prescribed antidepressant medication, since 
there are differences in the likelihood of individuals recognising and reporting 
mental health problems, as well as differences in GP prescribing behaviour and 
the exploration of alternative treatments (Hyde et al., 2005). Nevertheless, the 
antidepressant measure used in Chapter 6 provides a readily understandable 
measure of mental distress, in the form of people who do in fact receive medical 
treatment. In the context of the research itself, antidepressant usage is a useful 
measure in that it provides an indication of resource usage through the National 
Health Service (NHS), therefore allowing the investigation to highlight the 
potential public expenditure implications of benefit sanctions.  
In contrast to the administrative antidepressant prescribing data used in Chapter 
6, Chapters 7 to 9 rely on a self-reported measure of anxiety and/or depression 
using the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) (ONS, 2018c). Section 5.6 in this 
chapter provides more specific detail on the structure of the QLFS itself, whilst 
the present discussion focuses specifically on the questionnaire question relating 
to anxiety and depression, as detailed in Box 5.1.   
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Box 5.1: QLFS questionnaire health-related question 
a) In the QLFS, respondents are first asked:  
 
Do you have any health problems or disabilities that you expect will last for 
more than a year? 
 
From the second quarter in 2013 onwards this question was changed slightly to:  
 
Do you have any physical or mental health conditions or illnesses lasting or 
expecting to last 12 months or more? 
 
b) Respondents are then asked to select which particular health problem(s) that they 
suffer from using a pre-specified list, as follows: 
 
1. Problems or disabilities (including arthritis or rheumatism) connected with arms 
or hands; 
2. ... legs or feet; 
3. ... back or neck; 
4. Difficulty in seeing (while wearing spectacles or contact lenses); 
5. Difficulty in hearing; 
6. Speech impediment; 
7. Severe disfigurements, skin conditions, allergies; 
8. Chest or breathing problems, asthma, bronchitis; 
9. Heart, blood pressure or blood circulation problems; 
10. Stomach, liver, kidney or digestive problems; 
11. Diabetes; 
12. Depression, bad nerves or anxiety; 
13. Epilepsy; 
14. Severe or specific learning difficulties; 
15. Mental illness or suffer from phobias, panics or other nervous disorders; 
16. Progressive illness not included elsewhere (e.g. cancer not included elsewhere, 
multiple sclerosis, symptomatic HIV, Parkinson's disease, Muscular Dystrophy); 
and 
17. Other health problems or disabilities. 
Source: ONS (2014) 
As Box 5.1 details, mental health status in the QLFS is elicited using a self-
reported measure, in which respondents are first asked whether or not they 
have any health problems that they expect will last for more than a year. This 
question changed slightly from the second quarter in 2013, which the analysis 
takes into account where necessary and as explained in the specific empirical 
chapters themselves. Following this, respondents are then asked to select which 
particular health problems they suffer from using a pre-specified list, from 
which the primary outcome of interest in Chapters 7 to 9 relates to respondents 
who self-report as suffering from ‘Depression, bad nerves or anxiety’ (option 
12). Although option 15 ‘Mental illness or suffer from phobias, panics or other 
nervous disorders’ also relates to mental health, the fact that this option 
combines mental health problems such as phobias with the very broad term 
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‘mental illness’ meant that this self-reported measure was not ultimately 
investigated in the analysis, since it is unclear what mental health problems it 
measures or what the potential relationship with benefit sanctions is expected 
to be. As Figure 5.1 indicates, there is a high correlation between rates of self-
reported anxiety and/or depression and antidepressant prescribing at the local 
authority-level (r = 0.609, p < 0.001). The two measures are not perfectly 
correlated, however, which provides the basis for separate analyses in this 
thesis.  
Figure 5.1: relationship between rates of anxiety and/or depression and antidepressant prescribing 
 
Note: quarterly rates for 148 local authority counties, Q3 2010 – Q4 2014 
Bentley et al. (2016) criticise the self-reported measure of anxiety and 
depression available through the QLFS on the grounds that it only provides a 
subjective and indicative response to the survey sub-question. In contrast, they 
argue that a diagnostic assessment would provide a more robust measure. As the 
discussion at the beginning of this section indicates, an evident weakness in the 
criticism made by Bentley et al. (2016) is that it ignores the fact that medical 
diagnoses of depression and anxiety are themselves continually contested in the 
context of what has been described as an ongoing “diagnostic fuzziness” 
(Kokanovic et al., 2013: 380). Self-reported and diagnostic measures provide 
different means of capturing mental health. Whilst each have their strengths and 
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limitations, it would arguably be misguided to assume that either one provides a 
particular degree of validity that the other lacks. The use made of the self-
reported measure in this thesis does of course have certain implications. On the 
one hand, for example, the self-reported measure risks not identifying 
individuals who are in fact suffering from anxiety and/or depression, because 
they are either unaware that what they are suffering might be described as such 
or because they are unwilling to report suffering from such problems. On the 
other hand, nevertheless, this measure will potentially identify those who self-
identify as suffering from some form of mental distress but who have not had 
this affirmed by a formal medical diagnosis.  
Arguably, the biggest limitation of the self-reported measure of anxiety and 
depression used in Chapters 7 to 9 is that it provides only a binary indication of 
an individual’s mental health status. Mental health problems such as anxiety and 
depression can be conceptualised as both a category and a continuum (Wheaton, 
2001), and thus binary measures ignore the extent to which individuals might 
suffer mental and emotional distress as a matter of degree as opposed to one of 
kind. This binary measure of depression and anxiety is therefore limited in that 
it provides no information about the severity of the mental health problems 
being reported, such that the mental health of somebody who has already 
specified that they suffer from such problems cannot be observed to worsen.  
This limitation is compounded by the fact that the QLFS questionnaire asks 
respondents whether or not they expect the particular health problem to last 
more than a year. In this respect, this measure risks underestimating the 
prevalence of mental health problems given that it may not identify individuals 
who are suffering from anxiety or depression but who do not expect such issues 
to last as long as a year. Despite these limitations, the QLFS measure is a useful 
one in that it is consistently available on a quarterly basis throughout the time 
period of interest. Indeed, it is arguably relatively unproblematic to assume that 
if increases in rates of self-reported anxiety and/or depression using this 
measure are the result of increases in rates of sanctioning, then this is indicative 
of adverse impacts in terms of worsening mental health.  
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Other sources of mental health outcomes were considered as part of the 
research, though ultimately not investigated within the analysis. The UK 
Household Longitudinal Study (Understanding Society, the successor to the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)), for example, permits investigation of 
mental health outcomes that are measured through the General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ-12), which provides a scalar measure of mental distress 
ranging from zero (least distressed) to 36 (most distressed), based on answers to 
12 mental health-related questions (Brown et al., 2018). Delaney et al. (2017), 
however, have carried out initial – as yet unpublished – analysis of the 
relationship between mental health and local authority-level sanctions using 
Understanding Society, whilst the annual nature of the datasets mean that it 
would not be possible to exploit the high degree of quarterly variation in benefit 
sanctions in the analysis. The same limitation applies to the Annual Population 
Survey (APS) subjective well-being datasets, which provide measures of life 
satisfaction, life worth, happiness and anxiety on a zero to ten scale (ONS, 
2012). The APS well-being data are also only available from 2011-12 onwards, 
therefore missing out on the initial change in sanction frequency at the onset of 
the Coalition.  
5.5 Sanctions data 
In addition to mental health outcomes, a key variable in this research is the 
measurement of benefit sanctions themselves. Data on the number of JSA 
sanctions used throughout this thesis were accessed from the DWP’s Stat-Xplore 
database (DWP, 2018c), which publishes data on the monthly frequency of 
sanctions at the local authority-level, according to the residence of JSA 
claimants. As previously highlighted, in both Chapter 4 and in Section 5.3, there 
are important theoretical reasons for focusing specifically on JSA sanctions 
during the period of Coalition government (2010-15). Using the Stat-Xplore 
database, furthermore, local authority-level data for other claimant groups, 
such as ESA, IS and UC sanctions, are not available during this period and could 
therefore not be included in the analysis. Data on IS sanctions are only available 
from October 2016 onwards, whilst data on UC sanctions are only available from 
August 2015 onwards. Aggregated data on ESA sanctions are accessible 
throughout the time period analysed in this thesis, however such data could not 
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be included in the analysis due to the quality of the local authority-level data 
available. In particular, an extremely high proportion of the monthly ESA 
sanctions data available through Stat-Xplore are recorded as zero, or had their 
true figure suppressed due to disclosure concerns, due to the relatively lower 
level of ESA sanctioning that occurred throughout the period. This issue affected 
the data to such an extent that the use of ESA sanctions in the analysis would be 
highly unreliable, which also explains its non-use in the wider UK quantitative 
literature.  
The JSA benefit sanctions data that are available are limited in several ways by 
how they are recorded and published. The manner in which the DWP has 
reported on the available sanctions statistics has drawn repeated criticism as 
well as freedom of information requests (FOIs) from researchers. Criticism has 
even prompted the UK Statistics Authority (UKSA, 2015) to write to the 
department recommending that it improve various aspects of its published 
sanctions statistics, both in terms of transparency and in terms of gaps in areas 
such as hardship payments. Indeed, key gaps at the local authority-level remain 
regarding statistics on the length of sanctions, hardship payments and 
distinguishing between sanctions and disentitlements, meaning that the analysis 
in this thesis relies on data that records the frequency of sanctions only. Again, 
this is a feature of the wider UK quantitative literature into sanctions that was 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
Of central importance here is that the Stat-Xplore database records only the 
latest decision for each sanction case. To elucidate the implication of this 
recording decision, Figure 5.2 depicts the sanctions process for an individual 
following a sanctions referral by their Jobcentre Work Coach or Work Programme 
provider (DWP, 2018a).  
  
97 
 
 
Figure 5.2: stages in the sanctions process following a referral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from DWP (2018a) 
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As highlighted in Figure 5.2, Decision Makers within Jobcentre Plus offices can 
make one of four decisions once they receive a referral for a claimant to be 
sanctioned. These include:  
i. Adverse: a decision to impose a benefit sanction;  
ii. Non-Adverse: a decision not to impose a benefit sanction;  
iii. Cancelled: a decision to cancel the referral, given that it is deemed 
inappropriate; and  
iv. Reserved: a decision that a sanction cannot be imposed because the 
claimant is not currently receiving benefits. The claimant will be re-
referred if they claim again in the future.  
Following an ‘Original Decision’ to impose a sanction, three further steps are 
possible if the sanctioned claimant decides to challenge the decision made. 
First, claimants can offer an explanation of a sanction decision or provide 
additional evidence not yet considered, leading to a ‘Decision Review’. If an 
adverse decision is upheld, claimants are able to challenge the decision through 
a formal ‘Mandatory Reconsideration’ process. Following this, if an adverse 
decision is again upheld, claimants can then appeal the decision at an 
independent tribunal. Mandatory reconsiderations were introduced at the end of 
October 2013, at the height of sanctioning as depicted in Figure 3.1 in Chapter 
3. Prior to this time, a claimant could appeal following either an original or a 
reconsidered decision, though since the introduction of mandatory 
reconsiderations appeals are only permitted once they have received a decision 
in that regard.  
As highlighted above, the Stat-Xplore database records only the latest decision 
for each sanction case, and therefore updates the status of each case to the 
point in time in which the most recent decision has been made on it. The 
implication of this recording system is that sanctions that have gone through the 
review, reconsideration or appeals process will be recorded at a later point in 
time from the original sanctioning decision, meaning that it is not possible to 
ascertain when the original adverse decision was made. Consequently, it is also 
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not possible to calculate the total number of adverse sanctions before review, 
reconsideration or appeal for any given month, which is the point in time at 
which claimants first lose their benefit income and therefore an important 
measure in investigating the impacts of sanctions. Although a successful review, 
reconsideration or appeal should result in the claimant being refunded their lost 
income, the claimant in question will still have endured a period of time – 
weeks, potentially months – without any financial resources. An additional 
consequence is that it is not possible to calculate the number of sanction 
referrals in any given month, which are not published separately within Stat-
Xplore. An indicative measure can be calculated by adding together all the 
original decisions made (adverse, non-adverse, cancelled and reserved), though 
this more accurately measures original decisions as opposed to referrals and also 
remains an underestimate given the issue highlighted in relation to adverse 
sanctions.  
Given the data limitations described, there are several imperfect measures of 
local authority-level sanctions available for the purposes of the analysis. Each 
will be affected by the fact that the original adverse sanctions figure represents 
an underestimate of the true rate, given that this figure represents only those 
original decisions to impose a sanction that were not later reviewed, 
reconsidered and/or appealed. The first option is to use data on the remaining 
original adverse sanctions themselves, which is the approach taken by other 
quantitative studies in the literature (de Vries et al., 2017; Reeves, 2017; Reeves 
and Loopstra, 2017; Loopstra et al., 2018; Taulbut et al., 2018), and which is 
also the main approach that will be taken here. The data on the remaining 
original adverse sanctions (henceforth, original adverse sanctions) have the 
advantage of being precisely aligned with their original decision month, despite 
providing an underestimate of the true level of sanctions that were imposed. 
The size of this underestimate is not unsubstantial. Kennedy and Keen (2016), 
for example, estimate that under a fifth of original adverse decisions were 
challenged in any given month during the period of analysis. Importantly, 
nevertheless, the NAO (2016a: 32) notes that this proportion stayed “broadly the 
same” during this period, meaning that the remaining original adverse sanctions 
rate provides a consistent measure of sanctions through time.  
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As a sensitivity check, two additional sanctions rates are initially considered in 
the analysis in Chapter 6. The second rate that is used is the total adverse 
sanctions figure. For any given month, these include the remaining original 
adverse sanctions described above, as well as adverse sanctions resulting from a 
review, reconsideration or appeal. This sanctions measure is fuzzier than the 
original adverse measure, as it includes adverse sanctions decisions that had 
been originally imposed prior to the month in question. It also suffers from the 
fact that the rate of successful challenges increased through the period that is 
analysed in the investigation (Kennedy and Keen, 2016; NAO, 2016a), which 
therefore adds an additional degree of inconsistency into the analysis. The third 
rate that is considered is the indicative referral rate (henceforth, referral rate), 
which is measured by adding together all original decisions (adverse, non-
adverse, cancelled and reserved). As previously explained, this measure provides 
an underestimate of the true referral rate given the recording issue relating to 
original adverse sanctions, whilst it more accurately measures original decisions 
as opposed to the referrals themselves. One limitation of this measure in the 
current context is that it does not provide a clear expected relationship between 
sanctions and mental health outcomes. The mental health impact of a sanction 
referral, for example, will be very different once an individual knows that they 
have actually received a non-adverse decision.  
In their quantitative study, Taulbut et al. (2018) investigate both the referral 
rate as well as the original adverse sanctions figure, describing the former in 
terms of the threat of sanctions, with the implication being that the latter 
represents the imposition effect of sanctions. Arguably, however, it is not 
possible to investigate threat and imposition effects separately using the 
aggregate-level data that is available. Chapter 4 distinguished between threat 
and imposition effects for individual claimants, noting that threat effects have 
been thought of in terms of both the general threat of sanctions as well as the 
impact of an actual warning that a sanction might be imposed. Imposition 
effects, in contrast, occur once sanctions have actually been applied. The 
aggregate-level data that is available for the investigation in this thesis, in 
contrast, is better thought of as being able to capture an overall combined 
threat and imposition effect resulting from sanctions, as opposed to identifying 
one or the other. Consider, for example, the original adverse sanctions figure. A 
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quarterly increase in this sanction rate implies that more JSA claimants have 
received a sanction (an imposition effect), which itself is a form of increased 
threat effect for those JSA claimants who did not have a sanction imposed. 
Similarly, the referral rate does not isolate the threat effect of sanctions, since 
original adverse sanctions represents one of its key components.  
5.6 Overview of empirical chapters 
The empirical chapters in this thesis investigate the relationship between 
benefit sanctions and mental health outcomes during the Coalition government 
(2010-15). As highlighted in Chapter 4, the overarching research question that 
these empirical chapters seek to address is the following:  
[RQ]: Are benefit sanctions associated with adverse mental health 
impacts?  
In order to address this research question, each chapter exploits changes in the 
frequency and the strictness of sanctions that occurred across the period. These 
sources of variation are used to better understand the specific relationship that 
is being investigated in each chapter, as well as strengthen any causal inferences 
that are made, as will be explained in this section. In light of the various data 
limitations that have been highlighted throughout this chapter, and in order to 
maximise the potential of the data that is available, several different analyses 
are carried out across Chapters 6 to 9. These were previously summarised in 
Table 5.1. Benefit sanctions data in each chapter are sourced from Stat-Xplore 
(DWP, 2018c), and the separate analyses will be briefly outlined in turn in this 
section, including: two longitudinal ecological analyses (Chapter 6 and Chapter 
7); a multi-level analysis (Chapter 8); and a difference-in-differences analysis 
(Chapter 9). More in-depth discussion of the various aspects of each 
investigation will be provided in the specific chapters themselves.  
5.6.1 Longitudinal ecological analyses 
The analyses in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are conducted using similar research 
designs but consider different aspects of mental health. The former investigates 
antidepressant prescribing and the latter investigates rates of self-reported 
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anxiety and/or depression. In both, panel datasets are constructed that permit 
the investigation of the relationship between benefit sanctions and mental 
health outcomes through time at the local authority-level, which is enabled by 
the considerable spatial and temporal variation in sanction rates that occurred 
throughout the period. In addition, the implementation of the Welfare Reform 
Act 2012 increased the average length of the sanctions that could be imposed on 
claimants, and so both chapters consider whether the observed relationship 
between sanctions and mental health differs in the pre- and post-reform period. 
The particular research questions that inform the investigation in Chapter 6 are 
the following:  
[RQ 6.1]: Are benefit sanctions associated with higher rates of 
antidepressant prescribing at the local authority-level?  
[RQ 6.2]: Does the observed relationship strengthen following the 
implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012?  
Similarly, the research questions that inform the investigation in Chapter 7 are 
as follows:  
[RQ 7.1]: Are benefit sanctions associated with higher rates of anxiety 
and/or depression at the local authority-level?  
[RQ 7.2]: Does the observed relationship strengthen following the 
implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012?  
Section 5.3 highlights the twin concerns of omitted variable bias and reverse 
causality which the analyses in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 take various steps to 
take into account. In terms of omitted variable bias, additional local authority-
level variables are sourced from Nomis, Stat-Xplore and specific UK government 
departments and included in both fixed and random effects regression models, 
whilst falsification tests are carried out in robustness checks on the results of 
the main analysis. Granger tests are also carried out to consider the issue of 
reverse causality.   
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Ecological analyses are subject to well-known limitations that affect their scope 
for causal inference. Primarily, this relates to the fact that correlations that 
hold at the area-level do not necessarily apply at the individual-level. Since the 
investigations carried out in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are based on data at the 
local authority-level, it is not possible to know whether the individuals being 
sanctioned in each local authority are the same people who suffer impacts in 
terms of their mental health. Indeed, the risk of drawing incorrect inferences 
about individual-level relationships based on correlations that hold at the 
aggregate-level is commonly described as an “ecological fallacy” (Pearce, 2000: 
326). It is important, therefore, to be cognisant of this issue when interpreting 
the results in these chapters. Aggregate-level studies, nevertheless, are 
important in circumstances where individual-level data are unavailable. Such 
studies can, for example, provide initial tests of hypotheses and help to identify 
policy issues that need to be considered through additional individual-level 
research (Pearce, 2000). Indeed, aggregate-level analyses are a feature of the 
wider quantitative literature into both conditionality and sanctions, which has 
highlighted concerns regarding the impacts of recent social security reforms 
(Barr et al., 2016; Loopstra et al., 2018; Taulbut et al., 2018).  
Previously, Section 5.4 outlined the particular measures of mental health 
outcomes that will be adopted in each chapter. First, Chapter 6 uses 
administrative data from GPs on antidepressant prescribing that is then 
aggregated to the local authority-level (NHS Digital, 2018). Chapter 7, in 
contrast, uses a self-reported measure of anxiety and/or depression that is 
sourced from the QLFS (ONS, 2018c). In particular, use is made of the secure 
access version of the QLFS, which – amongst other advantages over the separate 
publicly available datasets – provides researchers with more fine grained 
geographical information such as the local authority in which survey respondents 
live. The QLFS itself is a nationally representative, quarterly household survey in 
which each quarterly dataset contains approximately 100,000 individuals (ONS, 
2016). The survey is carried out as a repeated cross-sectional study, though it 
adopts a rotational sampling design in which each household is included for five 
consecutive quarters, with the final interview carried out one year after the 
first. Each quarterly cross-sectional dataset contains five waves of data, made 
up of individuals at the five separate stages of the interview process. An 
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individual is in Wave 1 if it is their first interview and Wave 5 if it is their last. A 
fifth of the sample is replaced each quarter. Using the third quarter of 2010 as 
an example quarter, which is the beginning of the period of analysis in Chapter 
7, Table 5.2 depicts the wave pattern that is implied by the rotational sampling 
design used in the QLFS.  
Table 5.2: wave structure of the QLFS, Q3 2010 dataset example 
 Q3 2009 Q4 2009 Q1 2010 Q2 2010 Q3 2010 
Cohort 1: Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Cohort 2:  Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 
Cohort 3:   Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Cohort 4:    Wave 1 Wave 2 
Cohort 5:     Wave 1 
Source: adapted from ONS (2016) 
The potential to exploit the longitudinal aspects of the QLFS has important 
implications for the analysis in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9, though in Chapter 7 use 
is made of the QLFS by pooling separate cross-sectional datasets. Using the 
secure access version of the QLFS, it is possible to estimate local authority 
estimates of rates of anxiety and/or depression using QLFS survey weights. 
Weights function by assigning each survey respondent a number indicating how 
many people in the population that that individual represents, which enables 
population inferences to be made. The QLFS weights aim to take into account 
both sample design and non-response bias. The former compensates for 
probability of selection into the QLFS whilst the latter compensates for 
differential non-response for different groups. Using the QLFS weights, Chapter 7 
estimates the proportion of working age individuals that from anxiety and/or 
depression at the local authority-level. Although based on survey estimates, one 
advantage of the analysis in Chapter 7 over that of Chapter 6 is that the 
antidepressant prescribing data is not available with any population 
characteristics detailed. This means that the investigation in Chapter 6 is limited 
to a less precise outcome variable expressed as a rate per total local authority 
population.  
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5.6.2 Multi-level analysis 
In contrast to Chapter 7, the multi-level analysis in Chapter 8 combines 
individual-level data on JSA claimants from the QLFS with local authority-level 
benefit sanctions data, to investigate the relationship between individual-level 
mental health of claimants and the area-level sanctions rate. The research 
questions that inform the investigation at this stage of the analysis are the 
following:  
[RQ 8.1]: Are area-level sanction rates associated with adverse mental 
health impacts for JSA claimants?  
[RQ 8.2]: Does the observed relationship strengthen following the 
implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012?  
The analysis in Chapter 8 pools separate cross-sectional QLFS datasets over the 
period of investigation. Given the rotational sampling design described above, 
this introduces a longitudinal element into the analysis given the fact that JSA 
claimants will be present in the sample between one and five times, depending 
on how long they were claiming JSA. Chapter 8 therefore begins by analysing a 
three-level data structure, in which occasions of measurement are nested within 
individuals who are themselves nested within local authorities. Such clustering 
needs to be explicitly taken into account in the modelling process, as such 
observations are likely to be highly correlated with each other and will therefore 
violate the assumption of independence that underpins single-level multiple 
regression models. Chapter 8 itself provides more detailed discussion regarding 
the modelling approach, which estimates three-level models as well as a two-
level model that retains JSA claimants according to the first occasion in which 
they are present in the sample.  
The main contribution of Chapter 8 with regard to supporting the identification 
of benefit sanction impacts is that it provides an additional robustness check on 
the analysis conducted in Chapter 7. Given that the longitudinal analysis in 
Chapter 7 is carried out solely at the ecological-level, it encounters the 
additional risk of being influenced by compositional bias. In this context, there is 
a risk that any observed association between sanctions and anxiety and/or 
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depression is explained by unobserved changes in the characteristics of the JSA 
claimant group throughout the time period, as opposed to being driven by 
sanctions themselves. The use of individual-level data on JSA claimants helps 
attenuate this risk, as the regression models are able to explicitly control for 
claimant characteristics. The analysis in Chapter 8 is supported by an additional 
falsification test, though it is important to highlight that reverse causality could 
still be influential. Although the combined threat and imposition effect of the 
area-level sanctions rate might adversely affect claimants’ mental health, for 
example, it could also be the case that claimants at a higher risk of mental 
health problems are more likely to be sanctioned, which itself contributes to the 
area-level sanctions rate.  
5.6.3 Difference-in-differences analysis 
Chapter 9, finally, carries out a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis. It 
investigates the impact of a change in sanctions policy at the onset of the 
Coalition in 2010 on the self-reported mental health of JSA claimants. The move 
towards a harsher sanctioning environment at this time is constituted by two 
changes in sanctions policy, including an increase in the penalty for non-
attendance at advisory interviews and an increase in the rate of sanctions. The 
research question that informs the investigation at this stage of the analysis is 
the following:  
[RQ 9.1]: Are harsher sanctioning environments associated with adverse 
impacts on the mental health of JSA claimants?  
In contrast to Chapter 8, Chapter 9 makes use of the two-quarter longitudinal 
LFS datasets (ONS, 2018a). These link information on working age survey 
respondents who respond in two consecutive quarters and provide longitudinal 
survey weights that account for differential attrition. Whilst both two- and five-
quarter longitudinal LFS datasets are published, the analysis makes use of the 
two-quarter datasets given the larger sample size that they provide. Each two-
quarter dataset contains approximately 35,000 individuals compared with 
approximately 5,000 for the five-quarter datasets. Using the two-quarter 
longitudinal LFS datasets, the investigation carries out a DiD analysis that 
compares the changes in the mental health of a ‘treatment’ group of JSA 
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claimants before and after the onset of the Coalition with the experience of a 
comparable ‘control’ group. As Section 5.3 highlighted, the aim of this approach 
is to minimise the influence of both selection bias and time trends in the 
outcome for the group of interest. More depth on the precise nature of the DiD 
analysis that is carried out is provided in Chapter 9 itself, regarding the 
‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups that are used and the particular sanctions 
policy change that is exploited.  
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed the data and methods that provide the basis for the 
empirical analyses carried out in Chapters 6 to 9 of this thesis. Together, these 
conduct a quantitative investigation into the impact of benefit sanctions on 
mental health outcomes such as antidepressant prescribing, anxiety and 
depression. Particular attention has been given to the issue of causal inferences, 
due to the use of observational data throughout the analysis and in light of the 
reliance on local authority-level data on sanctions. Informed by Goldthorpe’s 
(2001) categorisation of different accounts of causation within quantitative 
research, the discussion has argued that the investigation is able to contribute to 
the establishment of robust empirical regularities in this area and is supported 
by the development of impact mechanisms carried out in Chapter 4. Four 
separate empirical analyses are carried out, and it is argued that the 
triangulation of data sources and research designs that the investigation is able 
to achieve is a particular strength. Whilst limitations have been highlighted, 
causal inferences are supported by the time period selected, which is 
characterised by exogenously influenced changes in sanctions policy. Methods 
such as fixed effects, multi-level and difference-in-differences analysis are used 
to take into account several sources of bias, which are reinforced through 
additional robustness checks. It is to these empirical chapters that this thesis 
now turns.   
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Chapter 6. Longitudinal ecological analysis I: 
antidepressant prescribing 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the relationship between JSA benefit sanctions and 
antidepressant prescribing during the period of Coalition government (2010-15), 
using data at the local authority-level. Informed by the discussion in the 
previous chapters of this thesis, the research questions associated with this 
stage of the analysis are as follows:  
[RQ 6.1]: Are benefit sanctions associated with higher rates of 
antidepressant prescribing at the local authority-level?  
[RQ 6.2]: Does the observed relationship strengthen following the 
implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012?  
Before investigating these research questions, the analysis in this chapter begins 
by considering the broader determinants of antidepressant prescribing beyond 
the key focus on benefit sanctions. This is an important exercise, as it helps to 
identify the additional explanatory variables that need to be included in the 
regression modelling stage of the analysis. Next, the chapter outlines the data 
and methods that will be used in the analysis, providing more specific detail to 
that previously outlined in Chapter 5. The results of the analysis are then 
presented and discussed. In the summary and discussion, consideration is given 
to the issue of whether the data and methods used permit causal inferences to 
be drawn from the results obtained. The analysis presented and discussed in this 
chapter forms the basis of the following journal article:  
Williams, E. (2019). Unemployment, sanctions and mental health: the 
relationship between benefit sanctions and antidepressant prescribing. 
Journal of Social Policy, forthcoming. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279419000783 
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6.2 Determinants of antidepressant prescribing 
Antidepressant medication is primarily prescribed to treat individuals who are 
suffering from anxiety and depression, and rates of prescribing have been on the 
rise in the UK in recent decades (Middleton et al., 2001). In the last yen years, 
for example, the number of antidepressant items prescribed more than doubled 
in England (NHS Digital, 2017), whilst the upward trend in prescribing increased 
following the 2008 recession (Barr et al., 2015). Increasing rates of 
antidepressant prescribing have been regularly reported upon in the media, 
though GPs themselves disagree on whether their rise is indicative of an over-
medicalisation of common mental health problems or in fact represents an 
improved response to rising levels of anxiety and depression in the population 
(Reid, 2013; Spence, 2013). At the local authority-level, antidepressant 
prescribing is positively correlated with the prevalence of mental health 
problems such as anxiety and depression, as shown in Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5. As 
previously highlighted, however, the two do not correlate perfectly because not 
all individuals suffering from these mental health problems will actually be 
prescribed antidepressant medication. This might occur for a variety of reasons, 
which relate to: the likelihood that people recognise and report mental health 
problems; access to health services; GP prescribing behaviour; and the 
exploration of alternative treatments (Hyde et al., 2005).  
This section provides an overview of the separate determinants of 
antidepressant prescribing, which will be used to inform the identification of 
additional explanatory variables that will be included in the regression analysis. 
Given the distinction that has been made between the prevalence of mental 
health problems and actual rates of antidepressant prescribing, which is a 
difference that is likely to vary by country, the discussion primarily draws on 
findings from UK-specific studies, as they will be most relevant to the statistical 
modelling carried out here. Existing quantitative research in the UK considers 
the factors that explain variations in prescribing rates at the GP practice-level, 
and takes into account a combination of the characteristics of registered 
patients and of the GP practice itself as well as area-level determinants. Spence 
et al. (2014), for example, find that antidepressant prescribing is higher in GP 
practices that have patients with a higher prevalence of depression, as well as 
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higher proportions of older people, women and white people. Morrison et al. 
(2009), furthermore, find that greater proportions of GPs who are female, young 
or born in the UK are factors that are associated with higher levels of 
antidepressant prescribing. In addition, recent rises in the overall numbers of 
people receiving antidepressants is partly explainable by changes in GP 
prescribing behaviour (Spence et al., 2014) as well as the increasing numbers of 
individuals that are receiving long-term treatment (Moore et al., 2009; Mars et 
al., 2017).  
As highlighted in Chapter 5, data availability means that the analysis in this 
chapter is carried out solely at the local authority-level. Unfortunately, there is 
a risk involved in the selection of explanatory variables for a local authority-
level analysis using empirical insights from research that is based at different 
levels, such as the individual and GP-level. Mars et al. (2017), for example, find 
that the prevalence of antidepressant prescribing increases with age, though 
there is no guarantee that the same relationship will hold when controlling for 
separate age proportions at the local authority-level. This is the reverse of the 
problem of ecological bias described in Chapter 5. Usefully, nevertheless, 
additional research considers area-level determinants, including differences by 
age, gender and ethnicity. Sreeharan et al. (2013), for example, find that 
antidepressant prescribing is higher in areas with higher proportions of older 
people and white people, though in contrast to previous findings, they also find 
it is lower in areas with higher female populations. A particularly important 
determinant is area-level socio-economic deprivation, where prescribing 
increases along with increased deprivation. The role of area-level deprivation is 
confirmed in additional research, which also identifies urban environments as an 
important factor associated with higher rates of prescribing (Morrison et al., 
2009; McKenzie et al., 2013).  
In addition to demographic characteristics, deprivation and urban-rural 
classification, area-level research highlights the influence of labour market and 
economic factors on rates of antidepressant prescribing. Barr et al. (2016), for 
example, find that antidepressant prescribing is higher in areas with higher 
unemployment rates, lower wages and lower rates of economic output. Indeed, 
this finding confirms the well-established link between factors such as 
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unemployment and poor mental health, as well as in relation to antidepressant 
prescribing, that is found at the individual-level (von Soest et al., 2012). As 
argued in Chapter 4, furthermore, the structure of the social security system 
itself is likely to play an important role in terms of both mental health and 
consequent impacts on antidepressant prescribing. As previously highlighted, for 
example, the particular focus of the study by Barr et al. (2016) is on work-
related conditionality in the form of Work Capability Assessments (WCAs). In 
their study, rates of antidepressant prescribing are higher in local authorities 
with a greater cumulative proportion of WCAs for claimants of the main out-of-
work disability benefit. The particular focus of this chapter, furthermore, is on 
benefit sanctions in relation to antidepressant prescribing. Chapter 4 argued 
that both the threat and actual imposition of a sanction is expected to impact 
mental health outcomes, operating through a mixture of material and 
psychosocial mechanisms. The specific data and methods used in the analysis are 
the subject of the next section.  
6.3 Data and methods 
6.3.1 Analytic sample 
As outlined in Chapter 5, the analysis in this chapter and the following empirical 
chapters in this thesis focuses on the period of Coalition government (2010-15). 
Importantly, this represents the period of the ‘great sanctions drive’ described 
in Chapter 3, which – it has previously been argued – serves to limit the overall 
influence of omitted variable bias and reverse causality on the results obtained. 
Antidepressant prescribing data itself is only available from June 2010 onwards 
for GP practices in England (NHS Digital, 2018). Since the investigation in this 
chapter is carried out using quarterly data, the time period for the analysis 
begins at the third quarter of 2010 (Q3: July-September), which coincides with 
the early months of the Coalition government and the initial rise in rates of JSA 
sanctions. At the other end of the time period, furthermore, it is important to 
highlight the influence of the rollout of Universal Credit (UC) on the JSA 
claimant count and JSA sanctions figures. February 2015 marked the start of the 
national expansion of UC, which – as previously described in Chapter 3 – began to 
replace six existing means-tested benefits including JSA (DWP, 2015c). 
Importantly, the rollout of UC systematically altered the composition of the 
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remaining JSA claimant group by initially only being open to younger 
unemployed individuals without dependent children (DWP, 2014).  
As Chapter 5 explained, however, data on UC claims and sanctions are not 
available for the time period in question and consequently cannot be included in 
the regression models. In order to minimise the potential influence of 
compositional change on the results of the analysis, therefore, data are included 
up to and including the fourth quarter of 2014, prior to the national rollout of 
UC. In the remaining pre-2015 sample, 31 local authorities were affected by the 
Pathfinder phase of UC that began in April 2013, which impacts 78 local 
authority quarters in the sample. These local authority quarters are removed in 
the analysis presented here, though the results were also re-run with them 
included as a sensitivity check. Importantly, the findings remain substantively 
unchanged with or without their inclusion, which is unsurprising given the small 
number of individuals actually claiming UC by December 2014. England is divided 
into 326 local authority districts, though the City of London and the Isles of Scilly 
are excluded from this analysis, since their small population size means that 
many observations for important variables are either missing from the data 
available or are highly unreliable. These exclusions imply that the analysis is 
based on 324 local authority districts across 18 quarters (Q3 2010 – Q4 2014). 
This provides a maximum sample size of 5,754 local authority quarters, once the 
78 local authority quarters have been removed.  
6.3.2 Dependent variable and falsification variable 
Data on the number of antidepressant items prescribed by GP practices were 
accessed from NHS Digital (2018), which publishes data at monthly intervals for 
all practices in England starting in June 2010. Comparable data for GP practices 
in Scotland are published, however are only publicly available from October 
2015 onwards, which is beyond the time period of analysis. Antidepressant 
prescribing items were identified using Section 4.3 ‘Antidepressant Drugs’ of the 
British National Formulary (BNF) code (BMA and RPS, 2018). In particular, the 
analysis uses a subset of antidepressant items categorised within BNF Section 
4.3.3 ‘Selective Serotonin Re-Uptake Inhibitors’ (SSRIs), which are the first-line 
medication for treating anxiety and depression (NICE, 2015). SSRIs are the most 
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appropriate indicator to capture impacts on anxiety and depression since the 
broader antidepressant measure includes items prescribed to treat non-
psychiatric health conditions such as chronic pain (Spence et al., 2014). 
Prescription items themselves are single supplies of a medicine that generally 
refer to month-long prescriptions, though the length of prescription items will 
vary depending on the length of treatment or quantity of medicine prescribed 
(HSCIC, 2015). They nevertheless represent a standard measure of 
antidepressant prescribing rates and are used widely in epidemiological research 
(Middleton et al., 2001; Moore et al., 2009; Spence et al., 2014).  
Using the GP practice-level data, rates of SSRI prescribing were constructed for 
each local authority in the sample. First, each GP practice was linked to the 
local authority in which it was located, using a postcode to local authority look-
up table published by the ONS (2015). Whilst this method represents the most 
straightforward option of linking GP-level data to local authorities given the data 
available, the approach nevertheless suffers the weakness that not all patients 
will necessarily live in the local authority in which their GP practice is based. 
This limitation is likely to introduce some degree of uncertainty to the measure, 
though is unlikely to systematically bias the findings obtained. Next, quarterly 
rates of SSRI prescribing per 100,000 local authority population were constructed 
for each local authority by aggregating the monthly data across quarters and 
using mid-year population estimates available through Nomis (ONS, 2018b). A 
key limitation of the NHS Digital prescribing data is that they do not contain any 
patient-related information, meaning that it was not possible to construct 
prescribing rates per working age population, which is the group who are at risk 
of sanctioning if claiming JSA. Consequently, the SSRI prescribing rate – as well 
as sanctions and additional explanatory variables included in the analysis – are 
expressed as quarterly rates per 100,000 population.  
In addition to the main dependent variable, a robustness check on the main 
results of the analysis is carried out in the form of a falsification test, using the 
non-equivalent dependent variable approach. The rationale behind this approach 
was explained in detail in Chapter 5, though it is worth briefly re-iterating that 
it tests for omitted variable bias by identifying an additional dependent variable 
that should not be affected by sanctions but that could be influenced by the 
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same potential unobserved confounding factors as for SSRI prescribing rates. 
Following Barr et al. (2016), the rate of cardiovascular drug prescribing (BNF 
Section 2.0) is used as a non-equivalent dependent variable, on the basis that it 
is unlikely that the health conditions treated by such items will be affected by 
sanctions, especially in the short-term. Cardiovascular prescribing is arguably 
not an arbitrary choice of variable, however, as it might be expected to be 
affected by potential unobserved confounders to SSRI prescribing, such as 
changes in access to primary healthcare across the study period, or changes in 
the propensity of individuals to report health problems to their GP. Similar to 
the other variables in the analysis, rates of cardiovascular prescribing are 
calculated as quarterly rates per 100,000 local authority population.  
6.3.3 Sanctions data and additional explanatory variables 
Data on the monthly number of JSA sanctions at the local authority-level were 
accessed from Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2018c), and aggregated into quarterly rates per 
100,000 population. The various limitations of the sanctions data that are 
available were explained in detail in Chapter 5, and will not be repeated in full 
here. It is worth re-iterating, nevertheless, that the sanctions measures that are 
available can be thought of as capturing the combined threat and imposition 
effects of sanctions, as opposed to uniquely identifying one or the other. Indeed, 
given that the analysis is carried out at the ecological-level, the sanction 
impacts that are observed do not necessarily identify effects on JSA claimants 
alone, but may also capture any wider impacts on the friends and family of 
sanctioned individuals. Sanctions data, furthermore, do not pertain to 
individuals, meaning that the same claimant could have received more than one 
sanction in the same quarter. As previously highlighted, three sanctions 
indicators are investigated as part of the analysis. The main sanctions indicator 
that will be used is referred to as original adverse sanctions, which represents 
original decisions to impose a sanction that were not later reviewed, 
reconsidered and/or appealed. This indicator is prevalent in the wider 
quantitative literature into benefit sanctions, and is used throughout the 
analysis in this chapter and the other empirical chapters in this thesis. As a 
sensitivity check, nevertheless, two additional indicators are briefly considered 
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in this chapter, referred to as total adverse sanctions and sanction referrals as 
previously explained.  
Additional explanatory variables are included in the analysis, informed by the 
discussion in Section 6.2. To capture the role of demographic characteristics, 
data on age and gender were accessed through Nomis (ONS, 2018b), which 
publishes annual local authority-level data. Data on the proportion of separate 
ethnic groups were also accessed through Nomis, which publishes annual 
estimates that are updated at quarterly intervals. Robust data were only 
available for proportions of white UK born individuals and so this is the 
particular variable that is included in the analysis. Next, measures were sought 
to account for variations in local labour market and economic conditions. Data 
on the number of JSA claimants were accessed from Nomis, which publishes data 
at monthly intervals at the local authority-level, which were then averaged 
across the quarter to provide quarterly estimates. In addition, local authority 
data on unemployment, employment and economic inactivity were accessed 
through Nomis, which publishes annual estimates that are updated each quarter. 
In contrast to the claimant count, the ILO unemployment rate includes both 
claimants and unemployed non-claimants, and therefore provides a broader 
measure of unemployment. As will be explained in Section 6.4, the claimant 
count and unemployment rate were included separately in the initial modelling 
process, with the unemployment rate ultimately preferred.  
Annual rates of GVA per head – which is a local authority-level equivalent of GDP 
that measures economic activity – were accessed through the ONS (2018b). 
Whilst previous research had indicated that wages would also be an important 
determinant of antidepressant prescribing at the local authority-level, their 
inclusion alongside GVA in this analysis did not add to the explanatory power of 
the estimated models and so were not ultimately included. Indeed, since GVA is 
calculated using an income approach that includes data on the compensation of 
employees, this result is arguably not a surprising one. In addition to 
demographic and economic factors, quarterly rates of Work Capability 
Assessments (WCAs) were accessed from Stat-Xplore and quarterly rates of 
antibiotic prescribing (BNF Section 5.1) were accessed through NHS Digital 
(2018). Spence et al. (2014) use antibiotic prescribing as a proxy for the 
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propensity of GPs to prescribe in general, since antibiotics are seen to reflect 
discretionary prescribing behaviour. Areas with higher rates of antibiotic 
prescribing are therefore also expected to have higher levels of antidepressant 
prescribing.  
Finally, data from the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2010 were accessed 
from the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG, 2011) and 
data on rural-urban classification 2011 were accessed from the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra, 2014). In contrast to the previous 
explanatory variables discussed, these two measures are time-invariant in that 
they are measured only once during the period that is analysed. The next sub-
section details how the influence of these two variables is considered within the 
statistical analysis itself.  
In terms of measurement, the IMD captures levels of deprivation based on an 
aggregation of separate indicators (Noble et al., 2006). The IMD 2010 ranks small 
areas (LSOAs) in England according to an overall score based on separate 
dimensions: income; employment; health and disability; education and training; 
barriers to housing and services; living environment; and crime. The ranking of 
local authorities is calculated by the DCLG using a population-weighted average 
of the combined LSOA scores. In the current analysis, the overall ranking is 
divided into quintiles that each represent 20% of local authorities. Importantly, 
the health domain of the IMD is partly determined by the number of people 
suffering from anxiety or mood-related problems, and so the inclusion of the IMD 
in the analysis can be thought of in some sense as controlling for initial 
differences in mental health that exist between local authorities. In terms of the 
rural-urban classification, data from the 2011 census are used by Defra to 
categorise local authorities into six separate groups based on the proportion of 
the resident population in each area that live in rural or urban settings. In this 
analysis, these six separate categories are collapsed into three broader 
categories that include: predominantly rural; urban with significant rural; and 
predominantly urban.  
Table 6.1 summarises the separate variables that are included in the analysis, 
their data source and summary statistics.  
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Table 6.1: summary statistics for 324 local authorities, Q3 2010 – Q4 2014 
 N Mean St.d Dev. Min. Max. Source 
Dependent variable:       
SSRI prescribing 5,754 12,946 3,411 5,114 28,830 NHS Digital 
Sanctions variables:       
Original adverse 5,754 223 139 9 969 Stat-Xplore 
Adverse 5,754 258 162 9 1,125 Stat-Xplore 
Referrals 5,754 481 298 43 2,369 Stat-Xplore 
Control variables:       
Claimants 5,754 1,851 964 287 6,033 Nomis 
Unemployment 5,459 3,514 1,393 603 10,044 Nomis 
Economic Inactivity 5,754 13,809 3,133 5,618 25,575 Nomis 
Employment 5,754 45,363 3,587 28,553 59,802 Nomis 
Work Capability 
Assessments 
5,754 248 129 26 1,173 Stat-Xplore 
GVA 5,754 22,886 14,435 11,876 235,244 ONS 
Age      Nomis 
0-15 year olds 5,754 18,586 1,837 13,712 26,967  
16-29 year olds 5,754 17,358 3,846 11,644 32,959  
30-49 year olds 5,754 27,132 2,817 18,670 37,897  
50-64 year olds 5,754 18,741 2,433 9,145 24,038  
65 and above 5,754 18,182 4,385 6,018 31,854  
Female 5,754 50,829 697 45,813 52,562 Nomis 
White UK born 5,754 82,636 15,482 13,921 99,042 Nomis 
Antibiotics prescribing 5,754 17,347 3,117 8,788 38,915 NHS Digital 
Index of Multiple 
Deprivation 
     DCLG 
Quintile 1 1,166      
Quintile 2 1,157      
Quintile 3 1,140      
Quintile 4 1,165      
Quintile 5 1,126      
Rural-Urban Classification      Defra 
Predominantly 
rural 
1,620      
Urban with 
significant rural 
959      
Predominantly 
urban 
3,175      
Falsification variable:       
Cardiovascular 
prescribing 
5,754 144,487 36,595 58,061 288,986 NHS Digital 
Note: suppression of values for the unemployment estimates leads to the fall in the sample size. 
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All variables in Table 6.1 are measured as rates per 100,000 population, except 
GVA per head, IMD and rural-urban classification, the latter two of which are 
categorical variables.  
As the discussion has indicated, the additional explanatory variables that are 
included in the regression analysis represent important determinants of 
antidepressant prescribing, and their inclusion therefore helps explain variation 
in antidepressants throughout the period over and above that which is 
explainable by sanctions alone. Importantly, furthermore, some of the 
explanatory variables detailed in Table 6.1 are factors that have been identified 
as influencing sanction rates themselves, and their inclusion therefore helps to 
limit the influence of omitted variable bias on the results of the analysis. As 
explained in Chapter 5, omitted variable bias occurs when a variable that is a 
determinant of both the dependent variable and the key independent variable of 
interest is not included in the analysis. In the current context, this would be the 
case if the omitted variable is a characteristic of local authorities that drives 
both antidepressant prescribing rates and sanction rates. Although research in 
this area is limited, the most recent investigation carried out at the local 
authority-level finds that younger people, men and ethnic minorities are more 
likely to be sanctioned than other groups (de Vries et al., 2017). As the authors 
emphasise, the reasons that explain why these demographic inequalities in rates 
of sanctioning occur remain unexplained, though they highlight possible 
explanations in the form of structural factors, differences in claimant behaviour 
and differential treatment of claimants by caseworkers. Whatever the reason, 
their inclusion here helps limit the concern that the estimated relationship 
between sanctions and antidepressant prescribing is in fact explained by the 
influence of some omitted third variable.  
In contrast to the need to control for confounding factors, the possibility exists 
that there is a risk in over-controlling for factors that are relevant to sanctions 
and mental health outcomes. For example, sanctions could positively affect 
mental health through the short-term employment impacts discussed in Chapter 
4, which would not be captured in the analysis because it controls for 
employment. This issue is complicated, however, by countervailing influences. 
As also discussed in Chapter 4, for example, the literature on the social 
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determinants of health does not suggest that all employment is conducive to 
good mental health, but rather that it is the quality of employment that is 
important. Indeed, the available evidence suggests that sanctions are associated 
with negative impacts on job quality, in terms of wages, stability and hours (Arni 
et al., 2013; van den Berg and Vikström, 2014), which might be expected to 
incur adverse mental health impacts (Allen et al., 2014; WHO, 2014; Silva et al., 
2016). The increased short-term employment effect of sanctions for some 
claimants, furthermore, has also been observed to be smaller than increases in 
economic inactivity for other claimants (Arni et al., 2013; Busk, 2016). This 
latter effect might also be expected to have adverse mental health impacts. To 
better consider the complex interactions between sanctions, the labour market 
and mental health outcomes, sufficiently detailed individual-level data are 
necessary. This issue is further discussed in the conclusion to this thesis. To 
consider the risk of over-controlling in this chapter, the main analysis will be re-
run without the labour market control variables included. The results of this 
sensitivity check are discussed in the results section.  
6.3.4 Statistical approach 
The first stage of the analysis investigates the relationship between sanctions 
and antidepressant prescribing across the time period, which responds to the 
first research question identified in the introduction to this chapter. To do so, 
fixed effects models are estimated, as described in a basic form in Equation 6.1:  
ܴܵܵܫ௜ǡ௧ ൌߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܵܽ݊ܿݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚᇱ ௜ܺǡ௧ ൅ߤ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ (6.1) 
In Equation 6.1, i denotes the local authority and t denotes the quarter. SSRI is 
the SSRI prescribing rate per 100,000 population, Sanctions is the JSA sanctions 
rate per 100,000 population and X represents a vector of additional explanatory 
variables. The remaining symbols are as follows: μ denotes local authority fixed 
effects; λ denotes time fixed effects; and ε represents the error term. The 
inclusion of local authority fixed effects controls for time-invariant unobserved 
differences between local authorities, meaning that the analysis ultimately 
estimates the average association between sanctions and antidepressants within 
local authorities across the time period. The inclusion of time fixed effects, 
furthermore, controls for the influence of factors that are constant across local 
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authorities but that vary over time, such as national policy changes affecting all 
local authorities or national trends in antidepressant prescribing. The advantage 
of time fixed effects over the inclusion of linear and quadratic time trends is 
that it is not necessary to impose a particular functional form on the relationship 
between SSRI prescribing and time. All estimated models use Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998), which are robust to 
heteroscedasticity, correlation through time within local authorities as well as 
general forms of cross-sectional dependence (Hoechle, 2007).  
As part of the initial modelling process, three separate regression models were 
first estimated, which are detailed in Table 6.2. The discussion here broadly 
describes this process of model selection, whilst the next section will discuss the 
results of the model that is ultimately preferred. First, Model 6.1 estimates a 
fixed effects model that incorporates the sanctions rate as well as a number of 
additional time-variant explanatory variables, which include: rates of 
unemployment and economic inactivity (with rates of employment left out due 
to perfect collinearity between the three variables); Work Capability 
Assessments (WCAs); GVA; age, gender and ethnicity; and antibiotic prescribing.  
Next, Model 6.2 repeats this model but also includes the two time-invariant 
variables that are available for the analysis: the Index of Multiple Deprivation 
quintiles; and rural-urban classification. In fixed effects regression models, time-
invariant variables are perfectly collinear with the local authority fixed effects, 
and are therefore automatically excluded from the model itself. However, it is 
possible to include separate time trends by quintile of deprivation and rural-
urban classification, by interacting the two time-invariant variables with time. 
This interaction captures the possibility that the influence of deprivation and 
rurality on antidepressant prescribing may have changed over the period, which 
is an issue that may have emerged due to the uneven impact of austerity policies 
or additional factors (Gray and Barford, 2018; Thomson et al., 2018). Indeed, 
this approach is carried out elsewhere in the UK literature that considers the 
impacts of welfare reform over a similar period (see, for example, Barr et al., 
2016). The coefficients for these interactions estimate how the effect of 
deprivation and rurality change over the period, with their main baseline effects 
absorbed into the local authority fixed effects as in Equation 6.1 (Allison, 2009).  
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Table 6.2: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing, initial model selection 
 
Model 6.1: 
Fixed effects 
Model 6.2: 
Fixed effects 
Model 6.3: 
Random effects 
Sanctions 
0.465* 
(0.206) 
0.371*** 
(0.079) 
0.478** 
(0.180) 
Unemployment 
-0.012 
(0.015) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
Economic Inactivity 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
WCAs 
0.440 
(0.595) 
0.199 
(0.412) 
0.528*** 
(0.162) 
GVA 
-0.054*** 
(0.013) 
-0.021* 
(0.008) 
-0.038** 
(0.013) 
Age    
16–29 
-0.001 
(0.067) 
-0.168*** 
(0.035) 
0.104 
(0.100) 
30–49 
-0.261* 
(0.090) 
-0.589*** 
(0.075) 
-0.147 
(0.137) 
50–64 
-0.208** 
(0.071) 
-0.519*** 
(0.072) 
-0.020 
(0.142) 
65 and over 
0.144** 
(0.047) 
0.011 
(0.034) 
0.229* 
(0.095) 
Female 
0.145 
(0.108) 
0.558*** 
(0.069) 
0.083 
(0.161) 
White UK born 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
0.015* 
(0.006) 
Antibiotic Prescribing 
0.111*** 
(0.019) 
0.086*** 
(0.015) 
0.133*** 
(0.021) 
Index of Multiple 
Deprivation 
   
Quintile 2   
370.56 
(368.396) 
Quintile 3   
1,268.77*** 
(371.098) 
Quintile 4   
2,215.73*** 
(398.461) 
Quintile 5   
3,052.26*** 
(469.230) 
Urban-Rural Classification    
Urban with 
significant rural 
  
-419.259 
(405.112) 
Predominantly urban   
-1224.087*** 
(362.712) 
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Index of Multiple 
Deprivation 
   
Quintile 2 × Quarter  
37.508*** 
(2.112) 
 
Quintile 3 × Quarter  
60.046*** 
(3.042) 
 
Quintile 4 × Quarter  
75.667*** 
(4.671) 
 
Quintile 5 × Quarter  
114.015*** 
(7.715) 
 
Urban-Rural Classification    
Urban with 
significant rural × 
Quarter 
 
-22.709*** 
(2.189) 
 
Predominantly urban 
× Quarter 
 
-30.276*** 
(3.388) 
 
R2 (within) 0.866 0.889 0.865 
LA Quarters 5,459 5,459 5,459 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Model 6.1 and Model 6.2 include local authority and 
time fixed effects. Model 6.3 includes time fixed effects. Constant not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Arguably, the comparison of Model 6.1 and Model 6.2 motivates the inclusion of 
the IMD and rural-urban interactions in the analysis. The coefficients for the 
interactions are statistically significant at the 0.1% level (p < 0.001), whilst the 
within-R2 increases from 0.866 to 0.889. This indicates that Model 6.2 explains 
more of the variance in antidepressant prescribing within local authorities than 
Model 6.1. In an additional sensitivity test, finally, Table 6.2 details the results 
of a random effects model in Model 6.3. As explained in Chapter 5, random 
effects models provide an alternative to fixed effects in that they are able to 
take into account both within-group and between-group variation. They are able 
to adjust for time-invariant factors, for example, by making the relatively 
stricter assumption that any omitted variables are uncorrelated with the 
included explanatory variables. A Hausman test of this assumption, however, 
indicates that a random effects framework should not be favoured over fixed 
effects in the current analysis (p < 0.001). Consequently, out of the three 
models discussed here, Model 6.2 is ultimately favoured for the purposes of the 
analysis, the results of which will be discussed in more depth in the following 
section. A full set of regression diagnostic checks of this model are detailed in 
the appendix for Chapter 6 (Section A6.1), which will also be referred to in the 
next section.  
The next stage of the analysis considers the second research question that is 
outlined in the introduction to this chapter. It investigates the impact of the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012, which introduced a harsher sanctions regime by 
increasing the average length of sanctions that could be imposed. The reforms, 
which are detailed in Chapter 3, increased both the minimum and maximum 
length of JSA sanctions, meaning that the sanctions data used in this analysis are 
qualitatively different in the post-reform period. To capture this effect, 
Equation 6.2 modifies the initial fixed effects analysis through inclusion of an 
interaction term between Sanctions and Reform:  
ܴܵܵܫ௜ǡ௧ ൌߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܵܽ݊ܿݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶሺܵܽ݊ܿݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜ǡ௧ כ ܴ݂݁݋ݎ݉௧ሻ ൅ ߚᇱ ௜ܺǡ௧ ൅ߤ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧     (6.2) 
In Equation 6.2, Reform is a dummy variable that marks the quarters before and 
after the implementation of the harsher sanctions regime brought about by the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012. It is coded 1 for quarters Q4 2012 onwards and 0 
before that date. The post-reform relationship between sanctions and 
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antidepressant prescribing is then arrived at through calculating a linear 
combination of β1 and β2, using the Stata command ‘lincomest’ created by 
Newson (2002) (see also, Reeves and Loopstra, 2017). The remainder of this 
chapter details the results of these fixed effects regressions and then goes on to 
discuss the implications of the findings obtained.  
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 6.1, above, details the summary statistics for the variables that are 
included in the analysis. It indicates that across the sample there are an average 
of 223 sanctions and 12,946 SSRI items per 100,000 population per quarter in 
local authorities. There is a large degree of variation, nevertheless, in rates of 
both antidepressant prescribing and sanctions around these averages. Blackpool, 
for example, stands out in particular with an average of 520 sanctions and 
24,567 SSRI items per 100,000 population per quarter, which are 2.3 and 1.9 
times the respective averages. Beatty and Fothergill (2013) estimate that, along 
with other seaside areas (Torbay, Hastings, Great Yarmouth and Thanet), 
Blackpool was badly hit in financial terms by Coalition government welfare 
reforms. All of these areas display high rates of both antidepressant prescribing 
and sanctions in the sample. Beatty and Fothergill (2013) argue that the 
increased exposure of these local authorities to welfare reform is due to the 
high proportions of working-age adults claiming out-of-work benefits in these 
areas, who migrated there due to the availability of cheap private rental sector 
accommodation. There is a risk that the inclusion of these local authorities plays 
an undue influence on the results of the main analysis. In a sensitivity test in the 
Chapter 6 appendix, therefore, these local authorities are removed from the 
sample and the results compared with those of the main findings. The 
substantive results remain unchanged, however, and so this section discusses the 
findings from the full sample.  
Elsewhere in England, local authorities that have high rates of sanctions are not 
necessarily the same local authorities that have high rates of SSRI prescribing, 
and vice versa. Several local authorities in London, for example, exhibit quite 
high rates of sanctions but very low rates of antidepressant prescribing, 
125 
 
 
indicating that additional factors are influential. Evidently, therefore, sanctions 
and antidepressant prescribing are not expected to correlate perfectly, though 
there is nevertheless an expectation that higher rates of sanctions will on 
average be correlated with higher rates of antidepressant prescribing. Indeed, 
this is confirmed in the scatterplot in Figure 6.1, which depicts the correlation 
between sanctions and SSRI prescribing in each local authority quarter across the 
period. Figure 6.1 indicates that in local authority quarters where the rate of 
sanctioning is higher, so too are rates of SSRI prescribing (r = 0.146; p < 0.001). 
Whilst the association is positive, the actual correlation is quite low. A basic 
linear regression model using the two variables indicates that only 2.1% of the 
variance in SSRI prescribing is explained by sanctions. This motivates the need to 
examine the relationship more formally as part of an expanded regression 
framework, which is carried out in the remainder of this section.  
Figure 6.1: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing 
 
Note: quarterly rates for 324 local authority districts, Q3 2010 – Q4 2014 
6.4.2 Regression models: full time period 
Following the process of model selection that was explained in the previous 
section, Table 6.3 reproduces the results of Model 6.2 for the purposes of the 
current discussion.   
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Table 6.3: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing, fixed effects model 
 Model 6.2 
Sanctions 
0.371*** 
(0.079) 
Unemployment 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
Economic Inactivity 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
WCAs 
0.199 
(0.412) 
GVA 
-0.021* 
(0.008) 
Age  
16–29 
-0.168*** 
(0.035) 
30–49 
-0.589*** 
(0.075) 
50–64 
-0.519*** 
(0.072) 
65 and over 
0.011 
(0.034) 
Female 
0.558*** 
(0.069) 
White UK born 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
Antibiotic Prescribing 
0.086*** 
(0.015) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation  
Quintile 2 × Quarter 
37.508*** 
(2.112) 
Quintile 3 × Quarter 
60.046*** 
(3.042) 
Quintile 4 × Quarter 
75.669*** 
(4.671) 
Quintile 5 × Quarter 
114.015*** 
(7.715) 
Urban-Rural Classification  
Urban with significant rural × 
Quarter 
-22.709*** 
(2.189) 
Predominantly urban × Quarter 
-30.276*** 
(3.388) 
R2 (within) 0.889 
LA Quarters 5,459 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Model includes local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Importantly, Model 6.2 indicates that sanctions are associated with increases in 
antidepressant prescribing rates. For every 10 additional sanctions applied per 
100,000 population, the rate of SSRI prescribing is 3.71 items higher per 100,000 
population, a result that is statistically significant at the 0.1% level (p < 0.001). 
The 95% confidence interval around this estimate, furthermore, ranges from 2.03 
to 5.38. A full diagnostic check of Model 6.2 is carried out in the appendix for 
Chapter 6 (Section A6.1). As Section A6.1 details, the diagnostic checks do not 
highlight any obvious issues that would undermine the results obtained. In 
addition, the models themselves use standard errors that are robust to 
heteroscedasticity, correlation through time within local authorities as well as 
general forms of cross-sectional dependence, as previously indicated. The 
additional explanatory variables included in Model 6.2, furthermore, generally 
conform to the expected relationship with antidepressant prescribing as 
informed by Section 6.2. That is, increases within local authorities in rates of 
economic inactivity, females, antibiotic prescribing and WCAs are associated 
with increases in SSRI prescribing, though this latter result is non-significant at 
the 5% level. Increases in GVA per head, furthermore, are associated with 
decreases in SSRI prescribing.  
In contrast to these variables, however, several of the estimated coefficients in 
Model 6.2 require additional attention. A zero coefficient, for example, is 
observed for rates of white UK born, whereas the expectation is for a positive 
relationship to exist. In this situation, it is useful to compare the Model 6.2 
coefficient for white UK born with the estimated random effects coefficient in 
Model 6.3 in Table 6.2. In Model 6.3, the association is positive and significant at 
the 5% level. This suggests that the zero coefficient in Model 6.2 is explained by 
the fact that fixed effects models are not well-placed to estimate the effects of 
slowly changing variables, which is something that random effects models are 
better able to achieve (Plümper and Troeger, 2007). The next counterintuitive 
result relates to the separate age group coefficients, which are progressively 
negative before becoming positive and non-significant for the proportion aged 65 
and over. The age groupings are affected by a similar issue as described for the 
white UK born variable, in that they exhibit a low degree of quarterly variation 
through the time period. In addition, however, pairwise correlations indicate 
that the separate age groups are affected by a high degree of multicollinearity 
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with one another. To check for the potential influence of this multicollinearity 
on the key sanctions coefficient, the results of Model 6.2 were re-run without 
the age groupings included, though this exclusion did not affect the main 
substantive results and so are included in Model 6.2 in any case.  
Perhaps the key counterintuitive result in Model 6.2 that requires additional 
discussion is the negative and non-significant coefficient for the rate of 
unemployment, given the well-established link between unemployment and poor 
mental health, which also exists with antidepressant prescribing at the 
individual-level (von Soest et al., 2012). As previously discussed, there are two 
unemployment-related variables available for the analysis: the JSA claimant 
count; and the ILO unemployment rate. Model 6.2 includes the ILO 
unemployment rate. In a separate model that uses the JSA claimant count, 
however, the estimated claimant count coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level (Table A6.2 in the Chapter 6 appendix (Section A6.2)). 
In this model, the sanctions coefficient remains substantively unchanged. In a 
further sensitivity check, the results are re-run without the labour market 
control variables included, to consider the previously discussed risk of over-
controlling (Table A6.3 in the Chapter 6 appendix (Section A6.3)). Again, the 
sanctions coefficient remains substantively unchanged.  
The ILO unemployment rate is favoured for use in the main analysis because it 
represents a wider measure of unemployment than the claimant count. The 
claimant rate also has a high degree of collinearity with the rate of sanctions (r 
= 0.793). This is of concern, due to the fact that when two variables are highly 
and positively correlated, it is likely that their slope coefficient estimators will 
be highly and negatively correlated (Berry and Feldman, 1985). The correlation 
between ILO unemployment and sanctions is lower (r = 0.586), suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not driving the counterintuitive result of concern.  
Indeed, this view is confirmed by the additional regression results detailed in the 
Chapter 6 appendix (Section A6.4, Table A6.4). In Table A6.4, the results of 
Model 6.2 are re-run with unemployment excluded (Model A6.6) and with 
sanctions excluded (Model A6.7), with little observed impact on the estimated 
coefficients. A possible explanation of the counterintuitive result under 
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discussion therefore, arguably relates to the previously identified risk of 
ecological bias on the findings of the analysis. Aggregate-level analyses are 
limited by the fact that correlations that hold at the area-level do not 
necessarily apply at the individual-level. The fact that unemployment has been 
observed to have a positive relationship with antidepressant prescribing at the 
individual-level in previous research, therefore, does not imply that the same 
will apply at the local authority-level. Indeed, existing area-level research into 
the relationship between unemployment and antidepressant prescribing finds 
contradictory results (Lundin and Hansson, 2014; Spence et al., 2014; Barr et al., 
2016). This issue in relation to unemployment highlights an important limitation 
on the results of the current study more broadly, and emphasises the need for 
additional individual-level analysis to better understand the relationships that 
are investigated throughout this thesis.  
Before moving on to discuss how the relationship between sanctions and 
antidepressant prescribing is affected by the Welfare Reform Act 2012, an 
additional sensitivity check is carried out that contrasts the results in Model 6.2 
with the two additional sanctions indicators described in Section 6.3. The results 
are detailed in Table 6.4, which reports the coefficients for the separate 
sanctions indicators. Each model includes the same explanatory variables as in 
Model 6.2, though these are not displayed in the table itself. As Table 6.4 make 
clear, the original adverse sanctions variable (Model 6.2) provides the strongest 
estimated relationship between sanctions and antidepressant prescribing. The 
sanctions coefficient falls from 0.371 in Model 6.2, to 0.283 using the total 
adverse sanction rate to 0.211 using the referrals figure. All three of the 
sanctions coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Comparison of 
the different sanctions measures provides a useful sensitivity check on the 
results of the main analysis, which is arguably supported by the fact that the 
estimated relationship with antidepressant prescribing is attenuated – but 
nevertheless still positive – when the two additional sanction rates are used. This 
is because the additional sanctions indicators provide fuzzier measures than the 
original adverse rate. Total adverse sanctions, for example, include adverse 
sanctions that were originally applied in previous time periods, whilst referrals 
include several types of sanction decisions in addition to adverse decisions (see 
Chapter 5).  
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As highlighted in Chapter 5, the original adverse sanctions rate used in Model 6.2 
is widely applied in the UK quantitative literature that investigates the impacts 
of benefit sanctions. Despite underestimating the true adverse sanctions rate, it 
nevertheless provides the best figure given the available data, and will be used 
throughout the remainder of the empirical analyses in this thesis.  
Table 6.4: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing, comparison of measures 
 Original Adverse (Model 6.2) Total Adverse Referrals 
Sanctions 
0.371*** 
(0.079) 
0.283** 
(0.075) 
0.211*** 
(0.043) 
R2 (within) 0.889 0.889 0.889 
LA Quarters 5,459 5,459 5,459 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant and additional explanatory variables not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
6.4.3 Regression models: influence of the Welfare Reform Act 
2012 
Next, the analysis examines whether the observed association between sanctions 
and SSRI prescribing is stronger in the post-reform period. The full results of this 
fixed effects regression model are displayed in Model 6.4 in Table 6.5, which 
reproduces Model 6.2 for ease of comparison. The results indicate that in the 
pre-reform period, for every 10 additional sanctions applied per 100,000 
population the rate of SSRI prescribing is 1.74 items per 100,000 population 
higher, though this result is non-significant at the 5% level. Following the 
implementation of the harsher sanctions regime, however, the association 
increases by 2.82 prescribing items, so that every 10 additional sanctions applied 
per 100,000 population are associated with 4.57 additional SSRI prescribing items 
(p < 0.001). The 95% confidence interval around this estimate, furthermore, 
ranges from 2.14 to 6.99. The coefficients for the additional explanatory 
variables, furthermore, are very similar between Model 6.4 and Model 6.2. 
Importantly, the results in Model 6.4 are consistent with the expectation that 
the harsher sanctions regime brought about following the implementation of the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012 would have a stronger association with antidepressant 
prescribing than the pre-reform period. Indeed, they indicate that the sanction 
effect observed in the Model 6.2 for the full time period are in fact driven by the 
influence of the post-reform period.   
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Table 6.5: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing, fixed effects models 
 Model 6.2 Model 6.4 
Sanctions 
0.371*** 
(0.079) 
0.174 
(0.179) 
Sanctions x Reform  
0.282 
(0.252) 
Unemployment 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
Economic Inactivity 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
WCAs 
0.199 
(0.412) 
0.186 
(0.413) 
GVA 
-0.021* 
(0.008) 
-0.021* 
(0.008) 
Age    
16–29 
-0.168*** 
(0.035) 
-0.170*** 
(0.035) 
30–49 
-0.589*** 
(0.075) 
-0.590*** 
(0.076) 
50–64 
-0.519*** 
(0.072) 
-0.525*** 
(0.073) 
65 and over 
0.011 
(0.034) 
0.014 
(0.035) 
Female 
0.558*** 
(0.069) 
0.548*** 
(0.063) 
White UK born 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
Antibiotic Prescribing 
0.086*** 
(0.015) 
0.084*** 
(0.014) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation   
Quintile 2 × Quarter 
37.508*** 
(2.112) 
36.465*** 
(2.271) 
Quintile 3 × Quarter 
60.046*** 
(3.042) 
57.878*** 
(3.400) 
Quintile 4 × Quarter 
75.669*** 
(4.671) 
72.009*** 
(5.015) 
Quintile 5 × Quarter 
114.015*** 
(7.715) 
107.853*** 
(8.275) 
Urban-Rural Classification    
Urban with significant rural × 
Quarter 
-22.709*** 
(2.189) 
-23.077*** 
(2.128) 
Predominantly urban × Quarter 
-30.276*** 
(3.388) 
-30.891*** 
(3.212) 
R2 (within) 0.889 0.889 
LA Quarters 5,459 5,459 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The results detailed in Table 6.5 are summarised in Figure 6.2, which displays 
the estimated sanctions coefficients for the full time period (Model 6.2), as well 
as the pre- and post-Act periods (Model 6.4).  
Figure 6.2: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing, sanctions coefficients 
 
Note: Point estimates for sanctions are derived from Table 6.5 
Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
6.4.4 Robustness tests 
In addition to the various sensitivity checks that have already been discussed, 
two further tests are carried out to consider the robustness of the main 
substantive findings. First, as previously explained, a falsification test is carried 
out using cardiovascular prescribing as a non-equivalent dependent variable. The 
full results of the falsification test are detailed in the appendix to Chapter 6 
(Table A6.5 in Section A6.5), which re-runs the regression analyses previously 
carried out in Model 6.2 and Model 6.4. The results for the sanctions coefficients 
are displayed in Figure 6.3. Assuming that cardiovascular prescribing provides a 
good choice of non-equivalent dependent variable, the substantive results of the 
main analysis are supported by the fact that no statistically significant 
relationship is found between sanctions and cardiovascular prescribing in Table 
A6.5, either across the time period (Model A6.8) or in the pre- and post-Welfare 
Reform Act periods (Model A6.9). Whilst the estimated coefficients are positive, 
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the effect size does not increase in the post-reform period in the manner 
observed in the main results. Arguably, therefore, the results of this falsification 
test strengthen the claim that the findings from the main analysis are not driven 
by omitted variable bias.  
Figure 6.3: relationship between sanctions and cardiovascular prescribing, sanctions coefficients 
 
Note: Point estimates for sanctions are derived from Table A6.5 
Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
Second, a Granger test for reverse causality is carried out, which considers 
whether the main analysis specifies the correct direction of causal inference. As 
discussed in Chapter 5 in terms of individual-level relationships, sanctions are 
expected to negatively impact the mental health of claimants. It might also be 
true, however, that claimants who are already suffering from mental health 
problems are themselves more likely to be sanctioned. This possibility may also 
apply at the local authority-level in the context of the current analysis. That is, 
there might be an increased risk of sanctions in areas with higher levels of 
individuals already suffering from poor mental health who are already being 
prescribed antidepressants. In this scenario, there is a risk that the substantive 
results discussed throughout this chapter overstate the direct effect of sanctions 
on mental health. As explained in Chapter 5, the Granger test provides a useful 
test of causality based on the predictive content of variables, though it cannot 
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by itself be used to rule out reverse causality entirely. Here, using a lag 
structure of four quarters, sanctions are found to Granger-cause SSRI prescribing 
(p < 0.01) whilst SSRI prescribing is not found to Granger-cause sanctions (p = 
0.775). This result supports the local authority-level inferences made in the 
main analysis, though clearly individual-level data and a different research 
design are necessary to fully account for this issue.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The results discussed in this chapter suggest that increases in sanction rates 
within local authorities are associated with increases in SSRI prescribing. First, 
results for the full time period indicate that every 10 additional sanctions 
applied per 100,000 population are associated with approximately 3.71 
additional SSRI prescribing items, a result that is significant at the 1% level (p < 
0.001) (95% CI: 2.03 to 5.38). Additional results, however, indicate that this 
association is driven by the harsher sanctions regime that followed the 
implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012. In the pre-reform period, 
sanctions are associated with higher rates of SSRI prescribing, though the 
relationship is non-significant at the 5% level. In the post-reform period, 
however, the results indicate that every 10 additional sanctions applied per 
100,000 population are associated with approximately 4.57 additional SSRI 
prescribing items, a result that is significant at the 1% level (p < 0.001) (95% CI: 
2.14 to 6.99). The average length of a prescribing item is one month, meaning 
that one person can receive three prescribing items per quarter. Consequently, 
this estimated quarterly relationship with SSRI prescribing items approximately 
translates to between one and two additional people receiving treatment. Since 
the analysis makes use of a sanctions indicator that underestimates the true 
quarterly rate, a best guess estimate would imply that every 10 additional 
sanctions applied per 100,000 population are associated with approximately one 
additional person receiving treatment (see Chapter 6 appendix Section A6.6 for a 
more in-depth mathematical explanation).  
As highlighted in Chapter 5 and as re-emphasised throughout this chapter, 
nevertheless, the analysis itself is subject to certain limitations in terms of its 
attempt to investigate the impact of sanctions on antidepressant prescribing. 
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Principally, these limitations relate to ecological bias, omitted variable bias and 
reverse causality. Regarding the first of these, the analysis is carried out at the 
local authority-level, meaning that it is not possible to ascertain whether the 
people being sanctioned are the same as those who are ultimately prescribed 
antidepressants. It has also been highlighted, however, that one consequence of 
this fact is that the findings therefore capture impacts on both JSA claimants as 
well as wider effects on the friends and family of sanctioned individuals. 
Ecological bias, nevertheless, is an important limitation on the current study. 
Indeed, the risk of mistakenly applying area-level associations to individual-level 
relationships was highlighted when discussing the results, and reinforces the 
need for additional individual-level research. It is an important finding, 
however, that the scale and severity of sanctions following the implementation 
of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 are sufficient to have observable impacts even 
at the local authority-level. Arguably, the findings are at least indicative of 
individual-level effects, since it is not immediately clear why such relationships 
would hold at the area- but not the individual-level.  
The results are estimated as part of fixed effects regression models that control 
for a number of additional explanatory variables. They are also supported by a 
variety of sensitivity checks, as well as a falsification test and a Granger test for 
reverse causality. Given that the analysis relies on observational data, however, 
it is not possible to completely rule out the influence of either omitted variable 
bias or reverse causality. In order to better account for these sources of bias, for 
example, individual-level data combined with a research design that could 
exploit sources of random allocation would be needed, as previously described in 
Chapter 5. In the current context, nevertheless, it is useful to consider whether 
there are any obvious unaccounted for factors that might serve as confounders 
of the results obtained. In this regard, it is important to highlight that for 
omitted variable bias to affect the main estimate of the relationship between 
sanctions and antidepressant prescribing, any omitted variable would have to be 
systematically correlated with both sanctions and antidepressant prescribing 
through time. There are various GP-level factors that the analysis does not 
account for, for example, such as numbers of GPs and GP characteristics, though 
the fixed effects control for initial differences between local authorities and it is 
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unlikely that changes in these factors across the period – if they occurred to any 
significant degree at all – would be related to the sanctions rate.  
Arguably, a possibly greater threat to the analysis is the fact that it is not able 
to control for rates of local authority-level ESA sanctions throughout the period. 
As Chapter 3 highlighted, ESA sanctions varied in frequency during the Coalition 
whilst their severity increased from December 2012. Whilst this omission is of 
concern, it was previously highlighted that variation in ESA sanctions occurred at 
a much lower level than those of JSA sanctions. In an additional check of this 
issue, Figure A6.3 in the Chapter 6 appendix (Section A6.7) compares the rate of 
JSA and ESA sanctions that are relevant to this analysis: original adverse 
sanctions in England during the Coalition period. As Figure A6.3 indicates, the 
two sanction rates follow quite different trajectories across the period. The rate 
of ESA sanctions in fact falls from the beginning of the Coalition to mid-2011 and 
then stays broadly level at a rate below 1% for the remainder of the Coalition 
government. There are, of course, other reforms during the Coalition 
government that the analysis is not able to take into account. In addition to 
sanctions changes, for example, the Welfare Reform Act 2012 provided for the 
introduction of UC, a benefit cap, changes to Housing Benefit (the ‘bedroom 
tax’) and the replacement of Disability Living Allowance with Personal 
Independence Payments. Again, however, it is not clear why these factors would 
be systematically correlated with sanction rates from October 2012 onwards.  
In light of this discussion, therefore, it is arguably reasonable to draw 
preliminary causal inferences from the results obtained, since it is not clear 
what other factors would plausibly explain them. This makes the findings more 
useful in terms of informing public policy, particularly in terms of considering 
the impact of the sanctions reforms that were introduced in the Welfare Reform 
Act 2012. The analysis in this chapter has focused on the relationship between 
JSA sanctions and antidepressant prescribing. The positive and robust association 
that is observed in this regard indicates that sanctions lead to adverse mental 
health impacts for claimants and others. Some of these individuals ultimately 
receive medical treatment for issues relating to anxiety and depression, meaning 
that the findings imply that sanctions policy knock-on effects in terms of wider 
public expenditure, given the additional demand that they create on the NHS. 
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This latter issue will be discussed in more depth in the concluding chapter of this 
thesis, which will also go into more detail regarding the policy recommendations 
that emerge from the empirical investigation as a whole. The next empirical 
chapter continues this investigation, and focuses on the relationship between 
benefit sanctions and mental health problems such as anxiety and depression.  
138 
 
 
Chapter 7. Longitudinal ecological analysis II: 
anxiety and/or depression 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the relationship between JSA benefit sanctions and 
rates of self-reported anxiety and/or depression during the period of Coalition 
government (2010-15), using data at the local authority-level. The specific 
research questions that are associated with this stage of the analysis are as 
follows:  
[RQ 7.1]: Are benefit sanctions associated with higher rates of anxiety 
and/or depression at the local authority-level?  
[RQ 7.2]: Does the observed relationship strengthen following the 
implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012?  
As previously highlighted in Chapter 5, the analyses in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 
follow quite similar research designs and apply similar methods as part of their 
respective investigations into the impacts of sanctions. Indeed, this is reflected 
in the structure of this chapter, which broadly mirrors that established in 
Chapter 6. First, it begins by briefly considering the broader determinants of 
anxiety and depression at the local authority-level beyond the key focus on 
benefit sanctions. Next, the chapter outlines the data and methods that are 
used in the analysis, and then goes on to describe and discuss the results of the 
fixed effects regression analysis. Overall, the discussion is more succinct in 
comparison with the previous chapter, as it focuses on what is different between 
the two analyses. Although certain aspects are shared, there are important 
differences between the two that will be made clear in the course of this 
chapter. In addition to focusing on anxiety/depression, for example, the analysis 
in this chapter relies on survey estimates as opposed to administrative data. One 
advantage of this is that it is able to calculate local authority rates per working 
age population, as opposed to rates per total population as previously. The use 
of survey estimates, however, also leads to the consideration of two different 
levels of local authority geography: district-level, as in the previous chapter; and 
the more aggregated county-level.  
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7.2 Determinants of anxiety and depression 
This section provides a brief overview of the separate factors that are associated 
with anxiety and depression. Previously, Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 depicted the 
Dahlgren-Whitehead (1991) rainbow model of the social determinants of health, 
which maps the relationship between individuals and the various influences on 
their physical and mental health. Age and gender are at the centre of the 
model, which progresses outwards through the following determinants: 
individual lifestyle factors; social and community networks; living and working 
conditions; and general socio-economic, cultural and environmental conditions. 
In contrast to this multi-level framework, however, and similar to the previous 
chapter, the analysis in the current investigation is carried out solely at the local 
authority-level, which means that it is limited to the inclusion of area-level 
variables. As a consequence, this again makes it necessary to include factors at 
the area-level that are based on findings from individual-level studies. Chapter 4 
has already highlighted the role that working conditions, unemployment and the 
nature of the social security interventions play in relation to mental health. In 
terms of the two characteristics that are at the centre of the Dahlgren-
Whitehead model, furthermore, existing empirical research indicates that rates 
of anxiety and depression are higher on average for women, whilst they are 
fairly consistent across people of working age before falling for older age groups 
(Allen et al., 2014; Silva et al., 2016; Baker, 2018).  
Additional research considers area-level determinants of psychological distress. 
Similar to the evidence discussed in relation to antidepressant prescribing, for 
example, Barr et al. (2016) highlight the role of labour market and economic 
factors, as well as the social security system itself. In their study, rates of 
mental health problems such as anxiety and depression are found to be higher in 
areas with higher unemployment rates, lower wages, lower rates of economic 
output and higher rates of Work Capability Assessments (WCAs). At the 
individual-level, furthermore, mental health follows a social gradient, in that 
mental health problems are more common the more disadvantaged people are in 
terms of their socio-economic status (Mattheys et al., 2016). The same is true at 
the area-level, where mental health problems have been found to increase along 
with increasing levels of deprivation (Mattheys et al., 2016; Silva et al., 2016). 
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Rural-urban classification is also important, in that urban environments are 
associated with higher rates of psychological distress, including anxiety and 
depression (Gong et al., 2016). Lastly, Rees et al. (2016) note that there is a 
limited UK evidence base on rates of anxiety and depression across separate 
ethnicities, which does not provide consistent results. At the area-level, the 
“ethnic density hypothesis” suggests that mental health for minority ethnic 
groups is improved when such individuals live in areas with higher proportions of 
people of the same ethnicity, though again UK evidence in this regard is mixed 
(Silva et al., 2016: 278).  
7.3 Data and methods 
7.3.1 Analytic sample 
The sample in this chapter mirrors that selected for the antidepressant analysis 
carried out in Chapter 6, namely the quarters including and between the third 
quarter of 2010 and the end of 2014 (Q3 2010 – Q4 2014). This time period is 
selected since the third quarter of 2010 coincides with the onset of the Coalition 
government, whilst early 2015 marks the beginning of the national rollout of UC. 
As previously described, furthermore, this period saw important changes in the 
frequency and severity of sanctions, which provides the context within which to 
estimate the independent effect of sanctions on mental health. The 
investigation in this chapter is also restricted to English local authorities. In 
Chapter 6, the sample restriction to England was driven by data availability for 
antidepressant prescribing, which is not an issue here. The restriction in this 
chapter, nevertheless, results from a similar issue of data availability relating to 
important explanatory variables: deprivation and rural-urban classification at 
the local authority-level. One consequence of this is to reduce the sample size 
available for the analysis, since there are 32 local authority districts in Scotland 
and 22 local authority districts in Wales. The restriction to England in both 
chapters, nevertheless, permits a greater degree of comparability between the 
two investigations, which is useful when carrying out a sense-check on the 
results obtained in this chapter.  
In addition, furthermore, the need to restrict the sample to England has the 
advantage of allowing the analysis to be carried out at two different levels of 
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local authority geography, which is not possible in Scotland or Wales given their 
single-tiered system of local governance. As explained in Chapter 5, the 
dependent variable in this chapter is based on QLFS survey estimates of anxiety 
and/or depression. Lower levels of geography are subject to more sampling 
variation than more aggregated levels, which – as Section 7.4 and Section 7.5 
will discuss in more depth – has important impacts on the results obtained. 
There are two levels of local authority geography available for the analysis: 326 
local authority districts that are organised into 152 county areas. The 
investigation in Chapter 6 used administrative data and therefore focused on 
local authority districts. Here, however, both district- and county-level models 
are estimated given the issue alluded to above. At the county-level, the QLFS 
combines the area of Cheshire East with Cheshire West and Chester into 
Cheshire, and the area of Bedford with Central Bedfordshire into Bedfordshire, 
which leaves 150 counties. Since the analysis excludes the City of London and 
the Isles of Scilly for reasons previously described, there are 324 local authority 
districts and 148 local authority counties in the two samples.  
Finally, and similar to the analysis in Chapter 6, the remaining pre-2015 sample 
contains areas that were affected by the Pathfinder phase of UC from April 
2013, which altered the composition of the remaining JSA claimant group in 
those areas. These local authority quarters are removed in order to minimise the 
influence of compositional bias on the results of the analysis, which totals 78 
district quarters and 69 county quarters. These exclusions imply a maximum 
sample size of 5,754 local authority district quarters and 2,595 county quarters. 
Again, the findings remain substantively unchanged with or without the inclusion 
of the local authority quarters that are affected by the UC Pathfinder, given the 
small number of individuals actually claiming UC by December 2014.  
7.3.2 Dependent variable and falsification variables 
As detailed in Chapter 5, quarterly estimates of the number of people in each 
local authority who self-report as suffering from anxiety and/or depression are 
produced using the QLFS (ONS, 2018c). QLFS survey respondents are first asked 
whether or not they suffer from ‘health problems’, and can then identify as 
suffering from ‘depression, bad nerves or anxiety’ from a pre-specified list (see 
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Box 5.1 in Chapter 5), referred to throughout this analysis as anxiety and/or 
depression. Using survey weights provided by the QLFS, furthermore, quarterly 
local authority estimates of the number of working age individuals suffering from 
anxiety and/or depression are constructed, and converted to rates per 100,000 
working age population using mid-year population estimates available through 
Nomis (ONS, 2018b). The fact that this chapter uses rates per working age 
population represents an advantage over the antidepressants analysis in Chapter 
6, which was only able to consider rates per total local authority population. 
Given the issue of sampling variation, however, local authority quarters where 
the estimates produced zero estimates were removed from the sample, which 
affected 78 district quarters and 3 county quarters. Given the small number of 
local authority quarters affected, the substantive findings remain unchanged 
with or without these exclusions.  
Since the QLFS question relating to ‘health problems’ was altered slightly from 
Q2 2013 onwards, all regression models include a dummy variable coded 0 for 
quarters prior to Q2 2013 and 1 thereafter. As detailed in Box 5.1 (Chapter 5), 
prior to Q2 2013 respondents were asked: ‘Do you have any health problems or 
disabilities that you expect will last for more than a year?’ From Q2 2013 
onwards, this changed to: ‘Do you have any physical or mental health conditions 
or illnesses lasting or expecting to last 12 months or more?’ Though the new 
health question refers more explicitly to respondent mental health than the 
previous one, the inclusion of the dummy variable to take into account this 
change ultimately has no substantive impact on the results of the analysis.  
A falsification test is carried out to provide a robustness check on the main 
results of the analysis, using the non-equivalent dependent variable approach. 
Following Barr et al. (2016), two falsification variables are used: the rate of 
anxiety and/or depression per 100,000 population aged 65 and over; and the 
rate of ‘Heart, blood pressure or blood circulation problems’ per 100,000 
working age population (henceforth ‘cardiovascular problems’). The falsification 
tests carried out in this chapter are limited by the availability of variables 
through the QLFS. The two non-equivalent dependent variables that are chosen 
arguably provide plausible candidates, nevertheless, particularly the rate of 
anxiety and/or depression in the population aged 65 and over. The assumption is 
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that these outcomes will not be affected by sanctions, especially in the short-
term, but might be affected by potential unobserved confounders affecting the 
results of the main analysis. These might include factors such as changes in 
people’s willingness to report health problems, for example, and/or changes in 
their access to healthcare. In this sense the rate of anxiety and/or depression in 
the population aged 65+ is a preferable choice, as it may be affected by changes 
in people’s willingness to report mental health problems specifically, as opposed 
to health problems more generally. Here, given the issue of sampling variation, 
local authority quarters where the estimates produced zero estimates are again 
removed from the sample.  
7.3.3 Sanctions data and additional explanatory variables 
Data on sanctions are sourced from Stat-Xplore and constructed in a similar way 
as in Chapter 6, though are calculated as a quarterly rate per 100,000 working 
age population. Given the separate results for the three different sanctions 
measures that were considered in Chapter 6, the analysis in this chapter focuses 
solely on the main original adverse sanctions figure. Along with sanctions, 
additional explanatory variables are included in the analysis that the previous 
discussion in Section 7.2 indicated as being important determinants of anxiety 
and/or depression. Given the close relationship between these mental health 
problems and antidepressant prescribing, the explanatory variables are similar 
to those identified in Chapter 6, and include: rates of JSA claimants, ILO 
unemployment, economic inactivity, employment, Work Capability Assessments, 
GVA per head, demographic characteristics (age, gender and ethnicity); and the 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) and rural-urban classification. The main 
difference here is that rates of antibiotic prescribing are not considered, since 
this variable was included in Chapter 6 as a proxy for discretionary GP 
prescribing behaviour, which is not relevant in the current context. Data are 
available, furthermore, for proportions of white working age individuals in each 
local authority, and so this variable is used as opposed to the white UK born 
measure that was available for the analysis in Chapter 6.  
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Table 7.1 summarises the separate variables that are included in the analysis, 
their data source and summary statistics. All variables are measured as rates per 
100,000 work age population, except GVA per head, IMD and rural-urban 
classification, the latter two of which are categorical variables. Table 7.1 details 
summary statistics at the county-level only. The equivalent information for the 
district-level is detailed in Table A7.1 in the appendix for Chapter 7 (Section 
A7.1). The county-level summary statistics are displayed here given the fact that 
the analysis itself ultimately focuses mainly on the county-level results, for 
reasons that will become clear in the discussion that follows.  
7.3.4 Statistical approach 
Similar to Chapter 6, the first stage of the analysis in this chapter investigates 
the relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression across the 
time period. This responds to the first research question identified in the 
introduction, by estimating fixed effects models as described in a basic form in 
Equation 7.1:  
ܣ݊ݔ݅݁ݐݕ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܵܽ݊ܿݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚᇱ ௜ܺǡ௧ ൅ ܳ௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ (7.1) 
In Equation 7.1, i denotes the local authority and t denotes the quarter. Anxiety 
is the rate of anxiety and/or depression per 100,000 working age population, 
Sanctions is the sanctions rate per 100,000 working age population and X 
represents a vector of additional explanatory variables. Q is a dummy variable 
coded 0 for quarters prior to Q2 2013 and 1 thereafter, to take into account the 
change in the QLFS survey question at that point in time. The remaining symbols 
are as follows: µ denotes local authority fixed effects, λ denotes time fixed 
effects and ε represents the error term. The meaning and implication of 
including these fixed effects terms was previously explained in Chapter 6. In 
addition, regression diagnostic checks are carried out, as detailed in the 
appendix for Chapter 7 (Section A7.3), and as a result of these checks all 
estimated models use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, which are robust to 
heteroscedasticity, correlation through time within local authorities as well as 
general forms of cross-sectional dependence.   
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Table 7.1: summary statistics for 148 local authority counties, Q3 2010 – Q4 2014 
 N Mean 
St.d 
Dev 
Min. Max. Source 
Dependent variable:       
Anxiety and/or depression 2,592 5,161 2,255 411 16,959 QLFS 
Sanctions variable:       
Original adverse 2,595 434 226 22 1,510 
Stat-
Xplore 
Control variables:       
Claimants 2,595 3,610 1,544 566 9,051 Nomis 
Unemployment 2,590 6,141 1,851 1,877 12,694 Nomis 
Economic Inactivity 2,595 23,428 4,033 13,821 36,524 Nomis 
Employment 2,595 69,408 5,168 51,682 81,121 Nomis 
Work Capability Assessments 2,595 439 216 54 1,887 
Stat-
Xplore 
GVA 2,595 24,903 20,395 12,791 238,714 Nomis 
Age      Nomis 
16-29 year olds 2,595 29,189 4,493 21,199 43,970  
30-49 year olds 2,595 43,331 3,049 35,066 52,332  
50-64 year olds 2,595 27,480 5,107 12,407 37,484  
Female 2,595 50,118 827 46,464 52,555 Nomis 
White 2,595 83,285 15,708 22,145 99,831 Nomis 
Index of Multiple Deprivation      DCLG 
Quintile 1 507      
Quintile 2 531      
Quintile 3 516      
Quintile 4 510      
Quintile 5 531      
Rural-Urban Classification      Defra 
Predominantly rural 338      
Urban with significant 
rural 
349      
Predominantly urban 1,908      
Falsification variables:       
Anxiety and/or depression 
(age 65+) 
2,201 1,577 1,553 92 35,295 QLFS 
Cardiovascular health 2,595 7,945 2,582 935 22,584 QLFS 
Note: Local authority quarters where the QLFS estimates produced zero estimates were 
removed from the sample.  
 
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The next stage of the analysis considers the second research question outlined in 
the introduction to this chapter, and investigates the impact of the Welfare 
Reform Act 2012. To capture the effect of this reform, Equation 7.2 modifies the 
initial fixed effect analysis through inclusion of an interaction term with 
Sanctions and Reform:  
ܣ݊ݔ݅݁ݐݕ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܵܽ݊ܿݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶሺܵܽ݊ܿݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜ǡ௧ כ ܴ݂݁݋ݎ݉௧ሻ ൅ ߚᇱ ௜ܺǡ௧ ൅ ܳ௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ (7.2) 
In Equation 7.2, Reform is a dummy variable that marks the quarters before and 
after the implementation of the harsher sanctions regime brought about by the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012. It is coded 1 for quarters Q4 2012 onwards and 0 
before that date. The post-reform relationship between sanctions and anxiety 
and/or depression is then arrived at through calculating a linear combination of 
β1 and β2, as previously explained. The remainder of this chapter details the 
results of these fixed effects regressions, both at the district- and the county-
level, and then goes on to discuss the implications of the findings obtained.  
7.4 District-level results 
This section details the results from the district-level analysis, including 
summary statistics and the regression estimates from both across the time 
period and in the pre- and post-reform periods. As will become clear in the 
course of the discussion, the regression results in relation to the key sanctions 
variable of interest are consistently non-significant. Consequently, the analysis 
in this section is relatively brief, focusing on the main sanctions coefficients 
only. The full regression tables themselves are detailed in the appendix for 
Chapter 7 (Section A7.1). The following section details the results of the county-
level analysis in more depth.  
7.4.1 Summary statistics 
Figure 7.1 depicts the correlation between sanctions and anxiety and/or 
depression in each local authority quarter across the period, and indicates that 
in local authority quarters where the rate of sanction is higher, so too are rates 
of anxiety and/or depression (r = 0.218; p < 0.001). Indeed, this correlation is 
stronger than in the equivalent Figure 6.1 in Chapter 6 regarding the relationship 
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between sanctions and SSRI prescribing. The positive association is nevertheless 
still quite low, with only 4.7% of the variance in anxiety and/or depression 
explained by sanctions, which motivates the application of an expanded fixed 
effects regression framework.  
Figure 7.1: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression 
 
Note: quarterly rates for 324 local authority districts, Q3 2010 – Q4 2014 
7.4.2 Regression models: full time period 
Estimates from the district-level fixed effects analysis are displayed in Table 
A7.3 in the appendix for Chapter 7 (Section A7.1). The detail is quite similar to 
the modelling carried out in Chapter 6, whilst the focus in this section is on the 
sanctions coefficients specifically. The results in Table A7.3 (Model A7.2) 
indicate that increases in sanction rates within local authorities are associated 
with increases in rates of anxiety and/or depression, though this effect is non-
significant at the 5% level. For every 10 additional sanctions applied per 100,000 
working age population, the rate of anxiety and/or depression increases by 1.91 
per 100,000 working age population (p = 0.536). Whilst the positive association is 
the expected one, it is not possible to place much confidence in the estimated 
coefficient itself. This is made clear in the graphical representation of the 
estimated sanctions coefficient for the full-time period in Figure 7.2.  
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7.4.3 Regression models: influence of the Welfare Reform Act 
2012 
Next, the analysis examines whether the observed association between sanctions 
and anxiety and/or depression is stronger in the period following the 
implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012. The full Model A7.4 results are 
displayed in Table A7.3 in the appendix for Chapter 7 (Section A7.1). Similar to 
the results for the full time period, the estimated relationship between 
sanctions and anxiety and/or depression is not statistically significant at the 5% 
level in either the pre- or post-reform periods. In the pre-reform period, for 
every 10 additional sanctions applied per 100,000 working age population the 
rate of anxiety and/or depression is 1.27 per 100,000 working age population 
higher (p = 0.782). Following the reform, the association increases by 0.91 per 
100,000 working population, so that for every 10 additional sanctions applied per 
100,000 population the rate of anxiety and/or depression is 2.18 per 100,000 
working age population higher (p = 0.524). These results are summarised in 
Figure 7.2, which displays the estimated sanctions coefficient for the full period, 
as well as the pre-and post-Act periods.  
Figure 7.2: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression 
 
Note: Point estimates for sanctions are derived from Table A7.3 
Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
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As highlighted in this section, the results at the district-level do not find a 
statistically significant association between sanctions and anxiety and/or 
depression. It is at least indicative, however, that the estimated coefficients 
conform to the expected relationship. Not only is the association between 
sanctions and anxiety and/or depression positive, the estimated coefficient is 
larger in the post-reform period. Clearly, however, the confidence intervals 
displayed in Figure 7.2 are too large for any reliance to be placed on the results 
in question. One plausible explanation of the large standard errors is the role of 
sampling variability from one quarter to the next, derived from the fact that the 
analysis estimates anxiety and/or depression using QLFS survey weights. When 
producing area-level QLFS estimates, the estimates themselves become less and 
less reliable at lower levels of geography (ONS, 2016). One option in this context 
would be to use estimates derived from the Annual Population Survey (APS), 
which benefits from a larger sample size. However, the APS is designed for 
annual as opposed to quarterly analysis, and is therefore not suited to producing 
estimates that can be utilised in the present analysis. Instead, and as previously 
indicated, the next section focuses on county-level estimates of anxiety and/or 
depression using the QLFS. By considering the association between sanctions and 
anxiety and/or depression at a more aggregated geographical level, the role of 
sampling variation is reduced and more confidence can be placed in the results 
obtained.  
7.5 County-level results 
7.5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 7.1, above, details the summary statistics for the variables included in the 
county-level analysis. It indicates that across the sample there are an average of 
434 sanctions and 5,161 people experiencing anxiety and/or depression per 
100,000 working age population per quarter in local authorities. There was a 
large degree of variation, nevertheless, in rates of both sanctions and anxiety 
and/or depression around these averages. Again, for example, Blackpool stands 
out with an average of 833 sanctions and 8,770 people experiencing anxiety 
and/or depression per 100,000 working age population per quarter. Equally, 
however, local authorities with high rates of sanctions are not necessarily the 
same local authorities with high rates of anxiety and/or depression, and vice 
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versa. Rutland, for example, has a low rate of sanctions but a relatively high 
rate of people experiencing anxiety and/or depression, which indicates that 
factors other than sanctions are important. The scatterplot in Figure 7.3 depicts 
the correlation between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression in each local 
authority quarter across the period, which is slightly stronger than that observed 
with the district-level scatterplot displayed in Figure 7.2. As before, in local 
authority quarters where the rate of sanction is higher, so too are rates of 
anxiety and/or depression (r = 0.263; p < 0.001). A basic linear regression model 
using the two variables indicates that only 6.9% of the variance in anxiety and/or 
depression is explained by sanctions, which motivates the application of an 
expanded fixed effects regression framework.  
Figure 7.3: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression 
 
Note: quarterly rates for 148 local authority counties, Q3 2010 – Q4 2014 
7.5.2 Regression models: full time period 
The initial modelling process that is carried for the county-level results follows 
that previously explained in Chapter 6. That is, three separate models are 
initially estimated, which are detailed in Table A7.4 in the appendix for Chapter 
7 (Section A7.2). The discussion itself will ultimately focus in more detail on the 
preferred model. First, a fixed effects model (Model A7.5) is estimated that 
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incorporates the sanctions rate as well as a number of additional time-variant 
explanatory variables, which include: rates of unemployment and economic 
inactivity; Work Capability Assessments (WCAs); GVA; age, gender and ethnicity. 
Second, this model is repeated with the inclusion of IMD quintiles and rural-
urban classification (Model A7.6), both interacted with time. As previously 
explained, this interaction captures the possibility that the influence of 
deprivation and rurality on anxiety and/or depression may have changed over 
the period. Third, as an additional sensitivity test, a random effects model is 
estimated (Model A7.7). Similar to the analysis in Chapter 6, the fixed effects 
model with the inclusion of IMD quintiles and rural-urban classification 
interactions is preferred. Again, a Hausman test indicates that a random effects 
framework should not be favoured over fixed effects in the current analysis (p < 
0.001). Equally, Model A7.6 is preferred over Model A7.5 due to the significance 
of the IMD and rural-urban interactions with time, as well as the increase in 
within-R2. The Model A7.6 results are reproduced in Table 7.2 (Model 7.1), for 
the purposes of the current discussion.  
Importantly, given the transition from a district-level to a county-level analysis, 
the results in Model 7.1 indicate that sanctions are associated with increases in 
rates of anxiety and/or depression. For every 10 additional sanctions applied per 
100,000 working age population, the rate of anxiety and/or depression increases 
by 7.77 per 100,000 working age population. Unlike at the district-level, 
furthermore, the results are now statistically significant at the 0.1% level (p < 
0.001) (95% C.I.: 3.57 to 11.97). A full diagnostic check of Model 7.1 is carried 
out in the appendix for Chapter 7 (Section A7.3), which tests the various fixed 
effects model assumptions. Importantly, the checks do not indicate that there 
are any clear issues that would undermine the results obtained. The models 
themselves also use standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity, 
correlation through time within local authorities as well as general forms of 
cross-sectional dependence, as previously indicated.  
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Table 7.2: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression, fixed effects models 
 Model 7.1 Model 7.2 
Sanctions 0.777*** 
(0.199) 
0.690 
(0.459) 
Sanctions x Reform  0.119 
(0.515) 
Unemployment -0.009 
(0.041) 
-0.009 
(0.041) 
Economic Inactivity 0.074** 
(0.020) 
0.074** 
(0.020) 
WCAs 0.216 
(0.536) 
0.212 
(0.549) 
GVA -0.059*** 
(0.014) 
-0.060*** 
(0.013) 
Age   
30–49 -0.407*** 
(0.104) 
-0.404** 
(0.109) 
50–64 0.105 
(0.108) 
0.104 
(0.109) 
Female 0.504 
(0.473) 
0.498 
(0.467) 
White 0.025 
(0.019) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation   
Quintile 2 x Quarter 51.541** 
(14.751) 
50.416** 
(16.222) 
Quintile 3 x Quarter 56.931*** 
(6.926) 
54.829*** 
(12.786) 
Quintile 4 x Quarter 66.666*** 
(16.652) 
63.880** 
(18.871) 
Quintile 5 x Quarter 80.834** 
(21.423) 
76.581* 
(29.328) 
Urban-Rural Classification   
Urban with significant rural x Quarter 10.867 
(12.300) 
10.519 
(13.054) 
Predominantly urban x Quarter -50.008** 
(14.758) 
-50.531** 
(15.344) 
R2 (within) 0.847 0.847 
LA Quarters 2,587 2,587 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant and LFS question change dummy not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Several of the explanatory variables included in Model 7.1 conform to the 
relationship that is expected with regard to rates of anxiety and/or depression. 
In terms of the statistically significant results, for example, increases within 
local authorities in rates of economic inactivity are associated with increases in 
anxiety and/or depression, whilst increases in GVA are associated with 
decreases. A positive relationship exists, furthermore, in terms of rates of WCAs, 
females and proportions of white people, though these results are non-
significant at the 5% level. Similar to the results in Chapter 6, however, a 
counterintuitive result in Model 7.1 is the negative and close to zero estimated 
coefficient for the rate of unemployment, given the well-established link 
between unemployment and poor mental health. As with previously, the results 
are re-run using the JSA claimant count as opposed to ILO unemployment, as 
detailed in the Chapter 7 appendix (Table A7.6, Section A7.4). In this model, the 
estimated claimant count coefficient remains negative and non-significant at the 
5% level. The sanctions coefficient also remains substantively unchanged.  
The wider ILO measure of unemployment is again favoured over the narrower 
JSA claimant rate in the analysis for two key reasons. As well as capturing a 
narrower set of unemployed individuals, the claimant rate has a high degree of 
collinearity with sanctions (r = 0.750) that has the potential to drive the 
negative estimated relationship between the claimant rate and anxiety and/or 
depression. The correlation between unemployment and sanctions is lower (r = 
0.653), though still high, but separate regressions with and without each 
variable included indicate that multicollinearity is not driving the 
counterintuitive estimated relationship that is observed here. Again, a possible 
explanation of the result relates to the previously identified and discussed risk of 
ecological bias, whereby correlations that hold at the area-level do not 
necessarily apply at the individual-level. The ongoing threat of ecological bias 
emphasises the need for additional individual-level analysis to better understand 
the relationships that are investigated throughout this thesis.  
7.5.3 Regression models: influence of the Welfare Reform Act 
2012 
Next, the analysis examines whether the observed association between sanctions 
and anxiety and/or depression is stronger in the period following the 
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implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012. The full results of this fixed 
effects regression model are displayed in Model 7.2 in Table 7.2. They indicate 
that before the implementation of the Act, for every 10 additional sanctions 
applied per 100,000 working age population the rate of anxiety and/or 
depression is 6.90 per 100,000 working age population higher, though – similar to 
the analysis in Chapter 6 – this result is not significant at the five per cent level 
(p = 0.151). Following the reform, however, the association increases by 1.19 
per 100,000 working age population, so that for every 10 additional sanctions 
applied per 100,000 working age population the rate of anxiety and/or 
depression is 8.09 per 100,000 working age population higher (p < 0.001) (95% C. 
I.: 3.67 to 12.50). These results are consistent with the expected impact of the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012. The coefficients for the additional explanatory 
variables in Model 7.2, furthermore, are very similar to those estimated in Model 
7.1. These results are summarised in Figure 7.4, which displays the estimated 
sanctions coefficient for the full time period (Model 7.1), as well as the pre-and 
post-Act periods (Model 7.2).  
Figure 7.4: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression, sanctions coefficients 
 
Note: Point estimates for sanctions are derived from Table 7.2 
Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
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7.5.4 Robustness tests 
Two falsification tests are carried out using rates of anxiety and/or depression in 
the population aged 65 and over, as well as rates of cardiovascular problems in 
the working age population. The full results are detailed in the appendix for 
Chapter 7 (Table A7.7 and Table A7.8, Section A7.5). For both variables, no 
statistically significant relationship is found in terms of sanctions either across 
the time period or in the pre- and post-reform periods. These results are 
displayed in Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6. Unfortunately, use of anxiety and/or 
depression in the population aged 65 and over is limited by the issue of zero 
estimates (Figure 7.5). As previously highlighted, local authority quarters with 
estimates of zero are removed from the sample as they are likely to reflect 
issues relating to sampling variability. This leads to a 15% drop in the sample size 
available for the analysis when carrying out the falsification test, which 
undermines its usefulness as a non-equivalent dependent variable. This is 
unfortunate, since it was previously highlighted that this measure arguably 
represents a better non-equivalent dependent than cardiovascular problems.  
Figure 7.5: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression (aged 65+), sanctions 
coefficients 
 
Note: Point estimates for sanctions are derived from Table A7.7 
Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
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Figure 7.6: relationship between sanctions and cardiovascular health, sanctions coefficients 
 
Note: Point estimates for sanctions are derived from Table A7.8 
Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
Second, a Granger test for reverse causality is carried out using a lag structure 
of four quarters, which indicates that sanctions are found to Granger-cause 
anxiety and/or depression (p = 0.013), whilst rates of anxiety and/or depression 
are not found to Granger-cause sanctions (p = 0.608). This result supports the 
local authority-level inferences made in the analysis here. It is important to 
reiterate, however, that the Granger test provides only a limited test of reverse 
causality, which would require individual-level data and a different research 
design to be fully taken into account.  
7.6 Conclusion 
The findings presented in this chapter suggest that higher sanction rates are 
associated with increases in rates of anxiety and/or depression within local 
authorities. Results for the full time period indicate that for every 10 additional 
sanctions applied per 100,000 working age population, the rate of anxiety 
and/or depression increases by 7.77 per 100,000 working age population (p < 
0.001) (95% C.I.: 3.57 to 11.97). Similar to the analysis in Chapter 6, however, 
additional models suggest that a stronger relationship exists following the 
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implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012. In the pre-reform period, that 
is, sanctions are associated with higher rates of anxiety and/or depression but 
the relationship is not significant at the 5% level. In the post-reform period, the 
results indicate that for every 10 additional sanctions applied per 100,000 
working age population, the rate of anxiety and/or depression increases by 8.09 
per 100,000 working age population (p < 0.001) (95% C. I.: 3.67 to 12.50). Whilst 
this local authority-level association might be considered to be quite high, it has 
been highlighted that this level of analysis captures impacts on both JSA 
claimants as well as wider effects on the friends and family of sanctioned 
individuals. As previously detailed in the appendix for Chapter 6 (Section A6.6), 
furthermore, the analysis uses a sanctions indicator that underestimates the true 
quarterly rate, which implies that it slightly overestimates the true relationship 
between sanctions and – in this case – anxiety and/or depression.  
The level of analysis and methods used in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are similar, 
and as such the results here are limited by a similar set of concerns to those 
previously discussed, which include: ecological bias; omitted variable bias; and 
reverse causality. The role of each of these issues was highlighted in Chapter 6 
(Section 6.5), and won’t be repeated in the discussion here, though it is 
important to reiterate that the results themselves are estimated as part of fixed 
effects models that control for a number of additional factors and are supported 
by sensitivity and robustness checks. A key difference between the two analyses, 
nevertheless, is that the results in this chapter rely on survey estimates of 
anxiety and/or depression and are run at both the district- and county-level of 
local authority geography, with statistically significant effects observed at the 
county-level only. Even at the district-level, however, the estimated non-
significant sanctions coefficients conform to the expected pattern. The 
difference between the district- and county-level results is also explainable by 
the fact that QLFS estimates are less reliable at lower levels of geography. It is 
an important finding, therefore, that the scale and severity of sanctions 
following the implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 are sufficient to 
have observable impacts at the local authority-level. Indeed, the findings in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are both observed despite the fact that the rate of 
hardship payments increased in the post-reform period (Webster, 2015).  
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An additional issue that was previously identified in Chapter 5 relates to 
compositional bias. Because the analyses in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are carried 
out at the local authority-level, there is a risk that the estimated association 
between sanctions and mental health outcomes are partly driven by unobserved 
changes in the characteristics of the JSA claimant group throughout the period 
of analysis, as opposed to by sanctions themselves. This is an unavoidable 
concern in the context of ecological analyses. As highlighted in both chapters, 
the analysis has sought to limit the potential influence of compositional bias by 
accounting for the rollout of Universal Credit (UC). This altered the composition 
of the JSA claimant group towards the end of the period as UC was initially only 
open to younger unemployed individuals without dependent children. To further 
investigate this issue, the analysis in the next empirical chapter considers the 
relationship between the area-level sanctions rate and the mental health of 
individual JSA claimants. Using individual-level QLFS data and controlling for 
claimant characteristics, this provides an additional robustness check on the 
findings in this chapter.  
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Chapter 8. Multi-level analysis: anxiety and/or 
depression 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the relationship between JSA benefit sanctions and 
rates of anxiety and/or depression during the period of Coalition government 
(2010-15), using individual-level data on JSA claimants and local authority-level 
data on benefit sanctions. As highlighted in the summary to Chapter 7, there is a 
risk that the estimated association in that chapter between sanctions and 
anxiety and/or depression is partly driven by compositional bias, given that it 
relies on longitudinal ecological data. To consider this issue further, the 
investigation in this chapter carries out a multi-level analysis that is able to 
control for individual-level characteristics of JSA claimants. Whilst this is 
primarily carried out to provide an additional robustness check on the findings in 
Chapter 7, the specific research questions associated with this stage of the 
analysis can be stated as follows:  
[RQ 8.1]: Are area-level sanction rates associated with adverse mental 
health impacts for JSA claimants?  
[RQ 8.2]: Does the observed relationship strengthen following the 
implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012?  
In the process of investigating these research questions, this chapter begins by 
outlining the specific modelling approach that will be pursued, in light of the 
fact that the analysis makes use of both individual- and area-level data. This 
discussion provides more depth into the multi-level modelling approach than was 
previously given in Chapter 5. Next, the chapter outlines additional details 
relating to the data and methods that are used in the investigation, and then 
goes on to describe and discuss the results of the multi-level analysis itself.  
8.2 Multi-level analysis 
The analysis in this chapter uses QLFS data (ONS, 2018c), which – when 
combined with sanctions data from Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2018c) – permit 
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investigation into the relationship between quarterly sanction rates at the local 
authority-level and the mental health of individual JSA claimants. This initial 
combination of individual- and area-level data involves the analysis of a two-
level data structure in which JSA claimants are clustered within local 
authorities. As previously highlighted, furthermore, the primary aim of this 
chapter is to provide a robustness check on the longitudinal ecological analysis 
carried out in Chapter 7, and so the investigation pools QLFS datasets between 
Q3 2010 and Q4 2014. One implication of pooling quarterly datasets, combined 
with the rotational sampling design adopted by the QLFS, is that some 
individuals will be present in the sample more than once. As previously 
explained in Chapter 5, the QLFS uses a rotational sampling design in which each 
household is interviewed for five consecutive quarters. Consequently, if an 
individual is a JSA claimant for five consecutive quarters then they will be 
included in the current sample five times, whereas if they are a claimant in only 
one quarter then they will be included in the sample only once. The 
investigation, therefore, involves the analysis of a hierarchical three-level data 
structure in which occasions of measurement are nested within individuals which 
are themselves nested within local authorities.  
Importantly, both the repeated observations of individuals and the clustering of 
individuals within local authorities must be explicitly taken into account during 
the modelling process, as such observations are likely to be highly correlated 
with each other. Such observations serve to violate the assumption of 
independence that underpins single-level multiple regression models, and if this 
clustering is ignored the standard errors of the regression coefficients are likely 
to be underestimated, which increases the likelihood of committing a Type I 
statistical error by falsely rejecting a true null hypothesis (Steele, 2008b). There 
are at least two strategies for dealing with such clustering in the current 
context. First, it is possible to estimate fixed effects regression models, as 
previously carried out in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. An alternative strategy is to 
explicitly model for dependency within individuals and local authorities using a 
multi-level modelling approach, which implies the use of random effects 
regression analysis. As previously highlighted in Chapter 5, when attempting to 
choose between the two approaches, it is important to compare the fact that 
whilst random effects models provide a more efficient and parsimonious means 
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of dealing with clustering, they are also underpinned by stricter assumptions. In 
order to exploit both within- and between-group variation, for example, random 
effects models make the relatively stricter assumption that any omitted 
variables are uncorrelated with the included explanatory variables. That is, the 
residual regression errors are assumed to be independent of the random effects, 
whilst also being normally distributed with a mean of zero and a constant 
variance (Steele, 2008b).  
Despite its relatively stricter assumptions, there are clear grounds in the current 
context for adopting a random effects framework over that of fixed effects. 
Importantly, for example, there are several disadvantages that affect the use of 
individual and local authority fixed effects given the data that is being analysed. 
The inclusion of individual fixed effects, for example, would involve including N-
1 individual dummy variables and use up many degrees of freedom due to the 
large number of individuals in the dataset. In addition, the use of individual 
fixed effects would involve essentially ignoring the explanatory power of those 
individuals who appear in the dataset only once, whilst the estimates of the 
local authority fixed effects are likely to be unreliable where the within-local 
authority sample size is small (Steele, 2008a). Here, individuals are perfectly 
nested within local authorities, meaning that the analysis will only be able to 
include individual-level fixed effects due to perfect multicollinearity between 
the two levels. Consequently, the clustering of individuals within local 
authorities would have to be dealt with using a ‘cluster-robust’ regression 
method, which provides only a limited response to the issue of clustering via 
post-estimation technical adjustments to the standard errors (Cameron and 
Miller, 2015).  
Random effects models, in contrast, not only avoid these pitfalls but also, by 
more explicitly recognising the nested structure of the data available, are better 
able to accurately estimate the standard errors of the key explanatory variable, 
which is the area-level sanctions rate. A key strength of the multi-level 
framework in the current context, furthermore, is that it does not require 
balanced data nor does it require the spacing of occasions to be the same 
between individuals (Rasbash, 2008). In the current sample, individuals might be 
claiming JSA at one or more quarters that are not necessarily equally spaced 
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apart. When conducting multi-level analysis it is possible to estimate both 
random intercept and random slope models (Steele, 2008b). In random intercept 
models, the intercept is allowed to vary randomly across groups, in this case 
individuals and local authorities, meaning that it can take on values from a 
distribution. The effect of explanatory variables included in the model are 
nonetheless fixed, in the sense that they do not vary across groups. The effect of 
age or gender on mental health, for example, is assumed to be the same no 
matter what local authority an individual is in. In random slope models, in 
contrast, such coefficients are allowed to vary randomly across groups. This 
approach is not pursued here, however, given the additional assumptions that 
these models entail and the central focus on the area-level sanctions rate.  
8.3 Data and methods 
8.3.1 Analytic sample 
As previously highlighted, the analysis in this chapter uses pooled QLFS data 
(ONS, 2018c), using information on JSA claimants present in the QLFS datasets 
between Q3 2010 and Q4 2014. Consistent with the analysis in Chapter 7, 
furthermore, JSA claimants in the City of London and the Isles of Scilly are 
removed, as well as JSA claimants in quarters affected by the roll-out of 
Universal Credit. This latter restriction leads to a loss of 250 JSA claimant 
observations from the sample (1.9% of the post-reform sample), though the 
substantive results are again similar with or without this exclusion, given the 
limited rollout of UC that had occurred by the end of 2014.  
In the initial analysis, all instances of an individual claiming JSA are retained, 
which implies that the investigation analyses a three-level data structure in 
which occasions of measurement are nested within individuals which are nested 
within local authorities. As a sensitivity check on the three-level analysis, 
however, the investigation also considers a two-level data structure in which JSA 
claimants are observed only once, relating to the first time that they enter the 
sample. Partly, this sensitivity check is carried out in response to the potential 
that the initial analysis could be affected by the sample size available at each 
level of occasion, individual and local authority. As Hox (2010) notes, for 
example, the estimates of coefficients and their standard errors become more 
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accurate with increasing sample sizes at all levels, and points towards rules of 
thumb that have been developed which suggest: at least 30 observations per 
group with 30 groups; at least 20 observations per group with 50 groups; and at 
least 10 observations per group with 100 groups. Whilst it is important to 
emphasise that these sample size suggestions provide rules of thumbs only, the 
role of sample size is investigated in a sensitivity check by requiring least 10 
observations per group. Since JSA claimants can only be present in the original 
sample for a maximum of 5 times, the minimum sample size requirement 
restricts the multi-level analysis to a two-level model of individual JSA claimants 
clustered within local authorities. This restriction has an added benefit in that 
the survey weights available in the QLFS are not strictly designed for use within 
longitudinal analyses.  
8.3.2 Dependent variable, sanctions and additional explanatory 
variables 
Consistent with the analysis in Chapter 7, the outcome of interest in this chapter 
relates to self-reported anxiety and/or depression. Unlike in Chapter 7, 
however, the focus here is on individual-level responses as opposed to rates per 
local authority population, which is captured through use of a dependent 
variable in which JSA claimants are coded as 1 if they report suffering from 
anxiety and/or depression and 0 if they do not. Given that the analysis in this 
chapter is primarily intended to provide a robustness check on the analysis in 
Chapter 7, a falsification test is not strictly necessary. For completeness, 
however, the analysis carries out a falsification test that uses cardiovascular 
problems as the non-equivalent dependent variable, constructed in a similar 
fashion to the main dependent variable.  
The main explanatory variable of interest is the quarterly local authority-level 
rate of JSA sanctions, calculated as a proportion of the number of JSA claimants. 
This sanctions rate differs from that used in Chapters 6 and 7, which constructed 
a rate as a proportion of the local authority population. Given the focus on the 
individual-level mental health of JSA claimants in this analysis, however, the 
selected sanctions rate arguably provides a better measure of the combined 
threat and imposition effects of sanctions in this context than a population-
based rate would provide. As part of the sensitivity tests, nevertheless, the 
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analysis is re-run using the population-based rate and the substantive results are 
similar. Of course, the use of a local authority-level sanctions measure elides 
variation in sanctioning that occurs at the Jobcentre-level. Prior to 2018, there 
were 784 Jobcentre Plus offices in Britain, approximately two per local authority 
(Bate, 2017). In addition, it is possible for a JSA claimant to live in a different 
local authority to the Jobcentre that is administering their claim. Clearly, 
therefore, a better measure of the sanctions rate would be the sanctions rate as 
a proportion of JSA claimants at the Jobcentre-level. However, this is not 
possible using the QLFS as it is not possible to identify the Jobcentres at which 
each JSA claimant in the sample is registered. This issue reinforces the need for 
further research in this area using more fine-grained individual-level data.  
In addition to the key explanatory variable of interest, the analysis includes a 
number of individual-level variables that are available through the QLFS and that 
have previously been shown to influence mental health (Sage, 2015b; Reeves et 
al., 2016; Carter and Whitworth, 2017), including: age, gender, ethnicity, 
education, disability, married/cohabiting, having children and socio-economic 
status. Previous research has indicated that there exists a ‘U-shaped’ 
relationship between age and mental health, in which an individual’s mental 
health is lowest in their middle-age, being higher when they are younger and 
older (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008). Rates of anxiety and depression in the 
UK, however, are fairly consistent across people of working age (Baker, 2018). 
To investigate this issue, the analysis initially considered age-squared as an 
additional control variable. This measure is not included in the models presented 
in this chapter, however, due to the fact that its inclusion did not add to the 
overall model fit and that the estimated coefficient was consistently non-
significant. Disability is measured in the QLFS based on long-term disabilities and 
health problems that substantially limit the day-to-day activities of respondents, 
as well as the kind or amount of work that they might engage in. Socio-economic 
status is measured based on the National Statistics Socio-economic classification 
(NS-SEC).  
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8.3.3 Statistical approach 
Binary outcome variables are most commonly analysed through the estimation of 
logistic regression models. The current analysis, however, is carried out using 
linear regression in response to the growing recognition of the problems that 
affect logistic regression models (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Hellevik, 2009; 
Mood, 2010; Breen et al., 2018; Gomila, 2019). Mood (2010), for example, 
details three issues that result from omitted variable bias and which affect the 
estimation of coefficients in logistic models. As detailed in Chapter 5, 
unobserved heterogeneity is a well-known source of bias in both linear and 
logistic regression, which occurs when omitted variables are correlated with the 
dependent and independent variables that are observed and included in the 
model. In logistic regression models, however, unobserved heterogeneity 
impacts regression estimates even when omitted variables are not correlated 
with the included independent variables. This occurs as a direct consequence of 
how coefficients are standardised as part of logistic regression, so that the 
regression residuals follow a logistic distribution (see Mood (2010) for a technical 
elaboration). This has three important consequences, as Mood (2010: 67-68) 
details:  
i. It is problematic to interpret log-odds ratios (LnOR) or odds ratios (OR) as 
substantive effects, because they also reflect unobserved heterogeneity.  
ii. It is problematic to compare LnOR or OR across models with different 
independent variables, because the unobserved heterogeneity is likely to 
vary across models.  
iii. It is problematic to compare LnOR or OR across samples, across groups 
within samples, or over time – even when we use models with the same 
independent variables – because the unobserved heterogeneity can vary 
across the compared samples, groups, or points in time.  
The issues detailed above have important implications for the current analysis. 
In a general sense, they indicate that there are concerns with regard to logistic 
regression estimates and what can be drawn from them in terms of substantive 
effects, which is clearly a central preoccupation for the current analysis. In 
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addition, logistic regression estimates cannot be compared across groups within 
samples or over time, which is a particular issue given the need to compare the 
impact of sanctions before and after the implementation of the Welfare Reform 
Act 2012. Importantly, Mood (2010) argues that the use of linear probability 
models are an acceptable alternative to logistic regression that can be used to 
overcome these issues, which is also the recommendation of several additional 
investigations (Hellevik, 2009; Breen et al., 2018; Gomila, 2019).  
In light of the above discussion, the analysis of the results in the next section 
foreground the estimates from linear probability models. Indeed, this approach 
is commonly adopted in economics and is gaining greater application in 
sociological and epidemiological research (see, for example, Reeves et al., 
2016). Of course, the use of linear probability models to analyse binary 
dependent variables is itself not necessarily uncontroversial. This relates to the 
fact that such models can predict unrealistic values that are higher than 1 or 
lower than 0, can suffer from heteroscedastic and non-normal residuals, and 
clearly mis-specify the functional form that exists between the dependent and 
independent variables. Such issues are arguably of lesser importance than the 
biases introduced in logistic regression models, however: unrealistic predicted 
values occur in linear regression models even without binary responses; 
heteroscedasticity can be corrected for; and misspecification is not of overriding 
concern where the investigation is primarily interested in the “sign and 
significance of an effect, or of an average effect estimate … and not in the non-
linearity of the relation per se” (Mood, 2010: 78). Indeed, estimates from linear 
probability models also benefit in terms of the immediate interpretability of 
effect sizes, which is not true of the coefficients or odds-ratios that result from 
logistic regression. As a sensitivity test, nevertheless, the results of the main 
analysis are re-run using logistic regression in order to check for the consistency 
of the results obtained.  
To investigate the relationship between area-level sanctions and anxiety and/or 
depression, the analysis estimates multi-level random intercept models as 
described in its most basic form in Equation 8.1:  
ܣ݊ݔ݅݁ݐݕ௜ǡ௝ǡ௞ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܵܽ݊ܿݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜ǡ௝ǡ௞ ൅ ߚᇱ ௜ܺǡ௝ǡ௞ ൅ ݒ௞ ൅ ݑ௝ǡ௞ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௝ǡ௞ (8.1) 
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In Equation 8.1, i denotes the occasion of measurement (level 1), j denotes the 
individual (level 2) and k denotes the local authority (level 3). Anxiety is the 
self-reported mental health status of an individual j at occasion i in local 
authority k. Sanctions denotes the local authority-level sanctions rate as a 
proportion of JSA claimants, whilst ν is the between-local authority residual (the 
level 3 random effect), υ is the between-individual residual (the level 2 random 
effect) and ε is the within-individual residual (the level 1 random effect). X 
represents a vector of additional individual-level explanatory variables.  
The analysis carried out in Chapter 7 highlights the importance of the Welfare 
Reform Act 2012 with regard to estimating the effect of sanctions on anxiety and 
or/depression. Previously, the effect of the reform was captured through an 
interaction term, which interacted the sanctions variable with a dummy variable 
indicating quarters before and after Q4 2012. A similar strategy is possible here, 
however for clarity of presentation the analysis divides the sample into the pre- 
and post-reform periods, repeating the regression models in Equation 8.1 for 
each period and comparing the results obtained. Whilst the aggregate-level 
analysis in Chapter 7 considered the same local authorities through time, the 
multi-level analysis carried out here involves largely different individuals in the 
pre- and post-reform periods, and so splitting the sample aids interpretation. 
Splitting the sample has the downside of losing statistical power, however 
additional checks indicate that the substantive results remain similar whichever 
method is used.  
As in Chapter 7 (see discussion in Section 7.3), a dummy variable coded ‘0’ for 
quarters prior to Q2 2013 and ‘1’ thereafter is included to capture the slight 
change in the wording of the health-related question at this point in time. In this 
analysis, this dummy only needs to be included in the models that relate to the 
post-reform sample, given the fact that the sample is split as explained above. 
As was the case in Chapter 7, nevertheless, the substantive results of the 
analysis carried out here remain unchanged with or without the inclusion of this 
question change dummy variable.  
All regression models include person weights that are calculated and provided by 
the QLFS, which aim to permit population inferences by taking into account the 
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survey’s sample design as well as differential non-response among different 
groups (ONS, 2016). As previously indicated, furthermore, the fact that the 
weights provided are not specifically designed for use in longitudinal analysis 
partly motivates a sensitivity check in which the main three-level analysis is 
repeated in a two-level form, based on unique occasions of JSA claimants 
clustered within local authorities.  
8.4 Results 
8.4.1 Summary statistics 
Summary statistics for the pre- and post-reform samples are detailed in Table 
8.1. There are 10,352 individuals in the pre-reform sample and 7,921 individuals 
in the post-reform sample, which form the basis of the statistics displayed in 
Table 8.1. In the pre-reform sample, repeat observations mean that the overall 
sample size available for the multi-level modelling consists of 15,807 occasions 
of measurement: 6,766 individuals were present in the sample just once and 
3,586 were present two or more times. In the post-reform sample, repeat 
observations mean that the overall sample size available for the multi-level 
modelling consists of 12,669 occasions of measurement: 4,910 individuals were 
present in the sample just once and 3,011 were present two or more times. As 
Table 8.1 indicates, the post-reform period saw a higher proportion of JSA 
claimants reporting that they suffered from anxiety and/or depression, rising 
from 7.5% to 12.4% of the sample. The average local authority-level sanctions 
rate was also higher in the post-reform period, rising from an average of 10.9% 
to 13.1%.  
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Table 8.1: summary statistics, JSA claimants in the pre- and post-reform samples 
 Pre-reform 
(N = 10,352) 
Post-reform 
(N = 7,921) 
Dependent variable:   
Anxiety and/or Depression 7.47 12.37 
Sanctions Variable:   
Original adverse 10.93 13.15 
Control variables:   
Age 35.29 36.50 
Female 36.34 40.93 
Ethnicity   
White 84.21 83.07 
Mixed 1.59 1.73 
Asian or Asian British 6.11 6.72 
Black or Black British 5.57 5.98 
Chinese 0.38 0.14 
Other 2.14 2.36 
Disability 25.77 32.43 
Qualifications   
Higher education 15.99 15.62 
A-Level or equivalent 17.53 17.56 
GCSE or equivalent 28.65 28.83 
Other qualifications 17.87 16.99 
No qualification 18.59 19.13 
Don't know 1.37 1.87 
Partner 28.51 27.46 
Dependent children 31.82 34.09 
Socio-economic status   
Never worked 45.66 49.80 
Routine and semi-routine occupations 28.56 26.39 
Lower supervisory and technical 5.04 4.53 
Small employers and own account 
workers 
3.83 3.53 
Intermediate occupations 6.27 6.34 
Managerial and professional 10.64 9.41 
Falsification variable:   
Cardiovascular problems 7.21 7.92 
Note: table reports unweighted sample percentages with the exception of age and the local 
authority-level sanctions rate, which report the unweighted means 
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8.4.2 Three-level models 
Estimates from the three-level analysis are displayed in Table 8.2, which 
contrasts between the pre- and post-reform periods in Model 8.1 and Model 8.2 
respectively. Separate to the models displayed in Table 8.2, null models without 
any covariates included are run. These show that – as remains the case in Table 
8.2 – there is larger individual- than local authority-level variation, though both 
are statistically significant at the 5% level in both the pre- and post-reform 
samples. The results in Model 8.1 indicate that the area-level sanctions rate is 
associated with increased rates of anxiety and/or depression for JSA claimants in 
the pre-reform period, though the effect is non-significant at the 5% level. 
Specifically, a one percentage point increase in the sanctions rate is associated 
with a 1.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood that a JSA claimant suffers 
from anxiety and/or depression (p = 0.213). Model 8.2 indicates, however, that 
in the post-reform period a one percentage point increase in the sanctions rate 
is associated with a 2.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood that a JSA 
claimant suffers from anxiety and/or depression (p < 0.05). These findings 
support the results of the aggregate-level analysis carried out in Chapter 7, 
which also only observed statistically significant sanction effects following the 
implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012.  
As part of sensitivity analyses, the results of Model 8.1 and Model 8.2 are re-run 
with time fixed effects and additional area-level factors included (IMD quintiles 
and rural-urban classification). Due to data availability, the inclusion of the 
additional area-level factors restricts the analysis to JSA claimants in England. 
These additional models are detailed in the Chapter 8 appendix (Table A8.1, 
Section A8.1). The substantive results of the analysis, however, remain 
unchanged, and so the models including only the local authority-level sanctions 
rate are detailed here.  
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Table 8.2: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression 
 Model 8.1: 
Pre-reform 
Model 8.2: 
Post-reform 
Sanctions 0.011 
(0.008) 
0.021* 
(0.009) 
Age 0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
Female (ref: Male) 0.029*** 
(0.005) 
0.050*** 
(0.007) 
Ethnicity (ref: White)   
Mixed 0.028 
(0.018) 
-0.021 
(0.025) 
Asian or Asian British -0.022* 
(0.010) 
-0.050*** 
(0.014) 
Black or Black British -0.044*** 
(0.010) 
-0.088*** 
(0.014) 
Chinese -0.108** 
(0.041) 
-0.068 
(0.102) 
Other -0.029* 
(0.015) 
-0.074*** 
(0.021) 
Disability (ref: No disability) 0.220*** 
(0.005) 
0.262*** 
(0.006) 
Qualifications (ref: Higher education)   
A-Level or equivalent 0.001 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
GCSE or equivalent 0.010 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
Other qualifications 0.011 
(0.008) 
0.047*** 
(0.010) 
No qualification 0.019* 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
Don't know 0.007 
(0.019) 
-0.041 
(0.021) 
Partner (ref. No partner) -0.022*** 
(0.006) 
-0.034*** 
(0.008) 
Dependent children (ref. No 
dependents) 
-0.012* 
(0.005) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
Socio-economic status (ref: Never 
worked) 
  
Routine and semi-routine 
occupations 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
Lower supervisory and technical -0.006 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
Small employers and own 
account workers 
-0.024* 
(0.011) 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
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Intermediate occupations -0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.021 
(0.011) 
Managerial and professional -0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.018 
(0.010) 
Within individual variance 0.015 0.014 
Between individual variance 0.044 0.070 
Between local authority variance 0.0004 0.001 
Occasion, n 15,807 12,669 
Individual, n 10,352 7,921 
Local Authority, n 376 372 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Constant and LFS question change dummy (post-
reform model) not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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8.4.3 Two-level models 
Next, the analysis considers a two-level model, which – as previously indicated – 
is carried out in order to respond to possible concerns regarding the available 
sample size at each level in the original three-level analysis. An additional 
benefit of moving to a two-level model without repeat observations for 
individuals is that the survey weights available in the QLFS are not designed for 
use within longitudinal analyses. Accordingly, the models estimated in Table 8.2 
are re-run with the additional requirement of at least 10 observations per group, 
with JSA claimants retained according to the first time that they enter the 
original sample. This leads to the loss of 83 local authorities in the pre-reform 
period and 140 local authorities in post-reform period, and a final sample size of 
9,831 and 6,699 individuals in each period respectively. Estimates from the two-
level analysis are displayed in Table 8.3, which finds similar results to those in 
the original three-level analysis. That is, the relationship between the area-level 
sanctions rate and anxiety and/or depression for JSA claimants is positive but 
not statistically significant in the pre-reform period. In the post-reform period, 
however, a one percentage point increase in the sanctions rate is associated 
with a 2.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood that a JSA claimant suffers 
from anxiety and/or depression (p < 0.05).  
As was previously the case, furthermore, these substantive results are consistent 
in sensitivity analyses in which Model 8.3 and Model 8.4 are re-run with time 
fixed effects and additional area-level factors included. These are detailed in 
the Chapter 8 appendix (Table A8.2, Section A8.1).   
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Table 8.3: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression 
 Model 8.3: 
Pre-reform 
Model 8.4: 
Post-reform 
Sanctions 0.008 
(0.016) 
0.025* 
(0.012) 
Age 0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
Female (ref. Male) 0.026*** 
(0.005) 
0.050*** 
(0.007) 
Ethnicity (ref. White)   
Mixed 0.013 
(0.019) 
-0.010 
(0.026) 
Asian or Asian British -0.022* 
(0.010) 
-0.053*** 
(0.014) 
Black or Black British -0.042*** 
(0.011) 
-0.080*** 
(0.015) 
Chinese -0.115** 
(0.043) 
-0.046 
(0.117) 
Other -0.015 
(0.016) 
-0.072** 
(0.023) 
Disability (ref. No disability) 0.233*** 
(0.006) 
0.303*** 
(0.008) 
Qualifications (ref. Higher education)   
A-Level or equivalent 0.001 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
GCSE or equivalent 0.013 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
Other qualifications 0.005 
(0.009) 
0.031* 
(0.013) 
No qualification 0.015 
(0.009) 
0.0005 
(0.013) 
Don't know 0.004 
(0.022) 
-0.025 
(0.028) 
Partner (ref. No partner) -0.023*** 
(0.006) 
-0.034*** 
(0.009) 
Dependent children (ref. No 
dependents) 
-0.013* 
(0.006) 
-0.014 
(0.008) 
Socio-economic status (ref: Never 
worked) 
  
Routine and semi-routine 
occupations 
0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
Lower supervisory and technical -0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
Small employers and own 
account workers 
-0.029* 
(0.013) 
-0.056** 
(0.020) 
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Intermediate occupations -0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.035* 
(0.015) 
Managerial and professional -0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.030* 
(0.014) 
Between individual variance 0.056 0.081 
Between local authority variance 0.0004 0.001 
Individual, n 9,831 6,699 
Local Authority, n 293 232 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Constant and LFS question change dummy (post-
reform model) not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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8.4.4 Robustness tests 
In addition to the sensitivity checks already alluded to, two further tests are 
carried out in order to underpin the robustness of the results discussed. First, 
the models of the main multi-level analysis are re-run using logistic regression, 
the results of which are detailed in Table A8.3 in the appendix for Chapter 8 
(Section A8.2). Given the issues relating to sample size and survey weights 
highlighted above, Table A8.3 details results from two-level logistic regression 
models. Consistent with the previous analysis, nevertheless, results across the 
three- and two-level models are broadly similar. The results in Table A8.3 
support the findings of the main analysis, in that a positive sanctions coefficient 
is estimated in both the pre- and post-reform periods, whilst the result is larger 
and statistically significant at the 5% level in the post-reform period (Model 
A8.6). These results indicate that the findings of the main analysis are not 
arbitrarily driven by the decision to estimate models using linear regression.  
Finally, a falsification test is run using cardiovascular problems as the non-
equivalent dependent variable, as detailed in Table A8.4 in the appendix for 
Chapter 8 (Section A8.3). Again, this details the results from two-level models. 
The results of the main analysis are supported by the fact that the sanctions 
coefficients in the pre- and post-reform periods (Model A8.7 and Model A8.8, 
respectively) are non-significant at the 5% level. Contrary to the results of the 
main analysis, furthermore, the sanctions coefficient is smaller and very close to 
zero in the post-reform period.  
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the relationship between the local authority-level 
sanctions rate and rates of anxiety and/or depression for individuals claiming 
JSA. Primarily, the analysis has been carried out in order to provide a robustness 
check on the aggregate-level investigation detailed in Chapter 7, which is open 
to the concern that the estimated association between sanctions and anxiety 
and/or depression at the local authority-level is driven by compositional bias. 
Importantly, the findings presented in this chapter support – or at the very least 
do not undermine – the results of the ecological analysis previously carried out. 
Results from the three-level models, for example, indicate that higher sanction 
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rates are associated with higher rates of anxiety and/or depression for JSA 
claimants. In the post-reform period, a one percentage point increase in the 
sanctions rate is associated with a 2.1 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood that a JSA claimant suffers from anxiety and/or depression (p < 0.05). 
Similar results are observed in two-level models that include each JSA claimant 
only once, where it is estimated that in the post-reform period a one percentage 
point increase in the sanctions rate is associated with a 2.5 percentage point 
increase in the likelihood that a JSA claimant suffers from anxiety and/or 
depression (p < 0.05). These results are supported, furthermore, in additional 
robustness tests using logistic regression and a falsification test.  
Whilst the analysis in this chapter has been primarily carried out in order to 
provide a robustness check on the results estimated in Chapter 7, it is an 
interesting finding in and of itself that a positive association exists between the 
area-level sanctions rate and rates of anxiety and/or depression for JSA 
claimants. A separate but limited literature, for example, has considered the 
potential for area-level unemployment rates to partially moderate the impact of 
unemployment on mental health, which are hypothesised to operate in response 
to social norm effects and/or the development of effective support networks 
(Clark, 2003; Flint et al., 2013). Whilst Strandh et al. (2011: 799) find “no 
coherent effect” of area-level unemployment rates on mental health in Sweden, 
Flint et al. (2013: 1) find that in the UK, living in areas with higher 
unemployment rates provides a “degree of protection” against the mental 
health impact of unemployment. Such dynamics have not been the focus of the 
analysis in this chapter, though the findings suggest that claiming JSA in areas 
with higher sanctions rates is associated with higher rates of anxiety and/or 
depression, which pertains despite the influence of any countervailing 
moderation effects that may be operating. 
Given the data available, it is not possible to interpret the relationship 
investigated in this chapter in terms of the causal effect of sanctions on mental 
health. As previously highlighted, for example, it would be more meaningful to 
study the Jobcentre-level sanctions rate in this context. In addition, one possible 
alternative explanation for the results obtained is that higher rates of anxiety 
and/or depression may themselves increase the likelihood of claimants being 
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sanctioned. Arguably, this concern is partly limited by the fact that a stronger 
relationship between the local authority-level sanctions rate and rates of anxiety 
and/or depression is observed in the post-reform period. This is important, since 
this finding is consistent with the expectation that harsher sanctions will have a 
stronger impact on mental health outcomes, but is harder to explain if the 
direction of causality runs solely in the other direction. Given that this limitation 
in terms of causal inference persists, however, the investigation in the next and 
final empirical chapter aims to provide a better estimate of the causal effect of 
sanctions on claimant mental health. This is carried out through the use of a 
difference-in-differences research design, as is explained in Chapter 9.  
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Chapter 9. Difference-in-differences analysis: 
anxiety and/or depression 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the impact of benefit sanctions on mental health 
outcomes in a manner that is distinct to the analyses carried out in Chapters 6 to 
8. The previous chapters considered variations in the frequency and severity of 
sanctions across the period of Coalition government (2010-15). This chapter, in 
contrast, investigates the impact of changes in sanctions policy that occurred at 
the onset of the Coalition government in 2010. It uses individual-level data on 
the self-reported mental health of JSA claimants from the two-quarter 
longitudinal Labour Force Survey (LFS) datasets (ONS, 2018a), as opposed to the 
separate quarterly datasets that were used in Chapter 7 (ONS, 2018c). The 
specific research question that is associated with this stage of the analysis is the 
following:  
[RQ 9.1]: Are harsher sanctioning environments associated with adverse 
impacts on the mental health of JSA claimants?  
To investigate this research question, the analysis makes use of the difference-
in-differences (DiD) method, which was previously described in broad terms in 
Chapter 5. This chapter begins by explaining the DiD method in greater detail, 
outlining how its use of a ‘treatment’ and a ‘control’ group enables it to better 
estimate the causal effects of policy interventions. The analysis carried out in 
this chapter therefore aims to contribute in terms of causal inferences, given 
the limitations in this regard that have been discussed in the previous empirical 
chapters. Next, the chapter outlines the particular changes in sanctions policy 
that occurred at the onset of the Coalition government, justifying why this 
period was selected over other stages of the ‘great sanctions drive’ described in 
Chapter 3. The chapter then outlines the data and statistical approach that will 
be used in the analysis, providing more specific detail to that previously outlined 
in Chapter 5. The results of the analysis are then presented and discussed.  
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9.2 Difference-in-differences research design 
As explained in Chapter 5, DiD analyses attempt to approximate the 
‘consequential manipulation’ that forms the basis of experimental research 
designs, and aim to improve upon the inferences that can be made when relying 
on observational data (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). In the standard two-group and 
two-period design, a ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ group are identified and 
compared before and after a policy intervention occurs that affects the 
treatment group in some way. DiD analyses proceed in two steps. First, 
outcomes for the treatment group are compared before and after the policy 
intervention. In the current context, this involves comparing the self-reported 
mental health of JSA claimants before and after a particular change in sanctions 
policy, which will be described below. The issue with relying on this initial 
difference, however, is that it does not take into account the fact that outcomes 
for the treatment group may have changed over the period, irrespective of the 
policy intervention itself. This issue is dealt with by comparing the average 
change in the outcome for the treatment group with the average change in the 
outcome for a comparable control group that is unaffected by the policy 
intervention. If the common trends assumption is met, in that the two groups 
can be assumed to have followed similar trends in the outcome in the absence of 
the policy intervention, then this comparison identifies the intervention effect 
of the policy change.  
Figure 9.1 portrays a stylised DiD research design, using the policy context that 
forms the basis of the analysis in this chapter. In particular, this involves an 
increase in the harshness of the sanctioning environment at the onset of the 
Coalition government in 2010. As displayed in Figure 9.1, the analysis will 
compare the self-reported mental health of JSA claimants in a less strict 
sanctioning period prior to the onset of the Coalition with those of JSA claimants 
in the later period. This first comparison provides the observed change in the 
outcome for the treatment group that is indicated in Figure 9.1. The DiD 
intervention effect is then arrived at through comparison of this change with the 
change in mental health observed in a comparable control group. Section 9.3 in 
this chapter provides more detail of the specific control group that will be used 
in the analysis itself. The remainder of this section details the policy change that 
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occurred at the onset of the Coalition government in 2010. In many DiD designs, 
the treatment group goes from a state of being fully untreated in the pre-
intervention period to fully treated in the post-intervention period. In this 
context, however, the JSA treatment group moves from a less strict sanctioning 
environment to a harsher sanctioning environment, and as such the current 
investigation can be understood as adopting a “fuzzy difference-in-differences” 
design (de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille, 2018: 999).  
Figure 9.1: difference-in-differences diagram 
 
Source: created by the author 
The move to a harsher sanctioning environment at the onset of the Coalition 
government in May 2010 is constituted by two changes in sanctions policy. First, 
in April 2010, the penalty for JSA claimants for non-attendance at interviews 
with JSA advisers was changed from disentitlement to a fixed length sanction of 
one week for a first ‘failure’ and two weeks for subsequent ‘failures’ (DWP, 
2013b). As previously highlighted in Chapter 3, under the old disentitlement 
rules the claimant’s existing claim was discontinued but they were then able to 
re-claim immediately, leading to very limited benefit loss for the claimant 
(DWP, 2011a). Thus, the change to a fixed sanction period resulted in an 
increased penalty for one of the most common reasons for a sanction being 
imposed. In addition to this change in the sanction rules, furthermore, the 
months following the onset of the Coalition in May 2010 saw an increase in the 
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frequency of benefit sanctions being applied. As Figure 9.2 demonstrates, for 
example, the JSA sanctions rate increased from approximately 3% in May 2010 to 
over 5% in November 2010, having generally been below 3% in the year prior to 
the onset of the Coalition. As previously discussed in Chapter 3, this marks the 
beginning of the ‘great sanctions drive’ observed under the Coalition 
government. Developments at the beginning of this period are described by 
Webster (2016: 2) as representing an “unannounced change of policy” in relation 
to the increase in the frequency of sanctions.  
Figure 9.2: monthly rate of JSA sanctions (per cent of JSA claimants) 
 
Source: author’s calculations using DWP Stat-Xplore data (DWP, 2018c) 
Taken together, the change in sanctioning rules and the increase in the rate of 
sanctions mean that the sanctioning environment in the period following the 
onset of the Coalition government was much harsher than that of the one that 
preceded it. In the process of the analysis, alternative time periods throughout 
the Coalition government were also considered. However, the combined increase 
in the severity and frequency of sanctions that coincided with the onset of the 
Coalition provided the best policy change for an intervention effect to be 
estimated. Following the implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012, for 
example, the severity of sanctions were hugely increased but the sanctions rate 
initially declined (see Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3). These are circumstances that do 
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not provide as clear developments for a DiD analysis as those exploited here. 
Arguably, the sanctioning environment brought about by the onset of the 
Coalition government can be considered to represent an exogenous shock in 
terms of the experience of JSA claiming, in which the severity, threat and 
imposition of sanctions increased. Indeed, because this change in sanctions 
policy was not plausibly driven by changes in the mental health of JSA claimants 
themselves, this period provides a good context for the application of the DiD 
design and its use in supporting causal inferences regarding the impact of 
sanctions on mental health.  
9.3 Data and methods 
9.3.1 Datasets 
In order to carry out the DiD analysis, the investigation makes use of two-quarter 
longitudinal Labour Force Survey (LFS) datasets (ONS, 2018a). As previously 
explained in Chapter 5, the rotational sampling design used in the QLFS means 
that each household is interviewed for five consecutive quarters and the ONS 
produces two- and five-quarter datasets that link information on working age 
survey respondents who respond in consecutive quarters. The analysis makes use 
of the two-quarter datasets given the larger sample size that they provide. Each 
two-quarter dataset contains approximately 35,000 individuals, compared with 
approximately 5,000 individuals in each five-quarter dataset. The result of 
linking the quarterly LFS datasets introduces the risk of two main biases: first, 
sample attrition will occur as a result of non-response; and second, response 
errors will produce spurious flows between different states of economic activity. 
The first of these biases will be mainly problematic where there is differential 
attrition, in which particular groups of individuals are more likely than other 
groups to drop out of the survey from one quarter to the next. To deal with such 
differential non-response bias, the ONS produce longitudinal weights that are 
applied in the analysis carried out here. The risk of spurious flows between 
quarters, furthermore, is minimised by the way in which the two-quarter 
datasets are ultimately used in the analysis, as explained below.  
Preferably, DiD analyses should use longitudinal data on the same individuals in 
the pre- and post-intervention time periods, as this helps minimise the influence 
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of compositional bias. Repeated cross-sectional designs are also common, 
however, that analyse data on different individuals in each time period. Such 
designs make the additional assumption that individuals in the period-one cross-
section are comparable to those in the period-two cross-section for both the 
treatment and control groups respectively. As a result of the timings of the 
sanctions policy change described above, and in conjunction with sample size 
concerns relating to the size of the JSA claimant group captured within the LFS, 
a cross-sectional DiD design forms the basis of the analysis in this chapter. A 
longitudinal element, nevertheless, is introduced by combining two different 
two-quarter LFS datasets from the pre- and post-intervention periods, which 
make it possible to observe and compare the change in mental health for JSA 
claimants from one quarter to the next. Consequently, the analysis is able to 
investigate the intervention effect that is associated with being a JSA claimant 
at a point during the harsher sanctioning environment, and to do so in terms of 
how that experience impacts the mental health of those JSA claimants into the 
following quarter.  
The findings in this chapter therefore differ from the results in the previous 
empirical chapters, in that they are able to capture lagged – as opposed to 
contemporaneous – sanction impacts. The findings in the previous chapters were 
primarily based on quarterly variation in sanction rates at the local authority-
level, the effects of which were captured by quarterly variation in mental health 
outcomes in the corresponding quarters. They therefore focused on the impact 
of sanctions in terms of levels of mental health outcomes. This chapter, in 
contrast, brings an additional element to the analysis, as it considers the impact 
of sanctions on changes in mental health. The research design does not 
therefore rely on there being a contemporaneous impact on mental health for 
those claiming JSA in the harsher sanctioning environment. Rather, it assumes 
that claiming JSA in this period may have an impact into the next quarter. As the 
next sub-section details, this allows the analysis to focus solely on those JSA 
claimants who initially did not report suffering from anxiety and/or depression, 
which helps deal with the influence of pre-existing mental health problems. 
Future research, of course, could conduct a similar DiD analysis to the one 
carried out here, but instead focus on levels of anxiety and/or depression using 
the QLFS as opposed to the longitudinal LFS datasets used in this chapter.  
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Table 9.1 details the specific two-quarter longitudinal LFS datasets that are 
combined as part of the analysis. The selection of these particular datasets is 
informed by a number of considerations. First, the dataset in the post-
intervention period is selected to coincide with the exogenous shock provided by 
the harsher sanctioning environment (Dataset 2). Dataset 2 starts with the 
October-December 2010 quarter as opposed to the July-September 2010 quarter 
in order to most clearly capture the influence of this shock. Second, the pre-
Coalition Dataset 1 is exactly a year before Dataset 2, which is necessary in 
order to avoid introducing biases relating to seasonality. Last, it is important to 
highlight that the claimant rate was level across the two time periods selected 
(NAO, 2016a). This means that the two different groups of JSA claimants that 
form the treatment group are likely to share a similar distribution of 
characteristics, which minimises the influence of compositional bias on the 
results that are ultimately obtained.  
Table 9.1: two-quarter longitudinal LFS datasets used in the difference-in-differences analysis 
 Quarter 1 Quarter 2 
Dataset 1: Pre-intervention 
(less strict sanctioning) 
October-December 2009 January-March 2010 
Dataset 2: Post-intervention 
(harsher sanctioning) 
October-December 2010 January-March 2011 
Figure 9.3 provides a graphical depiction of how these datasets align with 
changes in sanctions policy as previously shown in Figure 9.2. Having identified 
the specific two-quarter longitudinal LFS datasets that are used within the 
investigation in this chapter, the remainder of this section goes on to explain 
other important aspects of the DiD analysis, including: how mental health is 
measured and operationalised; the construction of the treatment and control 
groups; and the statistical models that are ultimately estimated.  
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Figure 9.3: two-quarter longitudinal LFS datasets used in the difference-in-differences analysis 
 
Source: created by the author 
9.3.2 Dependent variable and falsification variable 
Similar to the analysis in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, the mental health status of 
respondents is identified using a self-reported measure, in which LFS survey 
respondents are first asked whether or not they suffer from ‘health problems’. 
They can then identify as suffering from ‘depression, bad nerves or anxiety’ 
from a pre-specified list (see Box 5.1 in Chapter 5), which is referred to 
throughout this chapter as anxiety and/or depression. As previously indicated, 
the analysis is specifically concerned with changes in the mental health status of 
JSA claimants from one quarter to the next before and during the harsher 
sanctioning environment. In order to consider changes in mental health, two 
new indicators were initially investigated as part of the analysis. This is 
necessitated by the fact that the measure of anxiety and/or depression provides 
a binary indication of an individual’s mental health status. The first measure of 
change can be described in terms of ‘worsening’ mental health. This measure is 
coded ‘1’ if an individual did not report as suffering from anxiety and/or 
depression in the first quarter but did report as suffering from anxiety and/or 
depression in the second quarter. Conversely, it is coded ‘0’ if an individual did 
not report as suffering from anxiety and/or depression in either quarter. This 
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measure is summarised in Table 9.2 and is used to investigate whether or not the 
experience of claiming JSA in the harsher sanctioning period is associated with 
an increased prevalence of newly experiencing anxiety and/or depression.  
Table 9.2: construction of ‘worsening’ mental health variable  
Anxiety and/or depression 
(Q1) 
Anxiety and/or depression 
(Q2) 
‘Worsening’ mental health 
variable 
No No 0 
No Yes 1 
Similarly, the second outcome variable considered can be described as an 
‘improving’ mental health variable. As summarised in Table 9.3, this measure is 
coded ‘1’ if an individual suffered from anxiety and/or depression in the first 
quarter but did not in the second quarter, and is coded ‘0’ if they suffered from 
anxiety and/or depression in both quarters. This measure is used to investigate 
whether or not the experience of claiming JSA in the harsher sanctioning period 
is associated with a reduced prevalence of improvements in mental health, from 
suffering to not suffering from anxiety and/or depression.  
Table 9.3: construction of ‘improving’ mental health variable 
Anxiety and/or depression 
(Q1) 
Anxiety and/or depression 
(Q2) 
‘Improving’ mental health 
variable 
Yes Yes 0 
Yes No 1 
Initially, both the ‘worsening’ and ‘improving’ measures of change in mental 
health status were considered as part of the analysis. Unfortunately, however, 
there are very few instances of improvements in mental health observed for JSA 
claimants in the sample, which does not provide a sufficient number of 
observations to carry out a robust DiD analysis. The sample sizes for the JSA 
treatment group are displayed in Table 9.4, which displays the number of 
observations for the ‘worsening’ and ‘improving’ measures in both the pre- and 
post-intervention periods. With regard to the ‘improving’ measure, for example, 
there are only 40 JSA claimants present in the harsher sanctioning environment, 
35 of which suffered from anxiety and/or depression in both Q1 (October-
December 2010) and Q2 (January-March 2011) and 5 of which saw their mental 
health improve between the quarters. The sample size available for the 
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‘worsening’ measure, in contrast, is substantially higher, and as a result this is 
the dependent variable that forms the basis of the analysis conducted 
throughout this chapter.  
Table 9.4: sample size for ‘worsening’ and ‘improving’ mental health variables, JSA claimants 
 ‘Worsening’ mental health ‘Improving’ mental health 
 Maintained Worsened Maintained Improved 
Pre-intervention (less 
strict sanctioning) 
909 13 32 6 
Post-intervention 
(harsher sanctioning) 
786 25 35 5 
Note: table reports unweighted sample Ns 
The sample size available for the ‘worsening’ mental health measure is larger 
than that of the ‘improving’ variable, though Table 9.4 indicates that only a 
small proportion of JSA claimants report that their mental health status worsens 
from one quarter to the next. In terms of the ‘worsening’ measure, there are 
811 JSA claimants present in the harsher sanctioning environment, 25 of which 
report that they suffer from anxiety and/or depression in Q2 having not suffered 
from it in Q1 (approximately 3% of the sample). This issue re-emphasises 
limitations previously discussed in Chapter 5, where it was noted that the 
available measure provides only a binary account of mental health. 
Consequently, anxiety and/or depression is treated as a category as opposed to a 
continuum, meaning that if an individual’s mental health does worsen between 
the quarters this will only be captured if they record it in the terms specified in 
the QLFS questionnaire. This issue is compounded by the fact respondents are 
asked whether or not they expect their health problem to last more than a year. 
This further reduces the likelihood that an individual’s mental health will be 
observed to worsen from one quarter to the next even where such a 
deterioration does in fact take place. Together, these limitations increase the 
likelihood that the DiD analysis will observe no intervention effect on mental 
health, even where such an impact may in fact exist.  
In a robustness check on the main results of the analysis, a falsification test is 
carried out that uses the non-equivalent dependent variable approach. Similar to 
the analysis in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, responses in terms of people suffering 
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with ‘Heart, blood pressure or blood circulation problems’ (henceforth 
‘cardiovascular problems’) are used as a falsification variable. This is 
constructed in a similar fashion to the ‘worsening’ mental health measure as 
detailed in Table 9.2. In addition to a falsification test, the analysis carries out a 
placebo test. As previously explained in Chapter 5, this involves repeating the 
results of the main analysis in a period that is not marked by any significant 
changes in sanctions policy. By choosing a time period that was relatively stable 
in terms of sanctions policy, the results of the main analysis are supported if the 
placebo DiD analysis does not find evidence of an intervention effect. The 
placebo test provides a better check than the falsification test in the current 
context, since the latter may always be open to the concern that it is based on a 
poor choice of non-equivalent dependent variable. In the analysis carried out 
here, a period is selected in which the JSA claimant count was stable and in 
which there were no changes in either the severity or frequency of sanctions, 
ultimately leading to the use of two-quarter LFS datasets prior to the 2007-08 
financial crisis and recession. The exact details of the datasets used as part of 
the placebo test are detailed in the appendix for Chapter 9 (Section A9.5).  
9.3.3 Treatment and control groups 
As previously indicated, the analysis in this chapter carries out a cross-sectional 
version of the DiD design in which the treatment and control groups are formed 
of different individuals in the pre- and post-intervention periods. First, the 
treatment group is formed of JSA claimants in Quarter 1 for each dataset 
detailed in Table 9.1. These are a group of individuals who are claiming JSA in 
October-December 2009 and a different set of individuals who are claiming JSA 
in October-December 2010. These are the JSA claimants that form the sample 
detailed in Table 9.4. In terms of the ‘worsening’ mental health measure, for 
example, there are 922 JSA claimants in the pre-intervention period and 811 JSA 
claimants in the post-intervention period. For each group, no restrictions are 
placed on their economic status in the following Quarter 2 when their mental 
health status is measured again. This decision is taken to capture the 
expectation that the experience of claiming JSA in the harsher sanctioning 
environment will impact an individual’s mental health, and will do so 
irrespective of that individuals’ circumstances in the next quarter. In addition, 
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however, this construction has additional advantages in terms of sample size, as 
well as in helping to deal with the second source of bias that affect the two-
quarter longitudinal LFS datasets. As previously described, potential response 
errors may lead to erroneous flows between different states of economic 
activity, which are not dealt with through the use of longitudinal weights.  
A crucial component in a DiD analysis is an appropriate control group. In order to 
take into account the role of time trends, the treatment and control groups 
must be expected to follow a common trend in mental health outcomes in the 
absence of the policy change. If this condition is not met, the DiD estimator will 
be biased and will not accurately estimate the causal impact of the policy 
intervention. The remainder of this sub-section details the process of identifying 
a suitable control group for the DiD analysis. As highlighted in Chapter 4, 
elsewhere in the sanctions literature Machin and Marie (2006) use a DiD design to 
investigate impacts on crime. Their study benefits from the fact that claimants 
in particular pre-JSA duration categories were more affected by the introduction 
of JSA than others, which provided the variation that enabled areas to be split 
into treatment and control groups depending on their exposure to the policy 
change. Such geographical variation, however, is not present in the current 
context. In the process of the investigation, geographical variation in rates of 
JSA sanctions in the pre- and post-May 2010 periods was initially investigated. 
However, whilst some geographical variation was observed, rates of JSA 
sanctions increased in all areas following the onset of the Coalition, consistent 
with the view that the change in sanctions policy was an exogenous and 
centrally-determined decision. Indeed, the April 2010 rule change regarding the 
penalty for non-attendance at an advisory interview applied nationally, further 
limiting the scope for a DiD analysis based on geographical variation.  
In light of this, a variety of control groups are considered throughout the 
analysis, which will be explained in turn here. The first option considered is JSA 
claimants in Northern Ireland. Importantly, the ‘great sanctions drive’ described 
in Chapter 3 relates to sanctions policy in Britain specifically. In Northern 
Ireland, the frequency of sanctions was much lower than in the rest of the UK 
and did not see any dramatic variations throughout the period, whilst changes in 
the severity of sanctions were less harsh and applied at a later date (Webster, 
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2018). The same applies in the context considered in this chapter, given that the 
April 2010 changes that were introduced in Britain were only implemented in 
Northern Ireland in March 2012 (HM Government, 2012b). Whilst JSA claimants in 
Northern Ireland provide a plausible control group for JSA claimants in the rest 
of the UK, their use in the current context is limited by their low number of 
observations in the datasets used in the analysis. Specifically, there are 54 and 
58 JSA claimants in Northern Ireland in the pre- and post-intervention samples 
respectively. Additional concerns relate to their geographic separation from JSA 
claimants in the rest of the UK and wider differences in policy context. Whilst 
JSA claimants in Northern Ireland are retained in the analysis, these issues 
motivate the identification of alternative control groups.  
Several additional control groups are considered in the form of non-JSA claimant 
groups that are identifiable within the two-quarter LFS datasets, which include: 
Income Support (IS) claimants; Incapacity-related Benefit (IB) claimants; 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) claimants; Working Tax Credit (WTC) 
claimants; and unemployed non-claimants of JSA. For the purposes of the 
analysis, the group of IS claimants are restricted to the main lone parent group, 
whilst the IB group are formed of the three benefits that were replaced by ESA: 
Incapacity Benefit claimants; Severe Disablement Allowance; and Income 
Support paid because of an illness or disability. Each control group is constructed 
in a similar way to that described for the JSA treatment group, as detailed 
above. Admittedly, none of these potential control groups provide an ideal 
counterfactual for the JSA treatment group, since it can be argued that each 
might tend to differ systematically from JSA claimants in terms of particular 
observed and unobserved characteristics. This issue, unfortunately, represents 
an unavoidable limitation on the DiD analysis that is carried out in this chapter. 
Additional investigation, however, is carried out in order to limit the overall 
influence of this issue on the results obtained.  
First, the suitability of each control group is considered by checking whether or 
not their circumstances remained the same in the pre- and post-intervention 
periods. Like JSA claimants, several of the control groups considered are subject 
to work-related behavioural conditionality, as discussed in Chapter 3. It is 
important to ensure that there were no significant policy changes for these 
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groups over the period, as this helps strengthen the claim that any estimated 
intervention effect can be plausibly linked to the harsher sanctioning 
environment. Table 9.5 summarises relevant developments for each group. It 
indicates that – out of the various options considered in addition to JSA 
claimants in Northern Ireland – the best control groups available are the Working 
Tax Credit (WTC) group and the unemployed non-claimants of JSA group. This is 
because both of these groups were not affected by any important policy changes 
during the period. IS, IB and ESA claimants, on the other hand, were subject to a 
number of reforms that serve to weaken their usefulness as control groups. 
Indeed, the validity of comparing JSA claimants to claimants of lone parent 
benefits or sickness and disability benefits might itself be questioned, and so 
these groups are ultimately not used in the investigation. With regard to the 
remaining WTC and unemployed non-JSA claimant control groups, furthermore, 
it is useful to consider what similarities and differences these groups have with 
the JSA treatment group in order to assess their suitability, which will be 
considered in turn here.  
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Table 9.5: relevant developments for possible control groups, October 2009 – March 2011 
Control group Policy developments 
JSA claimants (NI) 
Sanctions policy did not change during the period of 
analysis.  
WTC claimants 
No changes occurred during the period of analysis. Key 
alterations to WTC rates, thresholds and tapers began 
in April 2011 (Hood and Phillips, 2015).  
Unemployed  
(non-JSA claimants) 
As non-claimants, there are no particular changes that 
affected this group during the period of analysis, 
whilst the ILO unemployment rate remained broadly 
level (Phillips, 2017).  
IS claimants 
In October 2009, eligibility for IS was changed, ending 
for lone parents with a youngest child aged 10 from 
the previous limit of 12 years old. This was further 
reduced to a youngest child aged seven in October 
2010 (CPAG, 2016).  
IB claimants 
Work Capability Assessments for existing IB claimants 
began in October 2010, with a trial in Aberdeen and 
Burnley (McInnes, 2012). This was followed by a full 
national rollout in April 2011, which is beyond the 
period of analysis.  
Garthwaite et al. (2014: 311) describe a “period of 
substantial change” for IB claimants that takes place 
during the period of analysis.  
ESA claimants 
Work Capability Assessments for ESA began at its 
creation in October 2008. Rates of initial assessments, 
as well as results of the assessments (support group 
versus work-related activity group) remained very 
similar across the period of analysis (DWP, 2011b).  
The only sanctions for ESA claimants – for failure to 
attend a mandatory interview – were falling rapidly at 
the onset of the Coalition, and began rising again as a 
result of the new ‘non-participation in work related 
activity’ sanction introduced at the onset of the Work 
Programme in June 2011 (Webster, 2016).  
Working tax credits are available for individuals on low incomes who are working 
at least 16 hours a week, whilst JSA is available for the unemployed or those 
working less than 16 hours a week. Given the differences that might be expected 
in the circumstances of these two groups, however, an additional comparison 
group of the self-employed WTC claimants is included in the analysis, which 
arguably serves as a better control group than the WTC group as a whole. 
Following the 2007-08 recession, the UK experienced a dramatic rise in the 
numbers of recorded self-employment and it has been argued that many of the 
newly self-employed can be considered to represent a hidden form of 
unemployment, in the sense that they registered as such because they could not 
194 
 
 
find employment and/or wanted to avoid claiming the more onerous JSA benefit 
(Hatfield, 2015). Indeed, this process has been described by Jordan (2018: 597) 
in terms of “zero-work self-employment”, who notes that in these circumstances 
JSA claimants and self-employed WTC claimants will receive benefits of a similar 
value. Admittedly, robust empirical evidence on this phenomenon is lacking, 
though D’Arcy and Gardiner (2014) estimate that this effect accounts for up to a 
quarter (24%) of the growth in self-employment following the recession. With 
this in mind, the analysis constructs a control group of self-employed WTC 
claimants, which provides a means of identifying this ‘hidden unemployed’ group 
and thus potentially providing a stronger comparison group than WTC claimants 
as a whole.  
With regard to unemployed non-claimants of JSA, these represent unemployed 
individuals who – for a variety of reasons – are not themselves claiming JSA. 
There are several technical differences between ILO unemployment and the 
claimant count, though the gap between the two measures began growing in the 
1990s, arguably driven by the introduction of JSA and the associated increase in 
work-related behavioural conditionality (Phillips, 2017). By 2010, overall 
unemployment was two-thirds higher than the claimant count, and as the gap 
has grown the age and gender differences between the two groups have 
narrowed (Clancy and Stam, 2010). Whilst this latter development is a useful one 
in the context of the current analysis, it of course remains the case that the two 
groups might differ in important respects. Unemployed non-JSA claimants, for 
example, are likely to enjoy a slightly better access to financial resources than 
JSA claimants, due to savings or support from friends and family, with such 
access meaning that they are either ineligible for JSA or don’t require financial 
support from the state. The possibility exists, furthermore, that some individuals 
in the unemployed non-JSA claimant group may have been subjected to 
sanctions themselves and stopped claiming JSA as a result, which weakens their 
validity as a control group. Whilst these limitations are recognised, the 
unemployed non-JSA claimant group is nonetheless retained in the analysis, and 
serves as a useful sensitivity check on the results for the other control groups 
investigated.  
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To consider this issue further, Figure 9.4 displays the trend in the proportion of 
individuals who experienced ‘worsening’ mental health in the period prior to the 
onset of the Coalition, using Dataset 1 (October 2009 – March 2010) and the 
previous two-quarter longitudinal LFS dataset (July 2009 – December 2009). With 
DiD analyses, the control group functions as a counterfactual for the treatment 
group. As such, the common trends assumption is not itself directly observable 
or verifiable. It is useful, however, to consider whether or not the treatment and 
control group(s) follow similar trends in the pre-intervention period. If they do, 
this helps support the claim that the two groups would have followed parallel 
trends in the post-intervention period. As shown in Figure 9.4, the proportion of 
JSA claimants reporting worsening mental health is broadly consistent in the pre-
intervention period, rising only very slightly between the two datasets used. 
With regard to the possible control groups, trends for JSA claimants in Northern 
Ireland, WTC claimants and self-employed WTC claimants are not perfectly 
parallel with the JSA treatment group, though do not appear to diverge 
dramatically from the common trends assumption. The same does not pertain, 
however, for unemployed non-JSA claimants. This group saw an increase in the 
proportion reporting worsening mental health far greater than that observed for 
the JSA treatment group. This divergence further weakens the validity of the 
unemployed non-JSA claimant group as a control group in the analysis.  
Figure 9.4: trend in proportions reporting ‘worsening’ mental health, treatment and control groups 
 
Note: sample proportions use longitudinal weights 
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Lastly, a robustness test on the main investigation is carried out that seeks to 
limit the influence of differences between the treatment and control groups 
through the use of a matching technique. As explained in Chapter 5, this method 
aims to reduce bias by estimating the intervention effect using treatment and 
control groups that are as similar as possible in terms of observed 
characteristics. Three broad types of matching methods have been developed, 
referred to as exact, Mahalanobis and propensity score matching (Stuart, 2010). 
As Stuart (2010) details, exact matching is viewed as the ideal form in that the 
method involves one-to-one matching of individuals from both groups. 
Inevitably, requiring one-to-one matches means that very few individuals will 
ultimately be matched, leading to larger biases than if inexact matching were 
carried out. Coarsened exact matching (CEM) has been developed to overcome 
this limitation, which involves temporarily coarsening data through re-coding 
continuous variables as categorical variables and balancing the sample on that 
basis (Iacus et al., 2012). This method increases the number of matched 
individuals whilst overcoming recognised limitations to the Mahalanobis and 
propensity score methods, which cannot guarantee improvements in balance 
(Iacus et al., 2011). In the analysis, the CEM method is implemented using the 
‘cem’ Stata command developed by Blackwell et al. (2009).  
9.3.4 Statistical approach 
As previously outlined, the DiD analysis carried out in this chapter investigates 
the intervention effect that is associated with the harsher sanctioning 
environment at the onset of the Coalition government in 2010. In particular, the 
analysis investigates whether or not the experience of claiming JSA in the 
harsher sanctioning period is associated with an increased prevalence of newly 
experiencing anxiety and/or depression. As described throughout this section, 
this involves comparing the change in the self-reported mental health of JSA 
claimants before and after important developments in sanctions policy, and 
comparing this difference to similar changes observed for a comparable control 
group. This intervention effect is shown in Equation 9.1:  
ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎݒ݁݊ݐ݅݋݊ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ ൌ൫οܣ݊ݔ݅݁ݐݕ௉௢௦௧ǡ௃ௌ஺ െ οܣ݊ݔ݅݁ݐݕ௉௥௘ǡ௃ௌ஺൯ െሺοܣ݊ݔ݅݁ݐݕ௉௢௦௧ǡ஼௢௡௧௥௢௟ െ οܣ݊ݔ݅݁ݐݕ௉௥௘ǡ஼௢௡௧௥௢௟ሻ               (9.1) 
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In order to estimate the intervention effect specified in Equation 9.1, the 
analysis carries out a DiD regression model as shown in Equation 9.2:  
οܣ݊ݔ݅݁ݐݕ௜ǡ௧ ൌߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ ൅ ߚଶܲ݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߚଷሺܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ כ ܲ݋ݏݐ௧ሻ ൅ ߚԢ ௜ܺǡ௧ ൅ߝ௜ǡ௧      (9.2) 
In Equation 9.2, i denotes the individual and t denotes the quarters in the pre- 
and post-intervention time periods. ∆Anxiety is a measure of ‘worsening’ mental 
health that is constructed as detailed in Table 9.2. Treat is a dummy variable 
that is equal to ‘1’ for JSA claimants in Q1 in the pre- and post-intervention time 
periods and ‘0’ for the control group. Post is a dummy variable that is equal to 
‘1’ if the individual is from the post-treatment period, and ‘0’ if they are from 
the pre-treatment period. By interacting Treat and Post it is possible to estimate 
β3, which is the DiD estimate of the intervention effect described in Equation 
9.1. This is the main coefficient of interest in the models that are estimated in 
this chapter. X represents a vector of additional explanatory variables. The 
analysis considers both a basic version of the DiD analysis without additional 
explanatory variables, as well as a regression model with additional explanatory 
variables included. These variables are similar to those used in Chapter 8, and 
include: gender; age; ethnicity; education; disability; marital status; dependent 
children; socio-economic status; and region of residence. In contrast to Chapter 
8, marital status is used as opposed to relationship status in this chapter, which 
is due to variable availability in the two-quarter longitudinal LFS datasets.  
Similar to the analysis in Chapter 8, furthermore, linear probability models are 
estimated despite the fact that the investigation is based on a binary measure of 
anxiety and/or depression. As previously explained, linear models are estimated 
in order to overcome the limitations of logistic regression models as identified 
by Mood (2010). Indeed, this response is carried out in other DiD analyses in the 
literature (see, for example, Reeves et al., 2016). In the current context, the 
use of linear models are not particularly affected by the risk of under- or over-
prediction, given that the main coefficient of interest – the β3 intervention 
effect – is a dummy term that is bounded between zero and one. Logistic 
regression models, nevertheless, are estimated as part of sensitivity analyses.  
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9.4 Results 
9.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 9.6 details the summary statistics for the measure of ‘worsening’ mental 
health that is used throughout the analysis. Table A9.1 in the appendix for 
Chapter 9 (Section A9.1) details the summary statistics for the additional 
explanatory variables included in the extended DiD models. As shown in Table 
9.6, 13 of the 922 JSA claimants in the pre-intervention period experienced a 
worsening in their mental health, which is approximately 1% of the sample. In 
the post-intervention period, in contrast, approximately 3% of JSA claimants 
experienced a worsening in their mental health (25/811). This very basic 
‘before’ and ‘after’ comparison, therefore, provides an initial indication that 
the harsher sanctioning environment might be associated with an increase in JSA 
claimants newly experiencing anxiety and/or depression, which will be further 
investigated in the DiD analysis. In terms of the various control groups that are 
considered, clearly the group of JSA claimants in Northern Ireland is limited by 
the small sample size that is available for the analysis, though the remaining 
control groups benefit from larger sample sizes. Table A9.1 in the appendix for 
Chapter 9, furthermore, indicates that the treatment and control groups are not 
identical in terms of the distribution of the characteristics captured by the 
explanatory variables, motivating the inclusion of the explanatory variables as 
well as the matching DiD analysis that will be carried out.  
Table 9.6: summary of ‘worsening’ mental health for JSA treatment and comparison groups 
 
Pre-intervention (less strict 
sanctioning) 
Post-intervention (harsher 
sanctioning) 
 Maintained Worsened Maintained Worsened 
Treatment group:     
JSA claimants 909 13 786 25 
Control groups:     
JSA claimants (NI) 54 0 58 0 
WTC claimants 4,229 43 3,421 23 
Self-employed WTC 
claimants 
528 5 450 2 
Unemployed  
(non-JSA claimants) 
1,063 27 904 6 
Note: table reports unweighted sample Ns 
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9.4.2 Difference-in-differences regression models 
Table 9.7 details the results of the initial DiD analysis, reporting estimates for 
the separate control groups in models with and without additional explanatory 
variables included. In particular, Table 9.7 reports the estimated intervention 
effect for each model, which is β3 in Equation 9.2. As previously highlighted, the 
intervention effect in this context is understood as the impact on the mental 
health of JSA claimants that is associated with claiming during the harsher 
sanctioning environment that followed the onset of the Coalition government. 
An estimated positive coefficient, for example, indicates that the harsher 
sanctioning environment is associated with an increase in the prevalence of JSA 
claimants newly experiencing anxiety and/or depression. Whilst Table 9.7 
reports only the estimated intervention effect from the separate models, Table 
A9.2 in the appendix for Chapter 9 (Section A9.2) details the full regression 
results for each control group, based on the models that include additional 
explanatory variables (Models 9.2).  
Importantly, across the separate models summarised in Table 9.7, the DiD 
analysis finds a positive and statistically significant intervention effect. First, in 
the basic models that do not include covariates (Models 9.1), the estimated 
intervention effect ranges from an increase of 1.4 to 3.3 percentage points, 
depending on the control group that is used. Using JSA claimants in Northern 
Ireland, for example, the estimated intervention effect is an increase of 1.4 
percentage points. Although this effect is not significant at the 5% level, it is 
close to it (p = 0.067). Indeed, with covariates included (Models 9.2), the 
intervention effect using this control group becomes significant at the 5% level. 
When comparing across Models 9.1 and Models 9.2, there is a high degree of 
consistency in the size of the estimated coefficients for each control group. The 
latter set of models estimate an intervention effect that ranges from an increase 
of 1.7 to 3.3 percentage points, all of which are significant at the 5% level. In 
Models 9.2, furthermore, the estimated coefficients are similar across the 
control groups of JSA claimants in Northern Ireland, WTC claimants and self-
employed WTC claimants. For the control group of unemployed non-JSA 
claimants, however, the estimate is higher, at an increase of 3.3 percentages 
points (p < 0.001). As indicated in Section 9.3, there are issues with this control 
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group in terms of differences in circumstances with the JSA treatment group, as 
well as very dissimilar pre-intervention trends in mental health. Such issues may 
be contributing to the larger estimated intervention effect, which puts the 
finding into question.  
Table 9.7: estimated intervention effect on the self-reported mental health of JSA claimants 
Control Group 
Model(s) 9.1: 
No covariates 
Model(s) 9.2: 
Covariates 
JSA claimants (NI) 
0.014 
(0.007) 
0.017* 
(0.009) 
WTC claimants 
0.017* 
(0.008) 
0.017* 
(0.008) 
Self-employed WTC 
claimants 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.019* 
(0.009) 
Unemployed (non-JSA 
claimants) 
0.033*** 
(0.010) 
0.033*** 
(0.010) 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Covariates: gender; age; ethnicity; qualification level; 
disability; marital status; dependent children; socio-economic status and region of residence. * p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The intervention effects that are estimated across the separate control groups 
considered in Models 9.2 are displayed in Figure 9.5.  
Figure 9.5: estimated intervention effect on the self-reported mental health of JSA claimants 
 
Note: Point estimates are derived from Models 9.2 in Table 9.7 
Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
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9.4.3 Robustness tests 
As a robustness check on the results in Table 9.7, the models are re-estimated 
using the coarsened exact matching (CEM) method, which was previously 
described in Section 9.3. The treatment and control groups are matched using 
all the additional explanatory variables previously described. In the case of JSA 
claimants in Northern Ireland, however, region of residence is not used for 
obvious reasons. For the self-employed WTC claimant group, furthermore, socio-
economic status is not used given that this group overwhelmingly responds 
according to their self-employed status (‘Small employers and own account 
workers’), leading to very few matches when this variable is used. The results 
for the CEM differences-in-differences analysis are displayed in Table 9.8, which 
reports similar findings to those previously detailed in Table 9.7. Importantly, 
the coefficients are very similar in terms of both the direction of the 
intervention effect as well as the scale. For the control group of JSA claimants in 
Northern Ireland, however, the estimated intervention effect – an increase of 
1.7 percentage points – is non-significant at the 5% level. Arguably, this finding is 
not surprising given the already low sample size for this control group in the 
absence of matching. The coefficient for the control group of self-employed 
WTC claimants, furthermore, is no longer statistically significant at the 5% level, 
though is statistically significant at the 10% level (p = 0.095).  
Table 9.8: estimated intervention effect on the self-reported mental health of JSA claimants 
Comparison Group 
Model(s) 9.3: 
Matching 
JSA claimants (NI) 
0.017 
(0.028) 
WTC claimants 
0.014* 
(0.006) 
Self-employed WTC 
claimants 
0.017 
(0.010) 
Unemployed (non-JSA 
claimants) 
0.037*** 
(0.010) 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The intervention effects that are estimated across the separate control groups in 
Models 9.3 are displayed in Figure 9.6. Arguably, the similarity of the results 
across Models 9.3 and Models 9.2 is unsurprising, given that the addition of 
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explanatory variables in Models 9.2 saw little change from the basic DiD analysis 
in Models 9.1. Indeed, as an additional sensitivity check, the results across these 
models are re-run using logistic regression. Consistency is again observed, 
though results for the self-employed WTC claimant group are non-significant at 
the 5% level (see Table A9.3 in the appendix for Chapter 9 (Section A9.3)). These 
similarities suggest that observed differences between the treatment and 
control groups are not driving the results obtained. Arguably, therefore, the 
intervention effects observed across the models discussed are caused by the 
harsher sanctioning environment itself, omitted variables bias, or some 
combination of the two. As previously indicated, the balance of factors will 
depend on the control group that is considered, given the concerns highlighted 
in relation to the unemployed non-JSA claimant group.  
Figure 9.6: estimated intervention effect on the self-reported mental health of JSA claimants, 
matching models 
 
Note: Point estimates are derived from Models 9.3 in Table 9.8 
Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
As an additional robustness check, a falsification test is carried out that uses 
cardiovascular problems as the non-equivalent dependent variable, as previously 
explained. The results of the falsification test are detailed in Table A9.5 in the 
appendix for Chapter 9 (Section A9.4). Across the various control groups and DiD 
models in Table A9.5, no statistically significant intervention effect is observed, 
203 
 
 
whilst the direction of the effects is negative and/or close to zero. These results 
strengthen the claim that the harsher sanctioning environment is a key factor in 
explaining the findings previously discussed, as opposed to some unaccounted for 
confounding factor. Figure 9.7 displays the results of the falsification test. It 
depicts the intervention effects that are estimated across the separate control 
groups, based on the DiD models that have covariates included.  
Figure 9.7: estimated intervention effect on the self-reported cardiovascular health of JSA 
claimants 
 
Note: Point estimates are derived from Models A9.9 in Table A9.5 
Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
In a final robustness check, a placebo test is carried out, the precise details of 
which were previously explained in Section 9.3. Briefly, the placebo test re-runs 
the analysis in a period of relative stability in sanctions policy prior to 2007, at 
which point an intervention effect would not be expected to be observed. The 
results of the placebo test are detailed in Table A9.8 in the appendix for Chapter 
9 (Section A9.5). Given variable availability within the QLFS, it is only possible to 
identify two control groups in this period: JSA claimants in Northern Ireland; and 
unemployed non-JSA claimants. For both control groups and across the various 
DiD models, no statistically significant intervention effect is observed. The 
direction and size of the effects is also negative and/or very close to zero. This 
is depicted in Figure 9.8, which displays the results of the DiD models that have 
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covariates included. The results strengthen the claim that the harsher 
sanctioning environment is a key factor in explaining the findings of the main 
analysis.  
Figure 9.8: estimated intervention effect on the self-reported mental health of JSA claimants, 
placebo test 
 
Note: Point estimates are derived from Models A9.12 in Table A9.8 
Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
9.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has carried out a difference-in-differences analysis, with the aim of 
considering the impact of the harsher sanctioning environment that was brought 
about at the onset of the Coalition government in 2010. Changes in sanctions 
policy at that time saw harsher penalties introduced for non-attendance at 
advisory interviews, as well as an increase in the rate of sanctions actually 
imposed. Importantly, the findings presented in this chapter suggest that the 
harsher sanctioning environment is associated with adverse impacts on the 
mental health of JSA claimants. DiD estimates using a variety of control groups 
estimate a small but positive and statistically significant intervention effect. 
Based on the most reliable control groups, the harsher sanctioning environment 
is associated with an increase of approximately 1 to 2 percentage points in the 
prevalence of JSA claimants newly experiencing anxiety and/or depression. 
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These results are relatively consistent across DiD models with and without 
additional explanatory variables included, as well as in matching models. 
Indeed, they are further supported by both a falsification test and a placebo 
test. As expected, an intervention effect is not observed when using a non-
equivalent dependent variable and when repeating the analysis during a 
relatively stable period in sanctions policy. The results of the main DiD analysis 
are observed, furthermore, despite the reliance on a dependent variable that is 
limited in its ability to capture variations in mental health.  
As highlighted throughout this chapter, the analysis is subject to certain 
limitations that imply that caution is necessary in terms of interpreting the 
estimated intervention effect solely in causal terms. A key issue relates to the 
availability of a suitable control group, which is central to the validity of any DiD 
analysis. Ultimately, four different control groups are used throughout the 
various models that are estimated. The suitability of each group was 
investigated to ensure that they were not affected by policy changes of their 
own between the pre- and post-intervention periods. In addition, a comparison 
was made of the trend in proportions reporting worsening mental health for each 
group in the pre-Coalition period. This comparison can provide some 
reassurance, albeit not definitive, regarding the plausibility of the common 
trends assumption. As highlighted throughout the analysis, there are issues with 
regard to the unemployed non-JSA claimants control group, both in terms of 
differences in circumstances with the treatment group and diverging pre-
intervention trends in mental health. Indeed, when using this control group, the 
estimated intervention effect is consistently over double that compared with the 
other control groups. This implies that the results when using this group should 
be treated as an overestimate of the intervention effect, given the issues 
highlighted.  
Three additional control groups are considered in the analysis: JSA claimants in 
Northern Ireland; WTC claimants; and self-employed WTC claimants. Unlike the 
group of unemployed non-JSA claimants, these control groups had similar pre-
Coalition trends in mental health outcomes, which strengthens the case for their 
use in the DiD analysis. The intervention effect that is estimated when using 
these groups is similar across the various models, in terms of both the direction 
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and size of the effect observed. Arguably, the estimated increase of 
approximately 1 to 2 percentage points in the prevalence of JSA claimants newly 
experiencing anxiety and/or depression can be considered plausible, given the 
scale of the change in sanctions policy that is considered here. The concern 
remains, of course, that none of these groups provide ‘ideal’ control groups 
given that they may differ systematically from the JSA treatment group in 
important respects. The group of JSA claimants in Northern Ireland, for 
example, are separated in terms of both geography and policy context from the 
treatment group, and suffer from a limited sample size in the two-quarter LFS 
datasets. Whilst this limitation is recognised, it is important to reiterate that the 
main results are supported by several robustness tests. If the results are 
explained by the influence of unobserved confounders, therefore, it is not 
immediately clear what these factors could be.  
Despite the acknowledged limitations, therefore, the DiD analysis carried out in 
this chapter provides a useful addition to the analyses carried out in Chapters 6 
to 8 of this thesis. Indeed, in light of the data that is available for the separate 
empirical analyses, the estimation of an intervention effect in this chapter has 
an important role to play, primarily in terms of contributing to the consideration 
of causal inferences. Together, these analyses combine to help identify robust 
empirical regularities in the area of sanctions and mental health impacts. This 
will be further discussed in the next chapter, which provides the concluding 
chapter for this thesis.  
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Chapter 10. Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the final and concluding chapter of this thesis. It discusses the 
findings of the empirical analyses that have been carried out in Chapters 6 to 9 
together, and reflects on their overall contribution to knowledge in the area of 
sanctions and their associated impacts. This task is carried out with reference to 
the research objectives outlined in the introductory chapter, as well as the 
overarching research question established in Chapter 4. First, this chapter begins 
with a summary of the results discussed in Chapters 6 to 9, highlighting the 
strengths and limitations of the analyses that have been carried out. In 
particular, the first section considers what the results imply regarding the 
impact of sanctions on mental health, which leads to a discussion of the 
important areas of future research that follow from the findings in this thesis. 
Last, this chapter ends with a discussion of the policy implications of the 
research, followed by a reflection on what the findings imply for sanctions policy 
more broadly, when considered in conjunction with the existing literature on the 
labour market and wider impacts of benefit sanctions.  
10.2 Thesis contribution 
10.2.1 Research objectives and overarching research question 
As identified in Chapter 1, this thesis has had two central research objectives:  
i. To contribute to the existing literature on the wider impacts of benefit 
sanctions, by using quantitative methods, longitudinal data and causal 
modelling frameworks to establish robust claims about the causal impacts 
of sanctions on mental health outcomes.  
ii. To provide evidence that can be used to inform sanctions policy in the UK, 
specifically in relation to the reforms introduced by the Welfare Reform 
Act 2012.  
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In the course of the research, Chapter 4 carried out a review of the existing 
empirical literature on the labour market and wider impacts of benefit 
sanctions, which identified the need for more systematic evidence regarding the 
relationship between sanctions and impacts on mental health. The central aim 
of the research carried out throughout the investigation, therefore, has been to 
address this particular gap in the literature. In light of this, the overarching 
research question that has motivated the separate empirical analyses carried out 
in the thesis is as follows:  
[RQ]: Are benefit sanctions associated with adverse mental health 
impacts?  
Through answering this overarching research question, the thesis has sought to 
address the two objectives outlined above. Prior to the empirical chapters 
themselves, Chapter 5 highlighted the fact that individual-level data on 
sanctions are not currently available for use within empirical research in the UK. 
In response to this central limitation, four separate quantitative analyses have 
been carried out in Chapters 6 to 9, each of which have addressed the 
overarching research question to the extent possible with the available data. 
The contribution of the empirical chapters will be highlighted in the discussion 
that follows, which focuses on how they – both individually and in combination – 
address the overarching research question and the objectives of the thesis.  
10.2.2 Empirical contribution 
Importantly, the separate analyses carried out in Chapters 6 to 9 have found 
consistent and mutually reinforcing evidence that links JSA sanctions with 
adverse mental health impacts, measured in terms of antidepressant prescribing 
and anxiety and/or depression. The main findings can be summarised as follows:  
i. Chapter 6 (local authority-level analysis): Following the implementation 
of the Welfare Reform Act 2012, every 10 additional sanctions applied per 
100,000 population per quarter are associated with approximately 4.57 
additional SSRI prescribing items. This represents approximately one 
additional person receiving treatment.  
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ii. Chapter 7 (local authority-level analysis): Following the implementation 
of the Welfare Reform Act 2012, every 10 additional sanctions applied per 
100,000 working age population per quarter are associated with 
approximately 8.09 additional people reporting that they suffer from 
anxiety and/or depression.  
iii. Chapter 8 (multi-level analysis): Following the implementation of the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012, a one percentage point increase in the local 
authority-level sanctions rate is associated with a 2-3 percentage point 
increase in the likelihood that JSA claimants report suffering from anxiety 
and/or depression.  
iv. Chapter 9 (difference-in-differences analysis): The harsher sanctioning 
environment that was brought about at the onset of the Coalition 
government in 2010 is associated with an increase of approximately 1-2 
percentage points in the prevalence of JSA claimants newly experiencing 
anxiety and/or depression.  
These findings make an important contribution to the literature on the wider 
impacts of benefit sanctions. As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, existing 
empirical research has focused its attention on the labour market impacts of 
sanctions, though there is a limited and growing research agenda that identifies 
a range of wider impacts. This wider impacts literature is not extensive overall, 
be it from evidence relating to the UK or international social security systems. 
Indeed, mental health impacts specifically have not been investigated as 
systematically as other areas such as food bank usage, which have been the 
focus of several qualitative and quantitative analyses (Lambie-Mumford, 2014; 
Loopstra et al., 2015a; Garratt et al., 2016; Loopstra et al., 2018).  
Previous research in the area of sanctions and mental health exists, though is 
limited in scope. Existing qualitative research, for example, highlights the 
mental distress that claimants experience in relation to the threat and actual 
imposition of a sanction, though such sanction-related impacts generally do not 
represent the primary focus of the available studies (Wright and Stewart, 2016; 
Dwyer, 2018; Dwyer et al., 2018; Johnsen and Blenkinsopp, 2018; Johnsen et al., 
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2018; Stewart and Wright, 2018; Dwyer et al., 2020; Redman, 2020). Existing 
quantitative research, furthermore, has focused on the broader issue of work-
related behavioural conditionality for a variety of claimant groups, as opposed to 
considering sanction impacts specifically (Barr et al., 2016; Katikireddi et al., 
2018; Davis, 2019).  
Importantly, the research carried out in this thesis makes a clear contribution to 
existing knowledge in this area, through conducting a large-scale and 
longitudinal quantitative investigation into JSA benefit sanctions and their 
impacts on mental health, with a specific focus on antidepressant prescribing, 
anxiety and depression. Despite various data limitations, a strength of the thesis 
is that it has been able to triangulate different data sources and research 
designs in separate analyses, which together provide strong evidence that JSA 
sanctions lead to adverse mental health impacts. In so doing, these findings 
contribute not only to the literature on the impacts of benefit sanctions, but 
also to wider debates relating to mental health, unemployment and the 
mediating role of social security systems. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
unemployment is widely recognised to have detrimental mental health impacts 
(Paul and Moser, 2009). The research carried out in this thesis supports the view 
that the social security system has an important role to play in this area, given 
that it can either serve to compound or alleviate these adverse mental health 
impacts (Coutts et al., 2014; O’Campo et al., 2015; Sage, 2015a; 2015b; Carter 
and Whitworth, 2017; Renahy et al., 2018).  
As highlighted in Chapter 5, a key concern in this thesis has been to establish 
robust empirical regularities with regard to sanctions and mental health impacts, 
with particular consideration given to the scope for making causal inferences. 
This is important, as evidence of this form, which attempts to move beyond 
merely measuring associations, is more useful in terms of informing the 
development of sanctions policy in the UK. Several methods have been pursued 
in order to contribute to this endeavour, which will be referred to below. These 
respond to the various issues that affect the estimation of the relationship 
between sanctions and mental health outcomes given the data analysed, such as 
ecological bias, omitted variable bias, reverse causality and compositional bias.  
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A central element in the investigation’s response to these issues begins with the 
time period chosen, which focuses specifically on the period of Coalition 
government (2010-15). As detailed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, this period is 
marked by significant developments in sanctions policy in terms of both the 
frequency and the severity with which sanctions were applied. These 
developments provide the exogenous variation through which it has been 
possible to better examine the mental health impacts of sanctions in the 
empirical chapters. In addition to exploiting this policy context, longitudinal 
data has been analysed throughout Chapters 6 to 9, which have investigated the 
topic using different levels of data and several quantitative methods such as 
fixed effects, multi-level and difference-in-differences analysis. The main 
results of these analyses, furthermore, have been supported through additional 
robustness checks in the form of falsification tests, placebo tests and Granger 
tests for reverse causality.  
It is important to reiterate, however, that the reliance on local authority-level 
sanctions data in this thesis is accompanied by additional issues relating to data 
availability and quality. As detailed in Chapter 5, for example, the publicly 
available local authority-level sanctions data published by the DWP are limited 
by the manner in which they are recorded. A central issue is that the Stat-Xplore 
database records only the latest decision for each sanction case, leading to the 
use of a JSA sanctions indicator that underestimates the true quarterly figure. As 
previously highlighted, furthermore, key data gaps at the local authority-level 
remain regarding statistics that distinguish between disentitlements and 
sanctions, the different length of sanctions applied as well as the number of 
hardship payments granted.  
Despite the limitations highlighted, the findings in this thesis combine to provide 
a robust indication that JSA sanctions are associated with adverse mental health 
impacts. The findings in Chapters 6 to 8, for example, indicate that evidence 
regarding the relationship between sanctions and adverse mental health impacts 
is clearest following the implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012, and 
the subsequent increase in the minimum and maximum length of the financial 
penalties imposed. It is an important finding that the frequency and increased 
severity of sanctions in the post-reform period are such that associations with 
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mental health outcomes are observed even when relying on local authority-level 
data. Whilst the analysis is not able to include hardship payment rates, 
furthermore, the findings in these chapters are observed despite the fact that 
the rate of hardship payments increased in the post-reform period. They are also 
supported by findings from the difference-in-differences analysis in Chapter 9, 
which considered the impact of an increase in the frequency and severity of 
sanctions that occurred at the beginning of the Coalition period.  
These empirical findings are also supported by the analysis in Chapter 4, which 
developed an account of the causal mechanisms linking benefit sanctions and 
adverse mental health impacts. Drawing on the work of Sage (2018), the causal 
pathways identified are based on a distinction between material and 
psychosocial mechanisms. Material mechanisms can be expected to operate in 
response to the imposition effects of sanctions solely, whereas psychosocial 
mechanisms such as stress, loss of agency and loss of social status can be 
expected to operate in response to both the threat and imposition effects of 
sanctions. As this implies, an important distinction within this account relates to 
the threat and imposition effects of sanctions. As detailed in Chapter 4, the 
literature on the impacts of sanctions is most developed in the area of 
imposition effects, which are relatively more straightforward to investigate 
within empirical research, given that they reflect the impact of sanctions that 
have actually been applied. Threat effects, in contrast, can be understood in 
two different ways, either in terms of the general threat of sanctions or a formal 
warning that a sanction will be applied. As explained in Chapter 5, however, the 
reliance on local authority-level sanctions data in this thesis means that it is not 
able to distinguish between threat and imposition effects in its findings, 
capturing instead an overall combined effect.  
The findings of the investigation carried out in this thesis motivate additional 
individual-level research to better consider the causal relationships involved. 
The next section in this chapter will go on to detail recommendations for any 
such future individual-level analysis (Section 10.3). It is important to emphasise 
here, nevertheless, that – despite the data limitations recognised  - the 
empirical investigation in this thesis, together with its consideration of causal 
inferences, mean that it is able to make an important contribution to ongoing 
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policy debates in this area. As detailed in Chapter 3, sanctions policy during the 
Coalition government has prompted a number of official investigations, inquiries 
and reviews. These have repeatedly called on the DWP to evaluate the impact of 
the reforms implemented in 2012, given the lack of evidence that informed the 
changes at the time and which – unfortunately – currently persists. The research 
carried out in this thesis contributes to filling this gap in policy knowledge, and 
challenges the prevailing policymaking assumption that sanctions will be 
associated with positive health outcomes. After the next section, Section 10.4 
will go on to detail recommendations for sanctions policy that follow from the 
empirical findings discussed here.  
10.3 Recommendations for future research 
As highlighted in the previous section, the findings of this thesis indicate that 
there is a clear need for additional individual-level research to investigate the 
relationship between sanctions and mental health outcomes. In an important 
recent statement, the DWP has responded to sustained criticism by committing 
to share administrative data on sanctions with researchers for the purposes of 
investigation into health impacts (HoC WPC, 2019). This indicates that 
individual-level research in this area could soon become possible in the UK, 
which is an extremely promising development. The recommendation for 
additional individual-level research can also be extended beyond the UK, where 
there is a need for greater international research into the mental health impacts 
of sanctions. In the review of the sanctions literature in Chapter 4, it was noted 
that existing research in terms of the wider impacts of benefit sanctions is 
largely based on evidence from the US and the UK. This contrasts with the 
literature on the labour market impacts of sanctions, which benefits from a 
wider range of studies across separate social security systems, notably across 
mainland Europe. In light of the UK-specific findings in this thesis, there is a 
therefore a need for additional research into mental health impacts in a wider 
range of contexts, where the frequency and severity of sanctions differ.  
The investigation carried out in this thesis highlights a number of important 
areas that it would be useful for any future UK and international research to 
take into account. One central issue relates to the identification of causal 
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impacts, since it has been highlighted that whilst sanctions themselves will have 
an independent impact on mental health, it is important to distinguish this 
effect from the influence of prior mental health status on the likelihood of 
claimants being sanctioned. Whilst the existence of each effect has negative 
implications in terms of the functioning of sanctions policy, it is useful to 
distinguish between the two in the process of informing effective policy 
responses. Informed by the methodological discussion carried out in Chapter 5, it 
is likely that such individual-level research will need to exploit a source of 
random allocation and/or identify an instrumental variable in order to better 
identify causal impacts.  
An important additional task for future UK and international research in this area 
relates to the need to test the hypothesised causal mechanisms that are thought 
to link sanctions and mental health impacts. Depending on data availability, the 
task of distinguishing between material and psychosocial factors may be a 
difficult one for quantitative research to achieve. A qualitative research design, 
in contrast, could be better placed to investigate claimant experiences regarding 
the separate influence such factors on their mental health, in relation to both 
the threat and imposition effects of sanctions. This highlights the potential of 
mixed methods research to make additional contributions in this area. On the 
topic of mental health itself, furthermore, there is a need to consider additional 
measures of mental and emotional distress to the ones investigated in this 
thesis. The main limitation of the self-reported measure of anxiety and/or 
depression used in Chapters 7 to 9, for example, is that it provides only a binary 
indication of an individual’s mental health status, and therefore overlooks the 
fact that such mental distress can be experienced along a continuum. As 
previously highlighted, the GHQ-12 provides a more continuous quantitative 
measure, though both quantitative and qualitative approaches could usefully 
consider additional and related issues such as stress and claimant well-being.  
In this thesis, a distinction has been maintained between the labour market and 
wider impacts of benefit sanctions, which reflects the respective focus of two 
broadly separate areas of existing empirical research. As highlighted in Chapter 
4, however, labour market and wider impacts are not necessarily independent of 
one another, which raises the potential that quite complex interactions exist 
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between the two. This is particularly true with regard to mental health and the 
labour market, though due to data availability the research carried out here has 
had to focus on mental health impacts solely. The mental health impacts of 
sanctions, for example, are likely to differ according to the separate labour 
market outcomes for claimants following a sanction, such as in terms of the 
quality of employment that individuals are able to find (Kim and von dem 
Knesebeck, 2015; Kim and von dem Knesebeck, 2016; Chandola and Zhang, 
2018). Equally, the immediate mental health impacts of sanctions may 
themselves affect people’s ability to search for and consequently secure paid 
work (Dwyer, 2018; Dwyer et al., 2020).  
The data requirements that are necessary to investigate such complex 
interactions are clearly quite demanding, and imply the need for longitudinal 
data that is able to measure labour market and mental health outcomes in both 
the short- and long-term. The impacts considered in this thesis have been fairly 
short-term in nature, and so future research could usefully consider whether 
they persist in the long-term. Labour market outcomes will again be relevant 
here, as the speed with which people return to work and the nature of the 
employment that they secure will influence whether mental health impacts 
improve or worsen. Arguably, research of this nature is possible in the UK given 
the administrative data at the DWP’s disposal and the advances that can be 
achieved by linking existing datasets (Katikireddi and Leyland, 2017; Pattaro et 
al., 2020). Indeed, data that are available through the Work and Pensions 
Longitudinal Study (WPLS), when linked to NHS administrative data, would make 
it possible to investigate sanction impacts for different claimant groups and 
potentially even to consider third-party impacts on the children of claimants.  
Future research into sanctions in the UK also needs to respond to the evolving 
policy context. The empirical investigation in this thesis has been limited to 
considering impacts relating to JSA sanctions, capturing impacts for JSA 
claimants themselves but also – in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 – potential wider 
knock-on effects for family and friends. As highlighted throughout this thesis, 
the rollout of Universal Credit (UC) replaces pre-existing means-tested benefits, 
such as JSA, ESA, IS and WTC, meaning that conditionality and sanctions now 
apply within a single benefit to groups such as the unemployed, lone parents, 
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disabled people and those in-work. Clearly, there is a need to evaluate the 
impact of sanctions within this new system, in which sanctions have become 
consecutive as opposed to concurrent, and in which hardship payments have 
become repayable. Indeed, the need for an evaluation of sanctions in the 
current policy landscape is a key recommendation of the most recent Work and 
Pensions Committee inquiries into benefit sanctions, which the DWP itself has 
now finally accepted (HoC WPC, 2018; 2019). An important area for 
consideration in this regard relates to how the impacts of sanctions differ for 
claimants in different circumstances. Existing evidence discussed in Chapter 4, 
for example, indicates that sanctions are more unambiguously counterproductive 
in terms of labour market outcomes for ESA WRAG claimants than for JSA 
claimants (NAO, 2016b). It is likely that diverse responses to sanctions will 
continue within UC, though this needs to be investigated in the new policy 
context so that appropriate responses can be developed.  
10.4 Implications for sanctions policy 
The findings of this thesis hold several implications for contemporary sanctions 
policy in the UK. Importantly, the empirical investigation provides consistent 
evidence that sanctions are associated with adverse mental health impacts, 
particularly following the implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012, 
which increased the minimum length of a sanction from 1 to 4 weeks and the 
maximum length from 26 to 156 weeks. Although these findings are based on an 
analysis of data relating to JSA sanctions up until 2015, they nevertheless have 
relevance with regard to the ongoing rollout of UC, which is itself underpinned 
by the sanctions regime introduced in 2012. The findings themselves are driven 
by both the severity and scale of sanctions in the post-reform period. Given that 
the DWP purports to be concerned about the mental health of claimants, the 
findings imply that action needs to be taken in both of these areas.  
First, there is a clear need to reduce the severity of the sanctions that can be 
applied, in terms of both the length of sanctions as well as the proportion of a 
benefit that is removed. This recommendation is made all the more evident by 
the fact that the international evidence, discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to 
social security systems with less severe sanctions than the UK, suggests that 
217 
 
 
harsher sanctions do not lead to greater employment effects. Thus, this 
suggested policy response, which is based on the findings of this thesis in 
relation to mental health, is not expected to conflict with the DWP’s additional 
policy concern with labour market outcomes. In a recent important and positive 
development in this regard, the DWP has ended the use of sanctions that last for 
156 weeks, meaning that the harshest sanction has returned to the pre-reform 
maximum of 26 weeks (HM Government, 2019). As previously highlighted, 
however, sanctions are consecutive under UC, which implies that some claimants 
will ultimately have their benefit income removed for longer than this – already 
quite lengthy – 26 week period.  
A key issue that relates to sanction severity, furthermore, is the functioning of 
the hardship payments system. As highlighted in Chapter 4, the official DWP 
Decision Makers’ Guide itself recognises that the two-week wait for receipt of a 
hardship payment is likely to result in adverse health impacts for claimants. 
Indeed, the empirical findings in this thesis are observed despite the fact that 
the proportion of sanctioned claimants receiving hardship payments increased in 
the post-reform period. Importantly, however, since October 2017 JSA claimants 
who are already suffering from mental health problems have been deemed to 
represent a ‘vulnerable’ group, and are therefore now eligible for an immediate 
hardship payment (HM Government, 2017). Whilst this change is welcome, it 
begs the question of why claimants already suffering from mental health 
problems are subject to sanctions at all, whilst the findings in this thesis suggest 
that greater consideration needs to be given to the mental health of all 
claimants subjected to sanctions. Indeed, under UC, hardship payments are 
awarded for a restricted set of reasons, must be renewed every month and are 
repayable, which clearly increases the overall material impact of a sanction 
relative to the previous system. As Webster (2019) argues, these requirements 
are likely to explain the fact that less than 20% of sanctioned claimants receive 
hardship payments within UC, which is under half the proportion that had been 
receiving them within JSA.  
Separate to the issues of sanction severity and associated hardship payments, is 
the issue of the overall frequency with which sanctions are applied. As argued in 
Chapter 3, the large variations in the rate of JSA sanctions between 2010 and 
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2015 cannot be plausibly explained by claimant behaviour alone. An influential 
role can be attributed to more structural determinants, such as decisions made 
by policymakers themselves, managerial focus on referral rates and the 
operation of the – now concluded – Work Programme. The monthly rate of 
sanctions within UC has also experienced a large degree of variation, falling 
from a high of approximately 9% in 2015 to 2% in 2019 (Webster, 2019). Using the 
latest data, Webster (2019) estimates that the monthly sanctions rate for 
unemployed claimants within UC stands at approximately 2.4%, which is similar 
to the JSA sanctions rate that generally pertained prior to 2010. The findings 
from this research motivate the recommendation that the DWP should do 
everything in its power to – at the very least – maintain this low rate of 
sanctions, which is clearly an achievable aim. Adler (2018) highlights, 
furthermore, that there are several straightforward means through which it 
would be possible to lower the sanctions rate even further. This could be 
achieved by limiting the number of reasons for which sanctions apply as well as 
establishing a more lenient conception of ‘good reason’ for which benefit rules 
might be contravened.  
An additional option that would help achieve this end relates to the introduction 
of a sanctions warning system. In this, work coaches would be able to issue 
claimants with a warning – as opposed to a sanction – the first time that they do 
not meet a particular requirement. In this regard, the DWP has recently agreed 
to run what it describes as a “Proof of Concept (PoC) of a warning system” (HoC 
WPC, 2019: 17), which will apply solely in instances where claimants do not 
attend an appointment. Though limited in scope, this statement of intent 
appears to represent a positive development from the DWP’s previous early 
warning trial, in which claimants were sent a warning letter requesting that they 
contact the DWP to provide evidence of good reason against a scheduled 
sanction and an additional 14 days in which to do this (DWP, 2018b). By 
providing claimants with a warning that they are at risk of being sanctioned, this 
opens up the possibility that individuals can take the necessary steps to avoid 
having a sanction actually imposed. In terms of mental health impacts, the 
analysis in this thesis indicates that this could have positive effects by helping 
claimants have a greater sense of control over the process and ultimately help 
them avoid experiencing the financial consequences of sanctions.  
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Despite the positive developments identified, the overall response by the DWP 
to the most recent Work and Pensions Committee inquiry indicates that it is 
fundamentally committed to a punitive sanctions system based upon escalating 
financial penalties (HoC WPC, 2019). The empirical findings in this thesis 
highlight that an important area of concern that will persist within such a system 
relates to impacts on claimants’ mental health, though a further implication of 
the analysis is that sanctions are associated with increased rates of 
antidepressant prescribing, which represents additional public expenditure 
through demand on the NHS. In their review of the UK sanctions regime, the 
National Audit Office (NAO, 2016a) concludes that the total public expenditure 
implications that result from the system of sanctioning are unknown. Savings to 
the government in terms of benefits not paid due to sanctions, for example, 
must be weighed against administrative costs and unknown levels of additional 
support for those affected. Though this thesis has not attempted to specify a 
precise monetary figure associated with increased antidepressant prescribing, 
the research nevertheless indicates that such additional costs represent an 
important issue for further consideration. Indeed, this represents an overlooked 
area within the business case for UC, which assumes that the additional 
conditionality within UC will result in “gains to the NHS” (DWP, 2018d: 19), 
based on the claim that UC will lead to increased employment for claimants, 
which itself is assumed to result in improved health outcomes.  
10.5 Final reflections 
Chapter 2 of this thesis provided an overview of the ongoing and highly 
contested debate regarding the ethical legitimacy of behavioural conditionality, 
and highlighted the importance of empirical evidence within this discussion. 
Whilst the differences between the various and competing normative claims on 
this issue are not reducible to empirical concerns alone, evidence regarding the 
impacts of conditionality are relevant for all the perspectives involved when 
attempting to provide an overall assessment of this policy agenda. This thesis 
has focused on the impacts of benefit sanctions specifically. In this regard, 
Chapter 4 detailed the findings from existing empirical research, in both the UK 
and internationally, on the labour market and wider impacts of benefit 
sanctions. As argued in Chapter 4, the UK and international evidence in relation 
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to labour market impacts is mixed, where sanctions are associated with short-
term increases into employment as well as increases out of the labour force 
itself. In the longer-term, furthermore, sanctions are associated with decreases 
in wages, job stability and working hours. UK evidence in relation to wider 
impacts, furthermore, is consistently negative, given that sanctions have been 
associated with impacts such as financial hardship, food bank usage and survival 
crime. Building on existing qualitative evidence relating to mental health 
impacts, furthermore, the quantitative analysis in this thesis indicates that 
sanctions are associated with increases in both antidepressant prescribing and 
rates of anxiety and depression. When research in terms of both labour market 
and wider impacts is considered together, therefore, it would arguably be 
difficult for any normative perspective to defend the use of sanctions as they 
currently apply in the UK.  
Indeed, whilst this concluding chapter has highlighted the need for more 
individual-level research in the area of sanctions and mental health, the existing 
weight of evidence arguably provides clear support for policy action on the 
grounds of the precautionary principle (Martuzzi and Tickner, 2004). Though the 
exact nature of cause and effect regarding the impacts of benefit sanctions 
merits further investigation, the precautionary principle implies that it is not 
necessary to wait for this debate to be resolved before action is taken, given 
that the burden of proof rests with those seeking to maintain a sanctions policy 
that holds clearly articulated risks for claimants. Indeed, Saunders et al. (2017: 
29) identify the social security system as a key part of the policy response in 
terms of the social determinants of health, arguing that it is important to ensure 
that “conditionality measures and financial sanctions do not harm 
beneficiaries”. The findings presented in this thesis, when considered in 
conjunction with the existing empirical research discussed, indicate that this 
basic requirement is unfortunately not being met. In light of this, lack of 
meaningful action in this area is inexcusable. With the appropriate will, the aim 
of minimising the negative impacts of sanctions policy could be achieved within 
a short period of time, and this conclusion has highlighted several 
straightforward means through which this might be carried out.  
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Promisingly, the discussion has indicated some areas where progress has been 
made with respect to sanctions. The DWP, furthermore, purports to respond to 
empirical evidence, arguing recently that sanctions policy “should be evidence-
based” (HoC WPC, 2019: 10). Whilst this commitment is a positive one in the 
present context, a gap arguably persists regarding how the DWP responds to the 
available evidence. Partly, this relates to a misunderstanding of the evidence 
base itself. In its response to the most recent Work and Pensions Committee 
inquiry into sanctions, for example, the DWP cites four studies to support its 
claim that international studies make it “clear” that conditionality and sanctions 
are associated with positive labour market impacts (HoC WPC, 2019: 3). All four 
of these studies were discussed in Chapter 4, which provided a more nuanced 
assessment. Lalive et al. (2005) and Svarer (2011), for example, are not able to 
distinguish between movements into work or out of the labour force, whilst Arni 
et al. (2013) and van den Berg and Vikström (2014) indicate that sanctions are 
also associated with negative longer-term impacts. Based on evidence from 
workshops with DWP policymakers and analysts involved in developing UC, 
furthermore, Monaghan and Ingold (2019: 364) argue that perceived constraints 
in terms of political feasibility continue to drive evidence use, leading to the 
“danger that vital, emerging evidence will continue to be obscured or omitted” 
in the process of policy development. Importantly, the authors identify the 
“austerity paradigm” as a key constitutive element in this process of filtering 
evidence. It can only be hoped that, as the UK apparently emerges into a post-
austerity era, opportunities for a reassessment of the evidence on sanctions will 
be forthcoming, and that appropriate action will be taken.  
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Chapter 6 appendix 
A6.1 Diagnostic tests 
Various diagnostic checks are carried out to test that the fixed effects model 
assumptions are satisfied, as detailed in Greene (2008). The checks presented 
here are for regression Model 6.2 in Table 6.3, as discussed in Section 6.4.  
A6.1.1 Normality of the residuals 
Figure A6.1 depicts a histogram of the regression residuals to check for serious 
deviations from the assumption of normality. Clearly, the residuals do not 
deviate sufficiently from the ideal of normality to be of concern to the results of 
the analysis. Three formal tests of normality, a Skewness/Kurtosis test (p < 
0.001), a Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.001) and a Shapiro-Francia test (p < 0.001) 
reject the null of normality. However, as Ghasemi and Zahedias (2012) outline, 
such tests are sensitive to even very small deviations from normality at large 
sample sizes. The rejection of normality by such tests is therefore not of 
concern to the analysis, given the distribution that is actually observed.  
Figure A6.1: distribution of regression residuals compared against normal distribution curve 
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A6.1.2 Cross-sectional independence, homoscedasticity, no serial 
correlation and stationarity 
The tests carried out in this sub-section indicate that the fixed effects models 
suffer from cross-sectional dependence, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, 
though there are important caveats on the tests themselves that will be 
explained in more detail in the following discussion. Consequently, the fixed 
effects regression models estimated throughout Chapter 6 use Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998), which are robust to cross-sectional 
dependence, heteroscedasticity and correlation through time within local 
authorities. These are implemented using the Stata command ‘xtscc’, developed 
by Hoechle (2007).  
First, a check for cross-sectional dependence is carried out. The standard test of 
this issue is the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, as developed by 
Breusch and Pagan (1980). This test isn’t valid in panels with a large number of 
observations (N) but a small number of observations per cross-sectional unit (T), 
which is the case here (N = 324, T = 18). Instead, Pesaran’s (2004) cross-
sectional dependence (CD) test is carried out, using the ‘xtcsd’ Stata command 
developed by de Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006), which is compatible with 
unbalanced datasets. The Pesaran (2004) CD test rejects the null hypothesis of 
no cross-sectional dependence (p < 0.05).  
Next, in order to check for heteroscedasticity, a modified Wald test (Greene, 
2008) is carried out that tests for group-wise heteroscedasticity in the residuals 
of fixed effect regression models, using the Stata command ‘xttest3’ developed 
by Baum (2001). The modified Wald test rejects the null of homoscedasticity (p 
< 0.001), which indicates that the residuals display heteroscedasticity. This test, 
however, has a very low power in the context of fixed effects with “large N, 
small T” (Baum, 2001: 102) panels, as is the case here. The result of the 
modified Wald test should, therefore, be treated with caution. Indeed, a scatter 
plot of the regression residuals against predicted values, furthermore, suggests 
that the error term has an approximately constant variance, since there is no 
sign of a fanning out effect over different predicted values. This is depicted in 
Figure A6.2.  
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Figure A6.2: scatter plot of the regression residuals against predicted values 
 
Next, in order to check for serial correlation, a Wooldridge (2002) test is carried 
out using the Stata command ‘xtserial’ developed by Drukker (2003). The 
Wooldridge (2002) test rejects the null of no autocorrelation (p < 0.001), though 
– like the modified Wald test – is very sensitive in the context of fixed effects 
with a large N and small T panel (Drukker, 2003).  
Finally, in order to test for non-stationarity in both sanctions and SSRI 
prescribing, Pesaran’s (2007) panel unit root test is carried out which – unlike 
many unit root tests – does not require the assumption of cross-sectional 
independence to be met. This is carried out using the Stata command ‘pescadf’ 
developed by Lewandowski (2007), which rejects the null of non-stationarity 
with or without a time trend included for both variables (p < 0.001).  
A6.1.3 Unusual and Influential Data 
Next, checks for the influence of outliers and extreme observations are carried 
out. Firstly, observations with residuals that are two standard deviations from 
the mean in Model 6.2 are removed and the regression models re-estimated 
(Cousineau and Chartier, 2010). The results are shown in Table A6.1, Model 
A6.1. To check for the role of extreme observations, furthermore, the results 
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from Model 6.2 are re-run with the top and bottom one percentiles removed for 
sanctions (Model A6.2). Finally, the results from Model 6.2 are re-run with the 
seaside areas discussed in Section 6.4 removed (Blackpool, Torbay, Hastings, 
Great Yarmouth and Thanet) (Model A6.3). As Table A6.1 indicates, the results 
across the separate models remain broadly similar to the estimated sanctions 
coefficient in Model 6.2, suggesting that the results of the main analysis are not 
adversely impacted by unusual or influential data.  
Table A6.1: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing 
 Model A6.1 Model A6.2 Model A6.3 
Sanctions 
0.344 *** 
(0.086) 
0.327** 
(0.109) 
0.409*** 
(0.083) 
R2 (within) 0.889 0.889 0.889 
LA Quarters 5,265 5,362 5,369 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant and additional explanatory variables not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A6.2 Claimant count model 
Table A6.2: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing 
 Model A6.4 
Sanctions 
0.417*** 
(0.100) 
JSA claimants 
-0.203* 
(0.078) 
Economic Inactivity 
0.005 
(0.002) 
WCAs 
0.250 
(0.426) 
GVA 
-0.021** 
(0.006) 
Age  
16–29 
-0.131*** 
(0.026) 
30–49 
-0.549*** 
(0.073) 
50–64 
-0.480*** 
(0.067) 
65 and over 
0.036 
(0.029) 
Female 
0.537*** 
(0.077) 
White UK born 
0.0006 
(0.002) 
Antibiotic Prescribing 
0.080*** 
(0.015) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation  
Quintile 2 × Quarter 
37.408*** 
(1.611) 
Quintile 3 × Quarter 
60.136*** 
(3.389) 
Quintile 4 × Quarter 
71.410*** 
(4.521) 
Quintile 5 × Quarter 
109.311*** 
(7.143) 
Urban-Rural Classification  
Urban with significant rural × 
Quarter 
-21.318*** 
(1.940) 
Predominantly urban × Quarter 
-29.716*** 
(3.436) 
R2 (within) 0.889 
LA Quarters 5,754 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Model includes local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A6.3 Employment and over-controlling 
Table A6.3: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing 
 Model A6.5 
Sanctions 
0.396*** 
(0.081) 
WCAs 
0.178 
(0.452) 
GVA 
-0.020** 
(0.006) 
Age  
16–29 
-0.113*** 
(0.026) 
30–49 
-0.513*** 
(0.072) 
50–64 
-0.460*** 
(0.066) 
65 and over 
0.049 
(0.028) 
Female 
0.548*** 
(0.072) 
White UK born 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
Antibiotic Prescribing 
0.083*** 
(0.015) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation  
Quintile 2 × Quarter 
38.657*** 
(1.844) 
Quintile 3 × Quarter 
62.560*** 
(3.729) 
Quintile 4 × Quarter 
74.722*** 
(5.236) 
Quintile 5 × Quarter 
113.908*** 
(8.333) 
Urban-Rural Classification  
Urban with significant rural × 
Quarter 
-20.168*** 
(1.897) 
Predominantly urban × Quarter 
-28.056*** 
(2.914) 
R2 (within) 0.888 
LA Quarters 5,754 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Model includes local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A6.4 Multicollinearity check 
Table A6.4: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing 
 Model A6.6 Model A6.7 
Sanctions 
0.397*** 
(0.081) 
 
Unemployment 
 -0.013 
(0.012) 
Economic Inactivity 
0.004 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
Work Capability Assessments 
0.178 
(0.453) 
0.231 
(0.400) 
GVA 
-0.020** 
(0.006) 
-0.023** 
(0.008) 
Age   
16–29 
-0.115*** 
(0.026) 
-0.169*** 
(0.038) 
30–49 
-0.513*** 
(0.071) 
-0.601*** 
(0.079) 
50–64 
-0.460*** 
(0.065) 
-0.524*** 
(0.073) 
65 and over 
0.049 
(0.028) 
0.003 
(0.037) 
Female 
0.546*** 
(0.072) 
0.575*** 
(0.069) 
White UK born 
0.0003 
(0.002) 
0.0005 
(0.002) 
Antibiotic Prescribing 
0.083*** 
(0.015) 
0.086*** 
(0.015) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation   
Quintile 2 × Quarter 
38.629*** 
(1.816) 
37.292*** 
(2.167) 
Quintile 3 × Quarter 
62.515*** 
(3.739) 
59.810*** 
(2.869) 
Quintile 4 × Quarter 
74.520*** 
(5.227) 
76.202*** 
(4.299) 
Quintile 5 × Quarter 
113.698*** 
(8.368) 
114.310*** 
(6.947) 
Urban-Rural Classification   
Urban with significant rural × 
Quarter 
-20.304*** 
(1.953) 
-22.867*** 
(2.214) 
Predominantly urban × 
Quarter 
-27.963*** 
(2.878) 
-30.551*** 
(3.495) 
R2 (within) 0.888 0.889 
LA Quarters 5,754 5,459 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A6.5 Falsification test 
Table A6.5: relationship between sanctions and cardiovascular prescribing, falsification test 
 Model A6.8 Model A6.9 
Sanctions 
1.503 
(1.288) 
1.478 
(1.685) 
Sanctions x Reform  
0.035 
(1.575) 
Unemployment 
-0.037 
(0.086) 
-0.037 
(0.086) 
Economic Inactivity 
-0.054 
(0.057) 
-0.054 
(0.057) 
Work Capability Assessments 
-2.463** 
(0.939) 
-2.465** 
(0.937) 
GVA 
0.099 
(0.083) 
0.099 
(0.082) 
Age   
16–29 
0.282 
(1.154) 
0.282 
(1.152) 
30–49 
0.843 
(1.710) 
0.842 
(1.708) 
50–64 
1.639 
(1.587) 
1.639 
(1.581) 
65 and over 
2.555* 
(1.039) 
2.555* 
(1.041) 
Female 
2.811* 
(1.134) 
2.810* 
(1.130) 
White UK born 
-0.008 
(0.041) 
-0.008 
(0.041) 
Antibiotic Prescribing 
0.677*** 
(0.163) 
0.676*** 
(0.164) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation   
Quintile 2 × Quarter 
206.595* 
(84.586) 
206.465* 
(84.596) 
Quintile 3 × Quarter 
100.641 
(68.404) 
100.372 
(70.299) 
Quintile 4 × Quarter 
263.887*** 
(73.243) 
263.433*** 
(75.009) 
Quintile 5 × Quarter 
283.358** 
(93.980) 
282.593** 
(105.256) 
Urban-Rural Classification   
Urban with significant rural × 
Quarter 
-175.721* 
(77.698) 
175.766* 
(77.863) 
Predominantly urban × 
Quarter 
-192.588* 
(77.830) 
192.665* 
(78.036) 
R2 (within) 0.631 0.631 
LA Quarters 5,459 5,459 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
253 
 
 
A6.6 Estimated sanctions coefficient 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the sanctions measure (original adverse sanctions) 
that is available for the analysis underestimates the true quarterly rate. This 
implies that original adverse sanctions (S’) capture only a proportion (k) of total 
sanctions (S) as indicated below: 
ܵᇱ ൌ ݇ܵݓ݄݁ݎ݁Ͳ ൏ ݇ ൏ ͳ 
As described in Chapter 6, the analysis investigates the relationship between 
sanctions and SSRI prescribing, which is written in a basic form below: 
ܴܵܵܫ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܵܽ݊ܿݐ݅݋݊ݏൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܵ 
Given that the sanctions measure (S’) underestimates the true sanctions rate (S), 
the analysis in fact estimates the following: 
ܴܵܵܫ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚᇱܵᇱ 
Which can be re-written as follows: 
ܴܵܵܫ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚᇱ݇ܵൌ ߙ ൅ ݇ߚᇱܵ 
Which implies that: 
ߚ ൌ ݇ߚԢ 
The above implies that the estimated relationship (β’) between sanctions and 
antidepressant prescribing in Chapter 6 is higher than what would be estimated 
if the true sanctions measure had been used (β), and needs to be re-scaled by 
the proportion k.  
As highlighted in Chapter 5, Kennedy and Keen (2016) estimate that under a fifth 
of original adverse decisions were challenged in any given month during the 
period of analysis, which implies that k should be set at 0.8 or above. Thus, 
whilst the finding in Chapter 6 that every 10 additional sanctions applied per 
100,000 population are associated with approximately 4.57 additional SSRI 
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prescribing items translates to between one and two additional people receiving 
treatment, this needs to be scaled down closer to one.   
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A6.7 Comparison of JSA and ESA sanction rates 
Figure A6.3 compares the JSA and ESA sanctions rate during the period that is 
investigated in Chapter 6. Due to changes in how the DWP publish claimant 
statistics, the rates themselves are only calculable for four particular months 
during each year (February, May, August and November). JSA and ESA sanction 
rates are calculated using original adverse sanctions relating to claimants in 
England only, and measure sanctions as a proportion of JSA claimants and ESA 
WRAG claimants respectively. The different variations in rates of JSA and ESA 
sanctions implies that the analysis does not suffer from omitted variable bias 
due to its inability to include the ESA sanctions rate at the local authority-level 
in the fixed effects regression models.  
Figure A6.3: JSA and ESA sanctions rate (per cent of claimants), 2010-2014 
 
Source: author’s calculations using Stat-Xplore data 
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Chapter 7 appendix 
A7.1 District-level summary statistics and regression 
tables 
Table A7.1: summary statistics for 324 local authority districts, Q3 2010 – Q4 2014 
 N Mean 
St.d 
Dev 
Min Max Source 
Dependent variable:       
Anxiety and/or depression 5,676 5,028 2,543 405 19,056 QLFS 
Sanctions variable:       
Original adverse 5,754 349 212 16 1,510 
Stat-
Xplore 
Control variables:       
Claimants 5,754 2,900 1,452 491 9,043 Nomis 
Unemployment 5,459 5,516 2,097 1,062 16,853 Nomis 
Economic Inactivity 5,754 21,777 4,452 9,081 37,519 Nomis 
Employment 5,754 71,839 5,559 51,682 90,813 Nomis 
Work Capability Assessments 5,754 393 202 43 1,891 
Stat-
Xplore 
GVA 5,754 22,886 14,435 11,876 235,244 Nomis 
Age      Nomis 
16-29 year olds 5,754 27,260 4,623 19,387 45,662  
30-49 year olds 5,754 42,846 2,912 33,514 52,309  
50-64 year olds 5,754 29,894 5,088 12,407 42,183  
Female 5,754 50,238 842 43,245 52,579 Nomis 
White 5,754 89,003 12,567 22,444 100,000 Nomis 
Index of Multiple Deprivation      DCLG 
Quintile 1 1,166      
Quintile 2 1,157      
Quintile 3 1,140      
Quintile 4 1,165      
Quintile 5 1,126      
Urban-Rural Classification      Defra 
Predominantly rural 1,620      
Urban with significant 
rural 
959      
Predominantly urban 3,175      
Falsification variables:       
Anxiety and/or depression 
(age 65+) 
3,918 2,028 2,171 116 35,545 QLFS 
Cardiovascular health 5,742 7,745 2,995 702 29,582 QLFS 
Note: Local authority quarters where the QLFS estimates produced zero estimates were 
removed from the sample. 
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Table A7.2: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression, initial model 
selection 
 Model A7.1: 
Fixed Effects 
Model A7.2: 
Fixed Effects 
Model A7.3: 
Random Effects 
Sanctions 0.226 
(0.317) 
0.191 
(0.302) 
0.253 
(0.392) 
Unemployment 0.028 
(0.025) 
0.029 
(0.025) 
0.042 
(0.031) 
Economic Inactivity 0.084*** 
(0.017) 
0.081*** 
(0.018) 
0.085*** 
(0.015) 
WCAs 0.851 
(0.454) 
0.790 
(0.457) 
1.028* 
(0.480) 
GVA -0.034* 
(0.012) 
-0.023 
(0.015) 
0.0003 
(0.003) 
Age    
30–49 -0.206** 
(0.055) 
-0.237** 
(0.080) 
-0.098*** 
(0.023) 
50–64 -0.157* 
(0.071) 
-0.164* 
(0.074) 
0.030 
(0.027) 
Female 0.843*** 
(0.193) 
0.943*** 
(0.220) 
-0.035 
(0.075) 
White 0.054*** 
(0.013) 
0.055*** 
(0.013) 
0.052*** 
(0.012) 
Index of Multiple 
Deprivation 
   
Quintile 2   -18.032 
(238.104) 
Quintile 3   214.030 
(215.671) 
Quintile 4   860.261*** 
(216.510) 
Quintile 5   1177.122*** 
(292.764) 
Urban-Rural Classification    
Urban with 
significant rural 
  -270.958 
(344.405) 
Predominantly 
urban 
  249.576 
(211.915) 
Index of Multiple 
Deprivation 
   
Quintile 2 x 
Quarter 
 17.545 
(26.505) 
 
Quintile 3 x 
Quarter 
 7.883 
(16.752) 
 
Quintile 4 x 
Quarter 
 33.019*** 
(8.253) 
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Quintile 5 x 
Quarter 
 32.799*** 
(6.846) 
 
Urban-Rural Classification    
Urban with 
significant rural x 
Quarter 
 59.653** 
(17.543) 
 
Predominantly 
urban x Quarter 
 8.193 
(25.801) 
 
R2 (within) 0.823 0.827 0.819 
LA Quarters 5,391 5,391 5,391 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Model A7.1 and A7.2 include local authority and time 
fixed effects. Model A7.3 includes time fixed effects. Constant and LFS question change dummy 
not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A7.3: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression, fixed effects models 
 Model A7.2 Model A7.4 
Sanctions 0.191 
(0.302) 
0.127 
(0.450) 
Sanctions x Reform  0.091 
(0.479) 
Unemployment 0.029 
(0.025) 
0.029 
(0.025) 
Economic Inactivity 0.081*** 
(0.018) 
0.081*** 
(0.018) 
WCAs 0.790 
(0.457) 
0.786 
(0.456) 
GVA -0.023 
(0.015) 
-0.023 
(0.016) 
Age   
30–49 -0.237** 
(0.080) 
-0.236** 
(0.079) 
50–64 -0.164* 
(0.074) 
-0.164* 
(0.073) 
Female 0.943*** 
(0.220) 
0.940*** 
(0.214) 
White 0.055*** 
(0.013) 
0.055*** 
(0.013) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation   
Quintile 2 x Quarter 17.545 
(26.505) 
17.020 
(26.081) 
Quintile 3 x Quarter 7.883 
(16.752) 
6.756 
(16.566) 
Quintile 4 x Quarter 33.019*** 
(8.253) 
31.163** 
(10.531) 
Quintile 5 x Quarter 32.799*** 
(6.846) 
 29.663 
(15.202) 
Urban-Rural Classification   
Urban with significant rural x Quarter 59.653** 
(17.543) 
59.414** 
(17.823) 
Predominantly urban x Quarter 8.193 
(25.801) 
7.794 
(25.783) 
R2 (within) 0.827 0.827 
LA Quarters 5,391 5,391 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant and LFS question change dummy not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A7.2 County-level initial modelling process 
Table A7.4: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression, initial model 
selection 
   Model A7.5: 
Fixed Effects 
Model A7.6: 
Fixed Effects 
Model A7.7: 
Random Effects 
Sanctions 0.819** 
(0.265) 
0.777*** 
(0.199) 
0.785*** 
(0.156) 
Unemployment -0.018 
(0.038) 
-0.009 
(0.041) 
0.018 
(0.047) 
Economic Inactivity 0.070** 
(0.020) 
0.074** 
(0.020) 
0.064* 
(0.022) 
WCAs 0.267 
(0.520) 
0.216 
(0.536) 
0.656 
(0.507) 
GVA -0.041** 
(0.013) 
-0.059*** 
(0.014) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
Age    
30–49 -0.448*** 
(0.091) 
-0.407*** 
(0.104) 
-0.139 
(0.067) 
50–64 0.107 
(0.156) 
0.105 
(0.108) 
0.061 
(0.033) 
Female 0.265 
(0.484) 
0.504 
(0.473) 
-0.111 
(0.173) 
White 0.023 
(0.020) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
0.045** 
(0.012) 
Index of Multiple 
Deprivation 
   
Quintile 2   176.388 
(333.627) 
Quintile 3   494.839 
(239.399) 
Quintile 4   1,228.314*** 
(308.493) 
Quintile 5   1,117.412* 
(424.947) 
Urban-Rural Classification    
Urban with 
significant rural 
  -318.679 
(223.929) 
Predominantly 
urban 
  332.084 
(300.793) 
Index of Multiple 
Deprivation 
   
Quintile 2 x 
Quarter 
 51.541** 
(14.751) 
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Quintile 3 x 
Quarter 
 56.931*** 
(6.926) 
 
Quintile 4 x 
Quarter 
 66.666*** 
(16.652) 
 
Quintile 5 x 
Quarter 
 80.834** 
(21.423) 
 
Urban-Rural Classification    
Urban with 
significant rural x 
Quarter 
 10.867 
(12.300) 
 
Predominantly 
urban x Quarter 
 -50.008** 
(14.758) 
 
R2 (within) 0.839 0.847 0.832 
LA Quarters 2,587 2,587 2,587 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Model 7.1 and Model 7.2 include local authority and 
time fixed effects. Model 7.3 includes time fixed effects. Constant and LFS question change 
dummy not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A7.3 Diagnostic tests 
Various diagnostic checks are carried out to test that the fixed effects model 
assumptions are satisfied, as previously identified in the appendix for Chapter 6 
(Section A6.1). The diagnostic checks presented here are for regression Model 
7.1, Table 7.2, as discussed in Section 7.5.  
A7.3.1 Normality of the residuals 
Figure A7.1 depicts a histogram of the regression residuals to check for serious 
deviations from the assumption of normality. Clearly, the residuals do not 
deviate sufficiently from the ideal of normality to be of concern. Three formal 
tests of normality, a Skewness/Kurtosis test (p < 0.001), a Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 
0.001) and a Shapiro-Francia test (p < 0.001) reject the null of normality. 
However, as previously highlighted, such tests are sensitive to even very small 
deviations from normality at large sample sizes. The rejection of normality by 
such tests is therefore not of concern to the analysis, given the distribution that 
is actually observed.  
Figure A7.1: distribution of regression residuals compared against normal distribution curve 
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A7.3.2 Cross-sectional independence, homoscedasticity, no serial 
correlation and stationarity 
The tests carried out in this sub-section indicate that the fixed effects models 
suffer from cross-sectional dependence, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, 
though the previously identified caveats apply regarding the results of such 
tests. In any case, the fixed effects regression models estimated throughout 
Chapter 7 use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (Driscoll and Kray, 1998), which are 
robust to cross-sectional dependence, heteroscedasticity and correlation through 
time within local authorities.  
The standard test for cross-sectional independence is the Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). This isn’t valid in panels 
with a large number of observations (N) but a small number of observations per 
cross-sectional unit (T), which is the case here (N = 148, T = 18). Instead, 
Pesaran’s (2004) cross-sectional dependence (CD) test is carried out, which is 
compatible with unbalanced datasets. The Pesaran CD test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence (p < 0.001).  
Next, in order to check for heteroscedasticity, a modified Wald test (Greene, 
2008) is carried out that tests for group-wise heteroscedasticity in the residuals 
of fixed effect regression models. The modified Wald test rejects the null of 
homoscedasticity (p < 0.001), which indicates that the residuals display 
heteroscedasticity. This test, however, has a very low power in the context of 
fixed effects with “large N, small T” (Baum, 2001: 102) panels, as is the case 
here. The result of the modified Wald test should, therefore, be treated with 
caution. Indeed, a scatter plot of the regression residuals against predicted 
values, furthermore, suggests that the error term has an approximately constant 
variance, since there is little sign of a fanning out effect over different 
predicted values. This is depicted in Figure A7.2.  
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Figure A7.2: scatter plot of the regression residuals against predicted values 
 
Next, in order to check for serial correlation, a Wooldridge (2002) test is carried 
out. The Wooldridge (2002) test rejects the null of no autocorrelation (p < 
0.001), though – like the modified Wald test – is very sensitive in the context of 
fixed effects with a large N and small T panel (Drukker, 2003).  
Finally, in order to test for non-stationarity, in both sanctions and anxiety 
and/or depression, Pesaran’s (2007) panel unit root test is carried out which – 
unlike many unit root tests – does not require the assumption of cross-sectional 
independence to be met. This test rejects the null of non-stationarity with or 
without a time trend included for both variables (p < 0.001).  
A7.3.3 Unusual and influential data 
Next, checks for the influence of outliers and extreme observations are carried 
out. Firstly, observations with residuals that are two standard deviations from 
the mean in Model 7.1 (Table 7.2) are removed and the regression models re-
estimated (Cousineau and Chartier, 2010). The results are shown in Table A7.5, 
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models remain broadly similar to the estimated sanctions coefficient in Model 
7.1, suggesting that the results of the main analysis are not adversely impacted 
by unusual or influential data.  
Table A7.5: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression 
 Model A7.8 Model A7.9 
Sanctions 0.748*** 
(0.172) 
0.549** 
(0.180) 
R2 (within) 0.854 0.847 
LA Quarters 2,568 2,537 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant and additional explanatory variables not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A7.4 Claimant count model 
Table A7.6: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression  
 Model A7.10 
Sanctions 
0.819*** 
(0.175) 
JSA claimants 
-0.166 
(0.162) 
Economic Inactivity 
0.079*** 
(0.021) 
WCAs 
0.367 
(0.517) 
GVA 
0.053*** 
(0.012) 
Age  
30–49 
-0.402*** 
(0.096) 
50–64 
0.093 
(0.098) 
Female 
0.319 
(0.402) 
White 
0.028 
(0.019) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation  
Quintile 2 × Quarter 
46.627** 
(15.023) 
Quintile 3 × Quarter 
50.296*** 
(8.760) 
Quintile 4 × Quarter 
58.465** 
(16.002) 
Quintile 5 × Quarter 
68.498* 
(25.019) 
Urban-Rural Classification  
Urban with significant rural × 
Quarter 
5.738 
(13.310) 
Predominantly urban × Quarter 
-54.160** 
(14.979) 
R2 (within) 0.847 
LA Quarters 2,592 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Model includes local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A7.5 Falsification tests 
Table A7.7: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression (aged 65+) 
 Model A7.11 Model A7.12 
Sanctions 0.518 
(0.293) 
0.616 
(0.405) 
Sanctions x Reform  -0.134 
(0.361) 
Unemployment 0.003 
(0.027) 
0.004 
(0.027) 
Economic Inactivity -0.003 
(0.020) 
-0.003 
(0.020) 
WCAs 0.492 
(0.289) 
0.497 
(0.279) 
GVA -0.036 
(0.021) 
-0.037 
(0.021) 
Age   
30–49 -0.286*** 
(0.059) 
-0.289*** 
(0.062) 
50–64 0.096 
(0.098) 
0.097 
(0.099) 
Female -1.157* 
(0.511) 
-1.150* 
(0.510) 
White 0.018 
(0.016) 
0.018 
(0.016) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation   
Quintile 2 x Quarter -17.367 
(10.564) 
-16.099 
(10.491) 
Quintile 3 x Quarter -3.642 
(14.349) 
-1.271 
(16.876) 
Quintile 4 x Quarter -11.376 
(22.597) 
-8.235 
(24.410) 
Quintile 5 x Quarter 4.435 
(16.186) 
9.231 
(23.854) 
Urban-Rural Classification   
Urban with significant 
rural x Quarter 
-6.589 
(16.770) 
-6.198 
(16.916) 
Predominantly urban x 
Quarter 
0.796 
(11.382) 
1.386 
(11.810) 
R2 (within) 0.763 0.763 
LA Quarters 2,196 2,196 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant and LFS question change dummy not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A7.8: relationship between sanctions and cardiovascular health 
 Model A7.13 Model A7.14 
Sanctions 0.672 
(0.496) 
0.530 
(0.569) 
Sanctions x Reform  0.194 
(0.335) 
Unemployment 0.042 
(0.041) 
0.042 
(0.040) 
Economic Inactivity 0.086** 
(0.028) 
0.086** 
(0.028) 
WCAs 0.345 
(0.397) 
0.338 
(0.385) 
GVA -0.007 
(0.042) 
-0.006 
(0.042) 
Age   
30–49 0.080 
(0.140) 
0.084 
(0.142) 
50–64 -0.095 
(0.145) 
-0.097 
(0.144) 
Female -2.281*** 
(0.479) 
-2.291*** 
(0.473) 
White 0.033 
(0.018) 
0.034 
(0.018) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation   
Quintile 2 x Quarter 8.100 
(22.361) 
6.260 
(20.553) 
Quintile 3 x Quarter 26.953 
(26.034) 
23.512 
(25.569) 
Quintile 4 x Quarter 30.900 
(29.839) 
26.341 
(28.315) 
Quintile 5 x Quarter 65.340* 
(22.880) 
58.379* 
(24.805) 
Urban-Rural Classification   
Urban with significant 
rural x Quarter 
46.521 
(25.803) 
45.954 
(25.481) 
Predominantly urban x 
Quarter 
-16.215 
(20.480) 
-17.071 
(20.117) 
R2 (within) 0.849 0.849 
LA Quarters 2,590 2,590 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant and LFS question change dummy not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Chapter 8 appendix 
A8.1 Additional control variables 
Table A8.1: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression (three-level) 
 Model A8.1: 
Pre-reform 
Model A8.2: 
Post-reform 
Sanctions 0.014 
(0.009) 
0.023* 
(0.010) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation   
Quintile 2 0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.047* 
(0.018) 
Quintile 3 -0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
Quintile 4 0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.019 
(0.017) 
Quintile 5 -0.014 
(0.011) 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
Urban-Rural Classification   
Urban with significant rural -0.0008 
(0.011) 
-0.009 
(0.016) 
Predominantly urban 0.021* 
(0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.013) 
Age 0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Female (ref: Male) 0.032*** 
(0.005) 
0.050*** 
(0.007) 
Ethnicity (ref: White)   
Mixed 0.029 
(0.019) 
-0.028 
(0.025) 
Asian or Asian British -0.024* 
(0.010) 
-0.046*** 
(0.014) 
Black or Black British -0.044*** 
(0.011) 
-0.083*** 
(0.014) 
Chinese -0.101* 
(0.041) 
-0.068 
(0.101) 
Other -0.027 
(0.015) 
-0.066** 
(0.022) 
Disability (ref: No disability) 0.215*** 
(0.005) 
0.252*** 
(0.006) 
Qualifications (ref: Higher education)   
A-Level or equivalent 0.006 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
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GCSE or equivalent 0.016* 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
Other qualifications 0.013 
(0.008) 
0.040*** 
(0.011) 
No qualification 0.027** 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
Don't know 0.020 
(0.020) 
-0.045 
(0.024) 
Partner (ref. No partner) -0.015* 
(0.006) 
-0.031*** 
(0.008) 
Dependent children (ref. No 
dependents) 
-0.015* 
(0.006) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
Socio-economic status (ref: Never 
worked) 
  
Routine and semi-routine 
occupations 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
Lower supervisory and technical -0.002 
(0.010) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
Small employers and own 
account workers 
-0.018 
(0.012) 
-0.023 
(0.016) 
Intermediate occupations -0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
Managerial and professional -0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
Within individual variance 0.015 0.015 
Between individual variance 0.044 0.067 
Between local authority variance 0.0004 0.001 
Occasion, n 13,278 10,672 
Individual, n 8,775 6,642 
Local Authority, n 324 319 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Constant, time fixed effects and LFS question change 
dummy (post-reform model) not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A8.2: relationship between sanctions and anxiety and/or depression (two-level) 
 Model A8.3: 
Pre-reform 
Model A8.4: 
Post-reform 
Sanctions 0.010 
(0.019) 
0.021* 
(0.010) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation   
Quintile 2 0.019 
(0.014) 
-0.013 
(0.026) 
Quintile 3 0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.024) 
Quintile 4 0.017 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.023) 
Quintile 5 0.004 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.023) 
Urban-Rural Classification   
Urban with significant rural -0.0002 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.020) 
Predominantly urban 0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
Age 0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
Female (ref. Male) 0.028*** 
(0.006) 
0.051*** 
(0.008) 
Ethnicity (ref. White)   
Mixed 0.007 
(0.020) 
-0.017 
(0.026) 
Asian or Asian British -0.025* 
(0.011) 
-0.051*** 
(0.015) 
Black or Black British -0.042*** 
(0.011) 
-0.076*** 
(0.015) 
Chinese -0.109* 
(0.043) 
-0.050 
(0.115) 
Other -0.011 
(0.017) 
-0.068** 
(0.024) 
Disability (ref. No disability) 0.228*** 
(0.006) 
0.284*** 
(0.009) 
Qualifications (ref. Higher education)   
A-Level or equivalent 0.002 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.014) 
GCSE or equivalent 0.013 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
Other qualifications 0.006 
(0.009) 
0.022 
(0.014) 
No qualification 0.018 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.014) 
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Don't know 0.016 
(0.025) 
-0.044 
(0.031) 
Partner (ref. No partner) -0.017** 
(0.006) 
-0.027** 
(0.009) 
Dependent children (ref. No 
dependents) 
-0.014* 
(0.006) 
-0.019* 
(0.009) 
Socio-economic status (ref: Never 
worked) 
  
Routine and semi-routine 
occupations 
0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
Lower supervisory and technical -0.005 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.019) 
Small employers and own 
account workers 
-0.019 
(0.014) 
-0.056** 
(0.021) 
Intermediate occupations -0.007 
(0.012) 
-0.030 
(0.016) 
Managerial and professional -0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.024 
(0.015) 
Between individual variance 0.055 0.079 
Between local authority variance 0.0004 0.001 
Individual, n 8,311 5,577 
Local Authority, n 248 191 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Constant, time fixed effects and LFS question change 
dummy (post-reform model) not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A8.2 Logistic regression 
Table A8.3: relationship between sanctions and cardiovascular problems (two-level) 
 Model A8.5: 
Pre-reform 
Model A8.6: 
Post-reform 
Sanctions 0.104 
(0.205) 
0.498* 
(0.228) 
Age 0.177*** 
(0.025) 
0.138*** 
(0.026) 
Female (ref: Male) 0.469*** 
(0.092) 
0.635*** 
(0.095) 
Ethnicity (ref: White)   
Mixed 0.137 
(0.313) 
-0.270 
(0.367) 
Asian or Asian British -0.519* 
(0.218) 
-0.836*** 
(0.220) 
Black or Black British -1.142*** 
(0.280) 
-1.597*** 
(0.315) 
Chinese -10.423 
(78.841) 
-13.522 
(858.781) 
Other -0.217 
(0.313) 
-1.112** 
(0.386) 
Disability (ref: No disability) 3.253*** 
(0.121) 
3.277*** 
(0.128) 
Qualifications (ref: Higher education)   
A-Level or equivalent 0.020 
(0.173) 
0.222 
(0.178) 
GCSE or equivalent 0.237 
(0.158) 
0.051 
(0.163) 
Other qualifications 0.177 
(0.172) 
0.390* 
(0.173) 
No qualification 0.252 
(0.166) 
0.050 
(0.171) 
Don't know 0.090 
(0.461) 
-0.572 
(0.494) 
Partner (ref. No partner) -0.373*** 
(0.115) 
-0.425*** 
(0.116) 
Dependent children (ref. No 
dependents) 
-0.315** 
(0.111) 
-0.163 
(0.116) 
Socio-economic status (ref: Never 
worked) 
  
Routine and semi-routine 
occupations 
0.069 
(0.106) 
-0.130 
(0.111) 
Lower supervisory and technical -0.181 
(0.231) 
-0.022 
(0.219) 
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Small employers and own 
account workers 
-0.552* 
(0.267) 
-0.521* 
(0.260) 
Intermediate occupations -0.134 
(0.217) 
-0.478* 
(0.221) 
Managerial and professional -0.133 
(0.173) 
-0.389* 
(0.197) 
Between local authority variance 0.113 0.271 
Individual, n 9,831 6,699 
Local Authority, n 293 232 
Note: Table reports coefficients (not odds ratios). Robust standard errors in brackets. Constant 
and LFS question change dummy (post-reform model) not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001 
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A8.3 Falsification test 
Table A8.4: relationship between sanctions and cardiovascular problems (two-level) 
 Model A8.7: 
Pre-reform 
Model A8.8: 
Post-reform 
Sanctions 0.110 
(0.080) 
0.002 
(0.089) 
Age -0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
Female (ref: Male) -0.010* 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
Ethnicity (ref: White)   
Mixed -0.023 
(0.019) 
0.031 
(0.023) 
Asian or Asian British 0.037*** 
(0.010) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
Black or Black British 0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
Chinese -0.065 
(0.043) 
0.128 
(0.102) 
Other 0.012 
(0.016) 
0.038 
(0.020) 
Disability (ref: No disability) 0.160*** 
(0.006) 
0.139*** 
(0.007) 
Qualifications (ref: Higher education)   
A-Level or equivalent 0.003 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
GCSE or equivalent 0.017* 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
Other qualifications 0.009 
(0.009) 
0.026 
(0.011) 
No qualification 0.006 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
Don't know -0.002 
(0.022) 
-0.030 
(0.024) 
Partner (ref. No partner) 0.007 
(0.006) 
0.020** 
(0.008) 
Dependent children (ref. No 
dependents) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
Socio-economic status (ref: Never 
worked) 
  
Routine and semi-routine 
occupations 
0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.020** 
(0.007) 
Lower supervisory and technical 0.008 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
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Small employers and own 
account workers 
0.016 
(0.013) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
Intermediate occupations 0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
Managerial and professional -0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.040*** 
(0.012) 
Between individual variance 0.055 0.062 
Between local authority variance 0.001   0.001 
Individual, n 9,831 6,699 
Local Authority, n 293 232 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Constant and LFS question change dummy (post-
reform model) not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A9.2 Difference-in-differences regression models 
Table A9.2: estimated intervention effect on the self-reported mental health of JSA claimants 
 
Model A9.1: 
JSA 
claimants 
(NI) 
Model 
A9.2: WTC 
claimants 
Model A9.3: 
Self-
employed 
WTC 
claimants 
Model A9.4: 
Unemployed 
(non-JSA 
claimants) 
Treat*Post 0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.017* 
(0.008) 
0.019* 
(0.009) 
0.033*** 
(0.010) 
Treat (ref: Control) 
0.054* 
(0.026) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
Post (ref: Pre) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.020*** 
(0.006) 
Constant 
0.015 
(0.017) 
0.027* 
(0.013) 
0.051* 
(0.024) 
0.058** 
(0.022) 
Female (ref: Male) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.002) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
Age 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.00003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
Ethnicity (ref: White)     
Mixed 
-0.021* 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.018** 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.028) 
Asian or Asian British 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
Black or Black 
British 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.013* 
(0.006) 
Chinese 
0.108 
(0.130) 
0.014 
(0.024) 
0.057 
(0.068) 
0.028 
(0.037) 
Other ethnic group 
0.013 
(0.031) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.027) 
0.029 
(0.024) 
Qualifications (ref: No 
qualifications) 
    
GCSE or equivalent 
-0.014 
(0.013) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
A-Level or 
equivalent 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
0.0003 
(0.006) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
Higher education 
-0.019 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
Other qualifications 
0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
Disability (ref: No disability) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
Marital status (ref: single)     
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Married 
0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
Divorced 
0.026 
(0.066) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.029) 
-0.004 
(0.027) 
Widowed 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.022* 
(0.010) 
Dependents (ref: No 
dependents) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
NS-SEC (ref: Never worked)     
Routine and semi-
routine occupations 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
Lower supervisory 
and technical 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.017 
(0.011) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
Small employers and 
own account 
workers 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.013 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
Intermediate 
occupations 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
-0.014* 
(0.007) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
Managerial 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.014* 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
R2 0.021 0.008 0.018 0.017 
N 1,842 9,423 2,711 3,728 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Region of residence not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
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A9.3 Logistic regression 
As a sensitivity check, Table A9.3 re-runs the results discussed in Models 9.1-9.3 
using logistic regression. Since the control group of JSA claimants in Northern 
Ireland did not see any worsening in mental health in either period, difference-
in-differences models using this control group cannot be estimated with logistic 
regression due to perfect collinearity with the dependent variable.  
Table A9.3: estimated intervention effect on the self-reported mental health of JSA claimants 
Comparison Group 
Model(s) A9.5: 
No covariates 
Model(s) A9.6: 
Covariates 
Model(s) 
A9.7: 
Matching 
JSA claimants (NI) - - - 
WTC claimants 
1.087* 
(0.446) 
1.106* 
(0.456) 
1.352* 
(0.648) 
Self-employed WTC claimants 
1.325 
(0.923) 
1.272 
(0.944) 
1.091 
(0.923) 
Unemployed (non-JSA 
claimants) 
2.036*** 
(0.590) 
2.067*** 
(0.606) 
2.074*** 
(0.574) 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Covariates: gender; age; ethnicity; qualification level; 
disability; marital status; dependent children; socio-economic status and region of residence. * p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A9.4 Falsification test 
Table A9.4: summary of ‘worsening’ mental health for JSA treatment group and comparison 
groups 
 
Pre-intervention (less strict 
sanctioning) 
Post-intervention (harsher 
sanctioning) 
 Maintained Worsened Maintained Worsened 
Treatment group:     
JSA claimants 862 22 767 14 
Control groups:     
JSA claimants (NI) 55 0 58 0 
WTC claimants 4,112 57 3,294 35 
Self-employed WTC 
claimants 
508 4 422 7 
Unemployed  
(non-JSA claimants) 
1,066 17 900 7 
Note: table reports unweighted sample Ns 
 
Table A9.5: estimated intervention effect on the self-reported cardiovascular health of JSA 
claimants 
Comparison Group 
Model(s) A9.8: 
No covariates 
Model(s) A9.9: 
Covariates 
Model(s) 
A9.10: 
Matching 
JSA claimants (NI) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.027) 
WTC claimants 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
Self-employed WTC 
claimants 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.016 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
Unemployed (non-JSA 
claimants) 
0.0002 
(0.007) 
0.0003 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Covariates: gender; age; ethnicity; qualification level; 
disability; marital status; dependent children; socio-economic status and region of residence. * p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A9.5 Placebo test 
Table A9.6: two-quarter longitudinal LFS datasets used in the difference-in-differences analysis 
 Quarter 1 Quarter 2 
Dataset 1 July-September 2005 October-December 2005 
Dataset 2 July-September 2006 October-December 2006 
 
Table A9.7: summary of ‘worsening’ mental health for JSA treatment group and comparison 
groups 
 ‘Pre-intervention’ ‘Post-intervention’ 
 Maintained Worsened Maintained Worsened 
Treatment group:     
JSA claimants 549 7 615 8 
Control groups:     
JSA claimants (NI) 43 0 33 0 
WTC claimants - - - - 
Self-employed WTC 
claimants 
- - - - 
Unemployed  
(non-JSA claimants) 
1,046 7 1,121 10 
Note: table reports unweighted sample Ns 
 
Table A9.8: estimated intervention effect on the self-reported mental health of JSA claimants 
Comparison Group 
Model(s) A9.11: 
No covariates 
Model(s) A9.12: 
Covariates 
Model(s) 
A9.13: 
Matching 
JSA claimants (NI) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.019) 
WTC claimants - - - 
Self-employed WTC claimants - - - 
Unemployed (non-JSA 
claimants) 
0.0006 
(0.008) 
-0.0001 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Covariates: gender; age; ethnicity; qualification level; 
disability; marital status; dependent children; socio-economic status and region of residence. * p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
